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1. AIM has established itself as the world’s leading stock 
market for young, growing companies, although 
competition from other exchanges is increasing. Since 
the start of the market in 1995 some 2,00 British and 
400 foreign companies have come to AIM, raising a total 
of £49bn; during this period some 1,000 companies 
have left the market for a variety of reasons (including 
transfers to the London Stock Exchange’s Main 
Market), leaving the present total of just over 1,600.
2. The competitive strength of AIM lies partly in its 
location within the City of London financial services 
cluster, partly in a distinctive regulatory system which 
is tailored to the needs of smaller companies. 
3. The amount of capital raised on AIM has increased sharply 
in the last few years, rising from £2bn in 200 to £4.7bn 
in 2004, £8.9bn in 2005 and £15.7bn in 2006. Much of 
the increase in the last three years has come from foreign 
companies. However, AIM continues to provide vital 
support for the UK’s small and medium-sized enterprise 
sector, including companies based in the regions. 
4. The London Stock Exchange has a vital stake, not 
only in the continuing vitality of AIM, but also in 
ensuring that it is regulated in a way that preserves the 
integrity of the market without stifling innovation. 
5. The internationalisation of AIM, which has taken 
place mainly since 2002, and the recent entry of 
property and equity investment entities, has not 
undermined the Nominated Adviser (Nomad) system, 
which is one of the key differentiators between AIM 
and the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market, 
but it has prompted the Exchange to formalise and 
tighten some of the regulatory arrangements. 
6. Although a large proportion of AIM companies are 
early-stage businesses and/or operating in high-
risk sectors, the failure rate on AIM is low, running 
at less than three per cent in the last four years. 
7. With an average monthly trading volume of just over 20m 
shares, liquidity in the shares of the larger AIM companies 
is comparable to that of similar-sized companies on the 
Main Market; the introduction of the new trading system, 
SETSmm, succeeded in its purpose of increasing liquidity 
and reducing spreads on the largest stocks. Smaller 
AIM companies traded on the SEAQ system have an 
average monthly trading volume of about 6.4m shares. 
8. As many venture capital firms now focus on 
larger and later-stage transactions, AIM has 
become more important as a source of funding 
for early-stage high-technology companies. 
9. AIM has matured since the collapse of the dot.com boom 
in 2000-2001, and now attracts a wide range of investors, 
including some of the world’s leading institutions. There 
is a need to attract more investment from the countries 
in which non-British AIM companies are based.
10. AIM still acts as a feeder to the Main Market, but this 
is not its primary role. It is complementary to the Main 
Market, allowing some companies to achieve their 
growth objectives without having to move from AIM.
11. AIM has become an important part of the capital-
raising options that the City of London offers, as well as 
enhancing the range of investment opportunities that can 
be accessed through London. It has also strengthened 
the City’s links with emerging markets. The income 
generated by AIM in the form of fees and other payments 
is estimated to be running at around £1bn a year, of 
which about half comes from non-British companies. 
Principal Findings
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51. Introduction
London’s ‘junior’ stock market, launched in 1995 as the 
Alternative Investment Market and now generally referred to as 
AIM, has developed over the last twelve years into a significant 
player on the world financial scene. Although its largest 
constituency remains that for which it was originally designed, 
small and medium-sized British companies seeking equity 
capital for expansion, it has also attracted, principally since 
2002, a growing number of foreign companies in a variety of 
sectors. The non-British element (taking into account both AIM 
companies that are domiciled outside the UK and those foreign 
entities which operate through UK-registered companies) now 
accounts for about half of AIM’s total market capitalisation. 
For companies which are looking to raise relatively small 
amounts of capital, from £10m upwards, principally from 
well-informed institutional investors, and at the same time 
to acquire a degree of international visibility, AIM provides a 
platform which at present is not matched anywhere else in the 
world. Thanks partly to its distinctive approach to regulation 
and partly to the fact that it is embedded in the cluster of skills, 
experience and resources which has been built up in the City 
over many years, AIM has acquired a scale and a momentum 
which may be difficult for other exchanges to match. 
The change in the character of AIM, involving a large 
number of foreign companies and, more recently, the 
entry of property funds and equity investment entities, has 
necessitated some tightening of the regulatory system, 
but the key feature of the system – the delegation of 
responsibility to Nominated Advisers (Nomads) for assessing 
the suitability of AIM entrants – has remained intact.
2. The evolution of AIM
The creation of AIM in 1995 followed a debate in the City 
about how best the Stock Exchange could improve its services 
to small and medium-sized British companies. The regulation 
and governance of AIM were designed in a way that clearly 
differentiated it from the Main Market and was tailored to the 
needs of smaller companies; some of the early entrants to AIM 
had previously been traded on the over-the-counter market.
AIM was caught up in the dot.com boom of the late 1990s, 
but it was less dependent on technology stocks than the 
new European growth markets, such as EASDAQ in Brussels 
and the Neuer Markt in Frankfurt, which were set up during 
this period. Hence AIM survived the stock market crash in 
2000-2001 in much better shape than these other markets.
From 2002 AIM began to target overseas companies more 
actively, concentrating first on Commonwealth countries such 
as Australia and Canada; a growing number of mining and 
other resource-based companies came to AIM from these 
countries, often via dual listings with their home exchange. 
AIM’s international reach was subsequently extended to 
American and other non-British companies outside the 
resources sector. Part of the reason why US companies came to 
AIM was that it provided a cheaper and less complex means of 
raising relatively small amounts of capital than US exchanges.
Since 2005, partly because of the influx of foreign companies, 
the average market capitalisation of AIM constituents has 
increased, as has the average size of Initial Public Offerings. 
Another factor has been the entry of property funds and 
equity investment entities, some of which focus on investment 
opportunities in emerging markets. However, the inflow of 
small and medium-sized British companies has continued. 
3. Regulation
AIM is an exchange-regulated market run by the London Stock 
Exchange, which in turn is regulated by the UK Financial Services 
Authority. Under provisions of EU law due to be implemented 
in November 2007 AIM’s regulatory status will change to being 
a multi-lateral trading facility operated by the Exchange. There 
may be further changes in AIM’s regulatory regime consequent 
on developments in EU law, currently under discussion.
AIM’s regulatory system relies heavily on Nomads (Nominated 
Advisers). Nomads are unique to AIM. Their role is quite distinct 
from that of sponsors to the Main Market and the regulatory 
regime which applies to them is more onerous. Changes in 
the composition of AIM and the increase in the size of the 
market have caused the Exchange to review AIM’s regulatory 
regime. The AIM rules have recently been reorganised into two 
new rulebooks: Rules for Nomads and Rules for Companies. 
The new rulebooks formalize and clarify the respective 
obligations of issuers and Nomads. In addition, the resourcing 
of AIM’s regulatory functions has increased significantly and 
a new system for monitoring Nomads is being introduced. 
4. The companies
Most companies that come to AIM, whether British 
or non-British, are small businesses that are ambitious 
to grow. The attraction of AIM is that it enables them 
to raise relatively small amounts of capital – from 
£10m upwards – from knowledgeable, predominantly 
institutional investors which are likely, if the business fulfils 
its promise, to support further fund-raising rounds.
Executive Summary
6The British contingent on AIM falls into two main categories. 
The first is made up of companies that are profitable when 
they come to AIM and generally operate in stable industries; 
they use AIM to fund their expansion, often by means of 
acquisition. Some of these companies subsequently transfer 
to the Main Market, but many of them are able to achieve 
their growth objectives without moving from AIM.
In the second category are early-stage companies for 
which AIM provides an alternative to, or complement for, 
venture capital. They include high-technology businesses 
which may be some way from profitability when they 
come to AIM and have few if any products on the market. 
They attract investors which specialise in this type of 
business, and, if their product development efforts bear 
fruit, they use AIM to progress to the next stage of their 
growth, when they become either free-standing, profit-
making companies or candidates for a trade sale. 
Within the foreign contingent, the largest group consists of 
mining, oil and gas, and other resource-based companies 
which are attracted to AIM partly because of London’s long-
established reputation as a repository of investment expertise in 
these industries. For Canadian or Australian companies which 
may be dual-listed with their home exchanges, AIM provides 
an additional fund-raising vehicle, and the opportunity to 
join the Main Market when they reach an appropriate size.
Outside the resources sector, non-British companies that come 
to AIM are looking partly to raise equity capital, which may 
be difficult or impossible in their home country, and partly 
to increase their international visibility. The latter applies 
particularly to technology companies which are seeking to 
compete in the world market. There are some specific sectors, 
such as renewable energy, where AIM has become the 
stock market of choice for would-be international players.
Some of the small American high-technology companies 
that come to AIM do so because it is difficult and expensive 
for them to raise capital on the public markets in the US; 
the average market value of new entrants on NASDAQ 
is significantly higher than on AIM. This is also true of 
companies based in other countries (such as Israel), which 
might in the past have considered a listing on NASDAQ. 
The newest element on AIM, which has become prominent 
since 2005, consists of property funds and equity investment 
entities which invite investors to back, not individual 
companies, but management teams with expertise in particular 
sectors or regions – real estate in India, for example, or 
manufacturing in Vietnam. The presence of these entities 
has extended AIM’s reach into emerging markets.
The largest companies in all these categories have the 
option of moving to the Main Market when their market 
value reaches around £500m (this figure is a guide, not a 
requirement laid down by the Stock Exchange), and some 
of them do so; nine companies have moved to the Main 
Market so far in 2007. But there has been a flow in the 
reverse direction, as smaller companies listed on the Main 
Market see advantages in moving to a market in which they 
have greater visibility. AIM has become a market in its own 
right, and is no longer simply a feeder to the Main Market. 
5. Investors in AIM 
When AIM was started in 1995, investment in the new 
market was stimulated by a range of tax incentives, 
designed to encourage UK private investors to put money 
into small, growing businesses. The incentives included 
exemption from inheritance tax for investors who held 
shares in qualifying companies for at least two years. There 
were also two new schemes – the Enterprise Investment 
Scheme and Venture Capital Trusts – which provided relief 
of income and capital gains tax for investors in unlisted 
companies, a category that included AIM companies. 
These incentives were put to good use by the investment 
bankers and brokers which specialised in smaller companies. 
As the market matured during and after the dot.com boom, 
and as investment opportunities on AIM widened, mainstream 
investing institutions became more actively involved in AIM. 
Institutions are now thought to own about half of the shares 
in all AIM companies, and they account for a larger proportion 
– probably at least 75 per cent – of the new money raised 
through Initial Public Offerings and secondary equity issues. 
The majority though not unanimous view among investors 
is that the quality of the market has been improved by the 
inclusion of more foreign companies and the new investment 
entities. However, there is some concern that in the last two 
years Nomads and brokers may have put too much emphasis 
on securing IPOs and not enough on nurturing companies 
after the flotation. Several initiatives have recently been 
launched that may lead to greater pressure being brought 
to bear by investors on under-performing AIM companies. 
6. The quality of the market
Although many AIM companies are early-stage business 
and/or operating in high-risk industries, the failure rate on 
AIM is low – averaging less than three per cent in the last four 
7years. Failures are treated as companies going into liquidation, 
or being delisted because of a failure to comply with the 
AIM rules or delisting without giving any other reason. 
Liquidity among AIM stocks varies widely; stocks with 
the highest capitalisation and the largest free float show 
liquidity levels that are comparable to the Main Market, 
but at the lower end of the market there is a large number 
of illiquid stocks. AIM has sought to improve the liquidity 
of the market by providing different trading platforms 
for different types of stock. The volatility of AIM is not 
significantly different from that of other markets. 
The FTSE AIM Index over the whole period from 1997 to 
2007 has shown an annualised return of only one per cent 
per annum, but this figure is distorted by the effects of the 
dot.com boom and bust, producing a very big rise in the 
index in 1999 and a sharp correction in 2001 and 2002. The 
newer AIM indices, the FTSE AIM 100 and the FTSE AIM 50, 
which were introduced in 2005, have produced annualised 
returns of three per cent and six per cent respectively. An 
analysis of the after-market returns on new listings since 
2000 – focusing on the 6 months following the IPO – shows 
that investors, on average, have made healthy gains. 
Over the whole period from 1995 to the end of June 2007 
AIM companies have raised £28bn through IPOs and £21bn 
through further equity issues. Some 75 per cent of the total 
capital raised has been raised in the years from 2004 to 2007. 
7. AIM and the UK economy 
Since the 1980s successive British governments have 
sought to improve the ability of small and medium-sized 
companies to access external sources of capital, especially 
equity capital. Much of this effort has been directed at 
business angels and venture capitalists – providers of 
funds that companies can tap into before they consider a 
public flotation. But governments have also encouraged 
the London Stock Exchange to improve its facilities for 
smaller companies – hence their support for the Unlisted 
Securities Market in the 1980s and for AIM in the 1990s. 
AIM plays an essential role in the provision of finance for 
growing British companies. Although most of AIM’s institutional 
investors have their headquarters in London, there is a sizeable 
regional dimension among Nomads and brokers, and many 
of them have close links to regional venture capital funds. 
As many of Britain’s leading venture capital firms have shifted 
their attention in recent years from start-ups and early-
stage businesses to larger and later-stage deals, including 
management buy-outs, AIM has become more important 
as a source of finance for high-technology entrepreneurs. In 
the case of biotechnology – an industry which has developed 
more rapidly in the UK than in other European countries – AIM 
now accommodates some 50 companies, many of which are 
loss-making and do not yet have products on the market. 
Although the failure rate among these companies is inevitably 
higher than in more predictable sectors, there have been 
some notable successes among AIM-quoted biotechnology 
companies. AIM plays a valuable role in sustaining this industry. 
8. AIM and the City of London 
The growth of AIM, especially in the period since 2002, has 
widened the capital-raising opportunities that the City of 
London provides, and has enhanced the position of the London 
Stock Exchange in what has become an increasingly fierce 
struggle for leadership among the world’s principal stock 
exchanges. To some extent the gains made by London have 
been at the expense of New York, and reflect the development 
in Britain, since the late 1990s, of a regulatory system which 
is less prescriptive than that of the US. For issuers of securities 
and for investors London now offers an ‘a la carte’ menu of 
options – including AIM – which suit a variety of needs. 
AIM has been valuable in linking the London capital market to 
fast-growing emerging markets such as India, China and Russia. 
Although London has long been an international financial 
centre, AIM has proved to be a useful capital-raising vehicle for 
companies based in countries whose stock markets are under-
developed or poorly equipped to serve smaller enterprises. 
AIM has also provided a considerable boost for those London-
based investment banks and brokers which specialise in 
small-capitalisation stocks. As AIM’s international scope 
has increased, these firms have also pushed overseas, often 
acquiring or forming partnerships with local brokers; thus 
AIM has contributed to the internationalisation of a part of 
the financial community that had traditionally been geared 
to domestic clients. The income generated by AIM, taking 
into account fees arising from IPOs and further equity issues, 
together with payments made to accountants, lawyers and 
other advisers, is estimated to be running at about £1bn a 
year, of which about half comes from non-British companies. 
9. AIM and its competitors
AIM was the only ‘junior’ market left standing in Europe 
after the stock market collapse of 2000-2001, and it was 
able to take advantage of the demise of its competitors by 
attracting more international companies. Since 2005, however, 
competition has been increasing, in the UK and overseas.
The main competition in the UK comes from what used 
to be called Ofex, but is now part of the PLUS Markets 
Group. So far most new issues on PLUS have been in 
smaller amounts than are commonly raised on AIM, but 
PLUS is supported by several of the investment banks and 
brokers that are also active on AIM, and it could become 
a significant competitor at the lower end of the market.
Outside the UK, there are numerous ‘junior’ markets – for 
example, TSX Ventures in Toronto and the Growth Enterprise 
Market in Hong Kong – which are primarily geared to 
companies based in their country or region, but also offer 
internationally-minded companies an alternative to AIM. In 
the next few years the main competition to AIM is likely to 
come from the two-recently established markets in Europe 
– Alternext in Paris (part of the NYSE Euronext group) 
and the Entry Standard segment of the Deutsche Börse in 
Frankfurt. Both these markets have international ambitions, 
but the momentum which AIM has established, and the 
network effects from which it benefits as part of the City 
of London, constitute a powerful competitive advantage. 
There is also the possibility, in the longer term, of stronger 
competition from the US. Most of the American companies 
that come to AIM are too small to be listed on NASDAQ or 
the New York Stock Exchange. But there is concern in the 
US about the lack of public market capital-raising options 
for smaller companies, and several ideas have been put 
forward for filling the gap. Any relaxations that may be made 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory framework could increase 
the attractiveness of US markets for foreign issuers. 
10. The future of AIM 
A key question for AIM and for its owner, the London Stock 
Exchange, is how far it should continue to be a ‘broad church’, 
accommodating both very small companies with a market value 
of less than £10m and larger companies valued at well over 
£100m. The average market capitalisation of AIM companies 
has increased in recent years, and this has highlighted the ‘long 
tail’ of small and relatively illiquid shares at the lower end. 
But if AIM were to focus on larger companies, the distinction 
between it and the Main Market would become blurred. 
AIM seems likely to hold to its original mission as a market 
for growing companies, but to do so in a way which puts 
greater stress on the quality of new entrants. This implies 
continuing pressure on Nomads to apply a stringent 
approach when they assess the suitability of potential AIM 
companies, and to ensure that that Nomads carry out their 
responsibilities after flotation as rigorously as possible. 
The evolution of AIM has been a market-driven process, 
and the market will continue to develop in response to the 
changing demands of issuers and investors. The regulatory 
arrangements will also need to evolve, as has happened 
over the last three years. This is likely to take the form of 
incremental adaptation, rather than radical reform of a 
distinctive system which has proved to be effective, and which 
has underpinned a notable success for the City of London. 
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9London’s ‘junior’ stock market, 
launched in 1995 as the Alternative 
Investment Market and now usually 
referred to as AIM, has developed 
over the last twelve years into a 
significant player on the world 
financial scene. Although its largest 
constituency remains that for 
which it was originally designed, 
small and medium-sized British 
companies seeking equity capital 
for expansion, it has also attracted 
a growing number of foreign 
companies (Table 1.1). AIM now 
comprises over 1600 companies 
with a total market capitalisation of 
more than £100bn, of which about 
half is accounted for by companies 
that are either domiciled overseas 
or have their principal operations 
outside the UK. In June 2007 there 
were more companies traded on AIM 
(1,656) than on the London Stock 
Exchange’s Main Market (1590). 
The increasing size of AIM and the 
changes in its composition have had 
three important consequences.
First, AIM is now an established part of 
the menu of capital-raising options which 
the City of London offers to British and 
non-British companies. For companies 
which are looking to raise relatively 
small amounts of capital, from £10m 
upwards, principally from well-informed 
institutional investors, and at the same 
time to acquire a degree of international 
visibility, AIM provides a platform which 
at present is not matched anywhere 
else in the world. Thanks partly to its 
distinctive approach to regulation and 
partly to the fact that it is embedded 
in the cluster of skills, experience and 
resources which has been built up in the 
City over many years, AIM has acquired 
a scale and a momentum which may be 
difficult for other exchanges to match. 
Second, the evolution of AIM from its 
modest beginnings in 1995 has obliged 
its owner, the London Stock Exchange, 
to adapt and in some respects to tighten 
a regulatory regime that was designed 
for a simpler and more homogeneous 
market. As an exchange-regulated 
market, AIM is not directly supervised 
by the Financial Services Authority, but 
falls under the responsibility of the Stock 
Exchange. The Exchange has a vital stake, 
not only in the continuing vitality of AIM, 
but also in ensuring that it is regulated 
in a way that preserves the integrity of 
the market without stifling innovation. 
The reputation of the Exchange, and of 
the City of London, would be seriously 
damaged if AIM was to become 
tainted by scandal or malpractice.
Third, the success of AIM has prompted 
imitation, envy and criticism from 
around the world. Several of the big 
national exchanges, such as Toronto 
and Tokyo, have ‘junior’ markets aimed 
at small and medium-sized companies, 
but flotations on these markets have 
come largely from domestic companies; 
AIM is the only one with a substantial 
international component. However, 
1
Introduction
Number of companies Market value 
(£m)
UK International Total
19/06/95 10 0 10 82.2
1995 118  121 2,82.4
1996 25 17 252 5,298.5
1997 286 22 08 5,655.1
1998 291 21 12 4,47.9
1999 25 22 47 1,468.5
2000 49 1 524 14,95.2
2001 587 42 69 11,607.2
2002 654 50 704 10,252.
200 694 60 754 18,58.5
2004 905 116 1,021 1,75.4
2005 1,179 220 1,99 59,618.5
2006 1,0 04 1,64 94,64.0
2007 to June 1,7 19 1,656 107,55.6
Table 1.1 Growth of AIM since 1995
Source: London Stock Exchange: AIM statistics
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since 2005 AIM has faced two new 
European competitors, Alternext in 
Paris (part of the Euronext group of 
stock exchanges, which merged with 
the New York Stock Exchange in 2006) 
and the Entry Standard segment of the 
Deutsche Börse in Frankfurt. Both these 
markets, which were partially modelled 
on AIM, have international ambitions.
Most of the criticism of AIM has come 
from the US. Two senior officials from 
the New York Stock Exchange and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
have claimed that AIM is too lightly 
regulated, exposing investors to serious 
risk.1 AIM has a regulatory system that 
is specifically tailored for the needs for 
small, growing companies, and the rules 
are in some respects less onerous than 
those of exchanges which cater for larger 
and more established companies. But 
the evidence presented in this report 
indicates that the system is working well 
both for investors and for the companies 
whose shares are traded on AIM. 
The criticism of AIM comes at a 
time when the world’s leading stock 
exchanges are jockeying for position 
in what appears to be a consolidating 
industry. Apart from the merger 
between Euronext and the New York 
Stock Exchange, NASDAQ made an 
unsuccessful bid for the London Stock 
Exchange early in 2007; it subsequently 
announced plans to acquired the Nordic
stock exchange, OMX. The London 
Stock Exchange is merging with the 
principal Italian exchange, Borsa Italiana. 
The report is organised as follows. 
Section 2 provides the historical 
background, covering the debate in the 
City that led to the creation of AIM in the 
early 1990s, the impact of the dot.com 
boom in the latter part of the decade, 
and the subsequent internationalisation 
of AIM. Section  reviews AIM’s 
regulatory arrangements. The remaining 
sections deal with: why companies 
come to AIM and what they get out of it 
(Section 4); investors in AIM (Section 5); 
the quality of the market (Section 6); AIM 
and the UK economy (Section 7); AIM’s 
role within the City of London (Section 
8); AIM and its competitors (Section 9); 
and the future of AIM (Section 10). 
1 John Thain, chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange, was quoted as saying at the World Economic Forum in January 2007 that AIM lacked stringent corporate 
governance standards. The London Stock Exchange, he said ‘did not have any standards at all (on AIM) and anyone could list’ (Financial Times, 27 January 2007). Roel 
Campos, a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, was quoted on a Dow Jones newswire in March 2007 as deploring the trend whereby companies 
simply chose their listing venue based on the lowest level of oversight available. Referring to AIM, he said: ‘I’m concerned that 0 per cent of issuers that list on AIM 
are gone in a year. That feels like a casino to me, and I believe investors will treat it as such’. Mr Campos subsequently said that his remarks had been taken out of 
context and that he did not regard AIM as a casino. ‘What I was referring to’, he said, ‘was a generalised situation in which if (regulatory) standards are ignored and 
you have a spiral downward you could get into a situation where an exchange could be nothing more than a casino’ (Financial Times, 8 March 2007).
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Origins and early growth
The origins of AIM can be traced 
back to the long-standing debate, 
starting with the report of the 
Macmillan Committee in 1931, about 
deficiencies in the supply of capital, 
especially equity capital, to smaller 
British businesses. This debate 
continued after the second world 
war, and the British clearing banks 
were persuaded by the government 
to set up a new institution, the 
Industrial Commercial and Financial 
Corporation (later re-named 
Investors In Industry, now 3i), which 
was designed to fill the so-called 
equity gap. But while the ICFC and 
other private-sector initiatives were 
helpful, small firms found it hard 
to get access to public markets and 
thus to a wider pool of investors. 
The regional stock exchanges, 
which had handled numerous small 
company flotations in the inter-
war years, declined in importance 
during the early post-war decades; 
they were integrated into the 
London Stock Exchange in 1973.
The financing difficulties facing small 
firms were partly a reflection of a weak 
economy and a tax system which did 
not encourage investment in equities; 
new issues on the London Stock 
Exchange fell to very low levels in the 
1970s. But there was also seen to be 
an institutional weakness, especially 
in comparison with the US, where the 
NASDAQ exchange, created out of the 
informal over-the-counter market in 
1971, had attracted listings from small, 
fast-growing companies which found its 
trading rules more flexible than those 
of the long-established New York Stock 
Exchange. The dearth of such companies 
in the UK, and in Europe as a whole, 
was highlighted in 1977 by an influential 
report from the US consultants, Arthur D. 
Little; a European equivalent to NASDAQ, 
the consultants said, was badly needed.2 
The Stock Exchange had been passive 
in this area – as the regulator of the 
securities industry it took a cautious line 
on what sorts of company should be 
listed – but it came under pressure in 
the second half of the 1970s to improve 
its services to small firms. The Exchange 
was facing competition from an over-
the-counter market through which non-
members of the Exchange could trade 
in shares of companies that were too 
small for the Official List. There was a 
special Stock Exchange rule (rule 16.2, 
later rule 55.2) whereby Exchange 
members could trade in such shares on 
a matched bargain basis, but it was an 
unsatisfactory arrangement because 
the Exchange had little supervision over 
the securities being traded. ‘Either it 
had to reject these companies, further 
stimulating the OTC markets made by 
non-members, or it had to create a 
market where these securities could be 
traded which would not jeopardise the 
reputation of the Stock Exchange’.
In 1980, following recommendations 
from the Wilson Committee, which had 
been set up by the Labour government 
to review the functioning of financial 
institutions, the Exchange introduced the 
Unlisted Securities Market (USM). The 
rules for admission to the USM were less 
stringent than for the Official List, and 
the costs of flotation were lower. Only 
ten per cent of the company’s equity had 
to be offered to the public, compared to 
25 per cent for a full listing, and only a 
three-year trading record was required, 
against five years on the Official List. 
Between 1980 and the end of 1987 
just over 600 companies were admitted 
to the USM, of which 108 were later 
transferred to the Official List. This was 
part of a general revival in the new issue 
market after the depressed conditions of 
the 1970s, but it also reflected a greater 
willingness on the part of investors 
to take the risk of buying shares in 
unproven businesses. The USM was 
welcomed by the new Conservative 
government under Margaret Thatcher. 
The promotion of enterprise was 
a central part of the government’s 
economic strategy, and several schemes 
were introduced to encourage new 
business formation; these included the 
Business Start-up Scheme, later renamed 
the Business Expansion Scheme, which 
gave tax incentives for investment in 
start-up businesses. The venture capital 
industry grew rapidly during the 1980s, 
and the USM provided an additional 
exit route for investors who had 
nurtured a business in its earlier years. 
The existence of the USM did not lead 
to the demise of the over-the-counter 
market. Unlike USM shares, shares 
traded on this market were treated by 
the tax authorities as unquoted and 
investment in them qualified for tax 
relief under the Business Expansion 
Scheme. The growth of the OTC led 
the Exchange in 1987 to introduce the 
Third Market, which enjoyed the same 
tax status as the OTC; Third Market 
companies did not have to have their 
prospectuses vetted by the Exchange’s 
quotations department before flotation.4 
However, Stock Exchange member firms 
continued to make use of Rule 55.2 
to trade shares in unquoted companies 
which were unable or unwilling to 
join the USM or the Third Market. 
2
The evolution of AIM
2 Arthur D. Little, New technology-based firms in the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany: a report for the Anglo-German Foundation, London 1977.
 Ranald Michie, The London Stock Exchange, a history, Oxford 1999, p572.
4  Roger Buckland and Edward W. Davis, The unlisted securities market, Oxford 1989, p1.
12
The growth of the USM was halted by 
the worldwide stock market decline 
in 1987, and this was followed in the 
early 1990s by a serious recession in 
Britain. The number of new issues, on 
the Official List as well as the USM, fell 
sharply. In 1991 only £11.6m of new 
capital was raised on the USM, compared 
with £08m in 1988. The attractions 
of the USM were also reduced by new 
regulations issued by the European 
Commission. The minimum trading 
period for companies on the Official List 
was cut from five years to three, and on 
the USM from three years to two. Given 
the greater prestige and visibility of the 
Official List, most companies that might 
have contemplated going to the USM 
preferred to wait another year so that 
they could qualify for the main market. 
Another factor was the decision by the 
Exchange in 1991 (at the request of the 
venture capital community) to relax its 
entry requirements on the Official List 
for biotechnology companies; they were 
allowed, subject to certain conditions, 
to come to the market without the 
normally mandatory trading record. 
Having already merged the Third 
Market into the USM in 1990, the Stock 
Exchange announced in 199 that it 
would close the USM itself, and that 
USM companies which were qualified 
to do so should transfer to the Official 
List. The Exchange was also obliged, 
under European Union regulations, to 
close down the Rule 55.2 facility. 
The prospective disappearance of capital-
raising facilities for smaller companies 
prompted protests from the investment 
banks and brokers which specialised 
in this end of the market. Conservative 
ministers also expressed their concern, 
as did the venture capitalists. The 
response from the Exchange was 
to introduce a new market within 
the Exchange – to be known as the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
– which would cater for Rule 55.2 
companies and for other small firms 
which did not qualify for the Official List.
The Exchange did not see AIM as a 
British equivalent to NASDAQ, and it 
was not specifically targeted at high-
technology companies. Some venture 
capitalists, led by Ronald Cohen of 
Apax Partners, favoured the creation 
of a specialist market which would be 
organised on a European basis and 
be independent of the national stock 
exchanges. In Cohen’s view, a market for 
high-growth entrepreneurial companies 
needed a distinctive management 
and marketing focus. The success of 
NASDAQ, he argued, was due in large 
measure to the fact that it was managed 
independently of the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock 
Exchange;5 a similar market in Europe 
would allow young high-technology 
companies to raise capital locally, instead 
of turning to NASDAQ as a growing 
number of them had been doing. 
This proposal was supported by the 
European Commission, which wanted 
to promote a more integrated European 
financial services market and to 
stimulate the growth of European high-
technology businesses. The Investment 
Services Directive, passed in 199, 
made it possible for a stock exchange 
to be set up in a single country and 
to operate on a pan-European basis. 
By 1994 plans for such an exchange, 
to be called EASDAQ and based in 
Brussels, had been agreed, although 
it would not come into operation 
until 1996, when the Investment 
Services Directive came into effect.6 
Faced with these pressures, the Stock 
Exchange pushed ahead with the 
Alternative Investment Market, planning 
to get it into operation well before 
the start of EASDAQ. The concept of 
AIM was very different from the USM. 
Michael Lawrence, who became chief 
executive of the Stock Exchange in 
1994, believed that AIM should be 
run separately from the Official List, 
with its own management team and 
a distinctive regulatory approach. 
There were sceptics in the City who 
doubted whether the Stock Exchange 
was capable of running two separate 
markets; the conservatism of the 
Quotations Department, in their view, 
had contributed to the failure of the USM 
and the Third Market. But Lawrence 
was determined that the new market 
should have its own identity and be 
regulated in a way that was appropriate 
for smaller companies; it should also 
serve a wide range of business sectors.
What form the regulation should take 
was the subject of much debate in the 
Stock Exchange, with some arguing that, 
if it was too ‘light touch’, there was a 
danger of scandals which would damage 
the reputation of the Exchange. The 
outcome was a set of rules which was 
less prescriptive than on the Official List – 
no requirement for a trading record, and 
no minimum percentage of the equity 
in public hands – but which contained 
an important element of self-regulation. 
Whereas on the Official List new entrants 
had to have their prospectus vetted by 
the Listing Authority (which at that time 
was the Stock Exchange), on AIM the 
responsibility for assessing the suitability 
of the company would rest with 
Nominated Advisers, or Nomads. These 
were investment bankers or brokers 
(and some accounting firms) whose role 
was similar in some respects to that of 
sponsors on the Official List, with the 
5 Ronald Cohen, chairman of Apax Partners, writing in the Financial Times, 8 March 1994.
6 Steven Weber and Elliot Posner, Creating a pan-European market: the origins of EASDAQ, Review of International Political Economy, 7, 4 Winter 2000 529-57.
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important difference that the decision 
on suitability was theirs, not that of the 
Listing Authority. Thus they had a dual 
responsibility – to the companies they 
were advising and to the Exchange, for 
ensuring the integrity of the market.
The initial candidates for admission to 
AIM were the companies which had 
been traded by Stock Exchange members 
under Rule 55.2 (now Rule 4.2); the 
launch date for AIM was set for June 
1995, and the Rule 4.2 facility was 
kept going until October of that year. 
But Lawrence and the head of AIM, 
Theresa Wallis, sought to promote the 
attractions of the market to companies 
which had not previously considered 
any form of public quotation. They 
conducted road shows around the 
country to explain how the new market 
would work, working with the Stock 
Exchange’s regional advisory groups. 
Lawrence wanted to de-mystify the 
stock market for business people who 
had previously shied away from it. 
The market opened with ten 
companies, including a garden centre 
business, a public house operator 
called the Old English Pub Company, 
a mining exploration company and 
three property companies. The most 
successful of the ten pioneers was 
Dawson Holdings, a newspaper and 
magazine distributor which moved 
to the Main Market in 1998.
In considering applications from 
would-be Nomads, the AIM team 
set high standards, mainly focused 
on the applicant’s record in handling 
capital market transactions and 
on the experience of the senior 
executives. There were 24 Nomads 
when the market opened (about the 
same number of applicants had been 
rejected), and the number increased 
to about 50 by the end of 1996. 
The Stock Exchange was able to persuade 
the Inland Revenue to treat AIM 
companies as unquoted for tax purposes, 
thus qualifying for the tax reliefs that 
were available under the Business 
Expansion Scheme. In addition, the 
Conservative government introduced two 
new schemes – the Enterprise Investment 
Scheme and Venture Capital Trusts 
– which, while not directed specifically 
at AIM, gave tax relief to individuals who 
bought shares in unquoted companies, 
including AIM companies. Shortly after 
the launch of AIM two investment 
trusts were set up in 1995 to attract 
investors into AIM companies, the 
Beacon Trust from Rutherford Asset 
Management and the AIM Trust from 
Isis. These and other fund managers later 
launched Venture Capital Trusts, some 
of them concentrating mainly on AIM 
companies. The favourable tax regime 
brought private investors into the market, 
both directly and through collective 
investment vehicles such as the VCTs. 
By the end of 1996 over 200 companies 
were traded on AIM, and a total of 
£650m had been raised through new 
issues. AIM still had an over-the-
counter competitor in the form of 
Ofex which had been set up in 1995 
after the Rule 4.2 facility had been 
withdrawn, but it mainly focused on 
companies that were too small for AIM. 
Shortly after AIM was established, 
the world stock market scene was 
transformed by what came to be 
known as the dot.com boom. One of 
the triggering events was the NASDAQ 
flotation of Netscape, the US internet 
browser company, in 1995; the shares 
were priced at $28 and rose to $71 
as soon as the market opened. There 
followed a stream of initial public 
offerings from companies with an 
internet connection, and prices were 
driven to levels that bore little or no 
relation to future profits. Unlike, say, 
Microsoft, which had floated in 1986, 
many companies came to the stock 
market with no track record of making 
profits, and no coherent business plan. 
The boom, which lasted until 2000, 
had a profound effect on AIM and its 
position in the world securities market. 
The dot-com boom 
The boom began in the US but quickly 
spread to Europe, prompting strenuous 
efforts by the national stock exchanges 
to climb on the bandwagon and attract 
high-technology stocks to their markets. 
The first dedicated high-technology 
market to get off the ground was 
EASDAQ, which began trading in 
November 1996, 18 months after AIM. 
The first company to be quoted on it 
was a British developer of anti-virus 
software, Dr Solomon’s Group; it was 
backed by Ronald Cohen’s Apax Partners. 
However, any hope that EASDAQ 
would become the preferred outlet for 
European technology companies was 
frustrated by the nationalistic reaction 
of the established stock exchanges. 
Although several of these bodies, 
including the Paris Stock Exchange, had 
participated in the planning of EASDAQ, 
they were reluctant to surrender control 
of what looked likely to be an important 
growth market. In 1995 the Paris Stock 
Exchange announced its intention to 
set up its own second-tier market, the 
Nouveau Marche; it began trading in 
March 1996. This was followed by the 
creation of similar exchanges in several 
other European countries, including 
Germany (Neuer Markt), Belgium 
(EuroNM), Italy (Nuovo Mercato) and 
Netherlands (Nieuwe Markt). These 
four exchanges, together with Paris, 
later joined forces in what was called 
Euro.NM. This was presented as a 
decentralised European stock market 
based on a network of similar national 
markets. Their argument was that, 
despite the Investment Services Directive, 
there was no common supervisory 
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authority in Europe and no common 
trading rules; hence the best approach to 
the creation of a European stock market 
was a loose association of national 
exchanges, keeping regulation at the 
national level while promoting sufficient 
harmonisation to permit cross-border 
trading. As one commentator remarked 
later, ‘Vested interests from the national 
financial systems, with the support of 
their governments, created these new 
markets to divert the challenge that 
EASDAQ posed to nationally based, 
quasi-monopolistic arrangements’.7
For the first few years these new 
markets, including EASDAQ, did well, 
benefiting from the explosion of interest 
in internet-related and other high-
technology stocks. The most spectacular 
growth was in Germany’s Neuer Markt. 
The number of IPOs there rose to 168 
and 159 in 1999 and 2000; in a country 
where over the previous fifteen years 
new issues on local stock markets had 
rarely exceeded 20 per year, this was 
an extraordinary change. A big stimulus 
to wider share ownership in Germany 
had been the flotation of Deutsche 
Telekom in 1996 – the first German 
IPO to be ‘promoted through all the 
channels of the mass media and with all 
the techniques of modern marketing’. 
When the Neuer Markt started trading 
a few months later, ‘the good taste of 
the Telekom IPO was still fresh’. Many 
of the new issues were viewed as future 
Microsofts or Netscapes, and prompted 
frenetic buying by individual investors, 
although institutional shareholders were 
sceptical, regarding the Neuer Markt as 
‘a market for gamblers and freaks’.8 
By the end of the 1990s the most highly 
valued companies on AIM were internet 
based firms, and they helped to push the 
AIM index, which had started at 1,000 in 
1995, to a peak of 2,925 in March 2000. 
But internet-based and other technology 
stocks formed a much smaller proportion 
of the AIM population than was the case 
in EASDAQ and the Neuer Markt, and, 
partly for that reason, the growth of 
AIM in the late 1990s looked lacklustre 
compared to its European rivals. 
The fear that London – both AIM and the 
Main Market – was losing out in high-
technology stocks prompted the Stock 
Exchange to launch techMARK in 1999. 
This was largely a branding exercise, 
aimed at demonstrating that the Main 
Market did contain a number of strong, 
high-technology companies. At the same 
time the Exchange extended the rule that 
had been brought in for biotechnology in 
1991 to other sectors such as computer 
hardware and software; provided they 
met certain conditions technology-based 
firms were allowed to list on the Main 
Market and to be included in techMARK. 
The launch of techMARK reflected 
concern in London about the competitive 
position of the Stock Exchange in Europe. 
As the European financial services 
market became more integrated, there 
was likely to be consolidation among 
European stock exchanges, and it was 
not clear how this would affect London. 
Commercially, too, the Exchange was 
entering a new era at the end of the 
1990s. It was about to convert itself 
from a mutual organisation into a 
shareholder-owned enterprise and its 
role as regulator of new issues was being 
transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority; it had to make its own way in 
the world as a profit-making business, 
without support from the government. 
The first response to these new 
circumstances was an agreement with 
the Deutsche Börse in 1998 to develop 
a joint electronic trading platform. 
In May 2000 this was transformed 
into a full-scale merger, to create 
what was called iX (international 
exchanges). As part of this plan, trading 
in high-technology stocks would be 
concentrated in Frankfurt through an 
enlarged Neuer Markt, while ‘blue-
chip’ companies would be traded in 
London. At the same time the two 
exchanges signed a memorandum of 
understanding with NASDAQ, whereby 
the American exchange would cooperate 
in creating a pan-European high-
growth market, in competition with 
EASDAQ and the other new markets. 
This proposal aroused opposition 
from the City of London investment 
community, not least from the small-
capitalisation specialists who deplored 
the suggestion that trading in high-
growth companies would be transferred 
to Frankfurt. There were also wider 
reservations, which gained ground 
in the months following the merger 
announcement, about the merits of the 
link with Germany. The Neuer Markt was 
hit hard by the collapse of the dot.com 
boom in March 2000, and it was clear 
by the autumn of that year that many of 
the companies which had come to the 
market had done so on the basis of false 
or misleading prospectuses; there were 
also allegations of price manipulation 
and insider trading. The Deutsche Börse 
was looking an unattractive partner, 
and the Stock Exchange abandoned 
the merger plan in September. 
The Neuer Markt was not the only 
casualty of the stock market collapse. 
Both EASDAQ and the other exchanges 
grouped in EuroNM were faced by an 
investor retreat, falling share prices, 
and a dearth of new issues. The Neuer 
Markt was shut down in 2002, and 
it was followed a few months later 
by the closure of Nouveau Marche 
in France. It was clear that separate, 
7 Robert Abbanat, Feasibility study: a Pan-European market for technology growth companies, EASDAQ, September 2004.
8 Hans-Peter Burghof and Adrian Hunger, Access to stock markets for small and medium sized growth firms: the temporary success and ultimate failure of Germany’s 
Neuer Markt, October 200.
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national high-technology markets 
were not viable, although the principle 
of trans-European collaboration was 
not abandoned; the French, Belgian, 
Dutch and Portuguese stock exchanges 
formed a new grouping called Euronext, 
through which their main markets would 
be integrated on a single platform. 
As for EASDAQ, NASDAQ bought 
control of this organisation in 2001 
and re-named it NASDAQ Europe, but 
it failed to breathe new life into the 
market, which was closed in 200. 
Part of the reason for the failure of 
Europe’s new growth markets was 
fragmentation.9 None of them were 
able to attract a sufficient number 
of listed companies, intermediaries 
and institutional investors to make 
the market a self-sustaining concern. 
Participation from the large investment 
banks – which have the most influence 
on where a company is listed – ‘was the 
missing linchpin that prevented any of 
the exchanges from acquiring critical 
mass’.10 Because there were too few 
listings and too little liquidity in the 
stocks that were traded, the markets 
were not attractive to institutional 
investors. To make matters worse, there 
was the unfortunate timing of the dot.
com boom; the new exchanges were 
too immature to survive the collapse. ‘By 
contrast NASDAQ had a long incubation 
period – free of catastrophic trauma – 
which enabled it to plant its roots. It had 
its start in 1971 and lingered for years 
as a mediocre exchange before the likes 
of MCI, Microsoft and Intel sprung up, 
making NASDAQ a household name’.11 
AIM was also a new market when 
the dot.com boom began, but it had 
been designed to fill the void left by 
the end of Rule 55.2 and the closure 
of the USM, and it was supported by 
a group of market participants who 
had long experience of floating small 
companies, investing in them and trading 
in them. It had not gone overboard for 
high-technology stocks, which never 
amounted to much more than 20 per 
cent of the market. The balance was 
made up of a wide range of sectors 
operating in more stable industries. 
Moreover, AIM had a regulatory system 
which, although it did not prevent the 
admission of some over-hyped internet 
stocks, was robust enough to keep out 
of the market the sort of flimsy, highly 
speculative businesses that undermined 
the credibility of the Neuer Markt. 
Although on paper the German market 
had stricter admission rules than AIM 
– two designated sponsors, a free float 
of 25 per cent and a track record of at 
least three years – these rules were often 
waived by the Deutsche Börse in its 
eagerness to get the market established.
Although the AIM index fell sharply 
after the stock market collapse (Figure 
2.1), AIM can be said to have matured 
during the period of the dot.com 
9 Abbanat, op cit
10 Abbanat op cit
11 Abbanat op cit
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boom, not least because of the greater 
involvement of institutional investors. 
If they were to get exposure to high-
flying internet stocks in the late 1990s, 
the institutions had to divert at least 
some of their investment to AIM shares. 
By 2002 the institutions accounted for 
some 75 per cent of the new money 
going into AIM companies; the junior 
exchange had become an integral 
part of their investment strategy.
All this was positive for AIM, and its 
relative strength compared to other 
European markets raised its profile 
within the London Stock Exchange. 
On the other hand, it had been badly 
affected by the dot.com crash; it needed 
more listings, more liquidity and more 
investors. The total number of AIM 
flotations was 55 in 2002, compared 
with 94 in 2001, and most of them 
were very small. (The actual number 
of companies listed on AIM increased 
during the year as 6 companies moved 
from the main market, but these were 
small capitalisation stocks that were 
not actively traded). One possibility, 
suggested by a leading institutional 
investor in AIM stocks, was to make AIM 
more of an international market. This was 
taken up in 2002, with consequences 
that over the next five years transformed 
the character of the market. 
Internationalisation
The first targets for the Exchange’s 
overseas marketing campaign were 
Commonwealth countries which had 
similar legal systems to the UK and a 
similar approach to equity markets. A 
number of Australian and Canadian 
companies were persuaded that a 
listing on AIM would give them greater 
international visibility and access 
to a wider pool of investors; given 
London’s long-standing importance 
as a source of funds for natural 
resource development, the Exchange 
particularly targeted mining and oil and 
gas exploration companies. The same 
arguments applied to other countries 
besides the ones with connections to 
the UK. One of the biggest flotations 
on AIM in 2002 was Highland Gold, 
a Russian gold mining company.
Many of these companies came to AIM 
in the form of a dual listing, a process 
that was made easier in 200 when 
the Stock Exchange introduced the 
Designated Markets Initiative, whereby 
companies that were listed on certain 
designated exchanges could obtain 
a secondary listing on AIM through 
a fast-track process, without having 
to submit a full prospectus. The list 
of designated exchanges included 
Australian, Canadian and South African 
exchanges, as well as Nasdaq and 
the New York Stock Exchange, and 
Deutsche Börse and Euronext in Europe. 
The Exchange also promoted the 
attractions of AIM to investment 
banks and brokers in these countries. 
As the flow of companies coming 
to AIM increased, some of them set 
up offices in London to become part 
of the AIM community. One of the 
most active Canadian brokers was 
Canaccord Capital (now Canaccord 
Adams) which acquired a London 
broker, T. Hoare & Co, in 1999, and 
became a Nomad in 2001; it has been 
responsible for many of the Canadian 
listings on AIM. (Canaccord is itself 
quoted on AIM, as well as in Toronto).
By the end of 200 AIM had not only 
recovered from the stock market crash, 
but was becoming a significant force 
both within the London capital market 
and on the international stage. Its status 
as an exchange-regulated market not 
subject to the EU Prospectus Directive, 
was confirmed in October 2004, 
allowing the Stock Exchange rather 
than the Financial Services Authority to 
continue setting and enforcing the rules. 
AIM had become more central to the 
business of the Stock Exchange than 
had been the case five years earlier, and 
its management was integrated more 
closely with that of the Exchange as a 
whole. When Simon Brickles (who had 
taken over from Theresa Wallis as head 
of AIM in 2001) resigned in 200 to join 
Ofex, he was replaced as head of AIM 
by Martin Graham, who combined the 
role with his existing post as Director 
of Markets for the Exchange. There 
was some anxiety initially in the AIM 
community about this reassignment 
of responsibilities, but the Exchange 
argued that the new management 
structure would give AIM greater 
prominence within the organisation. 
Graham said: ‘Our view is that AIM 
is the lifeblood of the market – it is 
of massive strategic importance’.12 
Between 200 and 2005 mining and 
oil and gas companies were the most 
dynamic sector on AIM, replacing the 
internet stocks which had led the market 
in the late 1990s. But the London 
Stock Exchange also targeted other 
countries and other industries in order 
to ensure that AIM was not dominated 
by one temporarily fashionable sector. 
One potential market was the US. The 
American business angel and venture 
capital community was far larger than 
its British counterpart, and NASDAQ 
was well established as a market for 
high-technology companies. However, 
most of the companies which floated 
on NASDAQ were larger and more 
mature than the typical AIM company. 
There was an opportunity for AIM 
to attract companies which were too 
12 Financial Times, 7 February 2004.
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small to be listed on NASDAQ but 
still felt that a public quotation would 
assist their growth. The attractions of 
the London capital market – the Main 
Market as well as AIM – were enhanced 
after the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002. Companies that 
were contemplating a listing in the US 
were faced with additional rules on 
disclosure and financial controls which 
were expensive and time-consuming.
By 2007 AIM was a much more broadly 
based market than it had been five years 
earlier. The average size of company had 
increased, with an increasing number 
valued at more than £50m at the time 
of flotation. It was also attracting a 
new class of property and closed end 
investment entities, some of which were 
concerned with exploiting investment 
opportunities in emerging markets 
such as China, India and Vietnam. 
These changes came at a time when 
a process of consolidation among the 
world’s stock exchanges was getting 
under way. The London Stock Exchange, 
having fended off a takeover bid from 
Deutsche Börse in 2005, found itself a 
year later on the receiving end of a bid 
from NASDAQ; this too was rebuffed. 
In 2006 the New York Stock Exchange 
unveiled a merger with Euronext. 
Meanwhile new moves were under 
way to revive the ‘junior’ exchanges 
which had flourished during the dot.
com boom. In 2005 Euronext, now 
NYSE Euronext, opened a new market 
called Alternext which was tailored to 
the needs of small and medium-sized 
companies and had operations in Paris, 
Amsterdam and Brussels. In Germany the 
Deutsche Börse introduced a new market 
segment called the Entry Standard, 
which it described as ‘a flexible and cost-
efficient option of listing, imposing fewer 
bureaucratic burdens on the company 
than the EU-regulated segments’. 
The challenge for the London Stock 
Exchange was how to maintain and 
strengthen AIM’s position in an 
increasingly competitive industry. 
Part of the challenge was to ensure 
that its regulatory arrangements 
kept pace with the changes in the 
character of the market; this is the 
subject of the next section. 
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The rapid growth and 
internationalization of AIM in 
the last few years has raised the 
issue of whether its regulatory 
regime needs modifying in order 
to respond to these changes. The 
regulatory regime is deliberately 
less prescriptive than that of 
the Main Market, but one of the 
chief criticisms of AIM is that it is 
‘unregulated’. This is a misleading 
characterisation. AIM does not 
fall under the technical, legal 
definition of a ‘regulated market’, 
but it is not unregulated. Under 
the current regulatory regime, AIM 
is an exchange-regulated market, 
run by the London Stock Exchange 
which in turn is recognised and 
regulated by the UK Financial 
Services Authority (FSA). As a 
market, AIM has a separate identity 
from the Exchange’s Main Market, 
but operationally it is part of the 
Exchange, and as such is subject 
to regulation by the FSA which is 
carried out, in FSA parlance, on a 
‘close and continuous’ basis. AIM is 
also a regulator: it establishes and 
monitors a regulatory regime for 
admission and imposes continuing 
obligations on issuers and their 
Nominated Advisers (Nomads). 
The regulation to which the Exchange, 
and thus AIM, is subject has been 
changing significantly in the last year, 
and will change again in November 2007. 
Some of these changes are consequent 
on changes in EU law, notably the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), one of the central pillars of the 
raft of EU legislation emerging under 
the Financial Services Action Plan and 
which is due to be implemented on 1 
November 2007. The Directive introduces 
changes in the regulation of trading 
venues which will impact on AIM in 
a number of ways, detailed below. 
AIM’s own regulatory regime has 
also been changing independently 
of pressures of EU law. In 2006 the 
Exchange conducted a review of AIM’s 
regulatory regime, focusing in particular 
on three areas: the implications of the 
internationalization of AIM and the 
changing nature of the companies 
which are admitted to the market; the 
role of Nomads; and the strength of 
AIM’s day to day regulatory operations. 
Subsequently, the rules applying to 
companies and those for Nomads have 
been clarified and elaborated, and a 
number of changes are being introduced 
in the resourcing and performance 
of AIM’s regulatory functions. 
This section considers the regulatory 
regime that applies to AIM and the 
regulatory regime which it applies to 
companies admitted to AIM and their 
Nominated Advisors. Part 1 outlines the 
broader regulatory regime which applies 
to AIM and the London Stock Exchange 
as markets or trading venues, including 
the changes to be introduced by the 
implementation of MiFID in November 
2007; Part 2 considers AIM as a regulator, 
focusing in particular on the issue of 
what type of companies are admitted, 
and should be admitted, to the market; 
Part  evaluates the role of Nomads in 
the regulatory regime; Part 4 considers 
the operational aspects of the regulatory 
function; and Part 5 considers the role 
of the FSA and its relationship with the 
London Stock Exchange and AIM. 
1. The Regulation of AIM
1.1 Status under the EU and 
UK regulatory regimes
Current status
AIM is an exchange-regulated market run 
by the London Stock Exchange. In order 
to operate as a market, the Exchange 
has to be recognised by the FSA and 
meet certain conditions: the recognition 
requirements.1 The requirements consist 
of both initial and ongoing obligations, 
the performance of which is monitored 
by the FSA. They require, among other 
things, the Exchange to have the 
necessary financial resources for its 
operations; to conduct its operations in 
an orderly manner; to ensure the proper 
protection for investors and to prevent 
market abuse or other criminal activities 
including money laundering on its 
markets; to provide systems for recording 
transactions and ensure that systems for 
clearing and settlement provide for the 
timely discharge of rights and liabilities 
arising from transactions on its markets. 
It is under an obligation to promote and 
maintain high standards of ‘integrity 
and fair dealing’ at all times. In its role 
as a regulator, the Exchange is required 
to ensure that there are appropriate 
systems of consultation for proposed 
rules; to ensure compliance with its rules 
and to have effective arrangements for 
monitoring and enforcing compliance 
with its rules. It must provide a fair and 
impartial system of dispute resolution, 
and any fines ordered to be paid must 
be applied for the benefit of users of its 
facilities or for charitable purposes.14 
The FSA supervises the Exchange on a 
‘close and continuous’ basis, discussed 
further below. It also has powers (as 

Regulation
1 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses (Amendment) ) Regulations 2006 (SI 
2006/86) FSA Handbook, REC sourcebook.
14 FSA Handbook, REC 2.
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yet unused) to issue directions to 
the Exchange and ultimately to de-
recognise the Exchange for failing to 
meet its obligations.15 The FSA has 
also acquired new powers to review 
the rules and other provisions of the 
Exchange and to prevent it from making 
rules which are excessive, ie which 
are disproportionate to the end to be 
achieved or which do not pursue a 
reasonable regulatory objective. The 
provisions were introduced officially to 
preserve the UK’s proportionate and 
risk based approach to financial services 
regulation, and in practice to guard 
against the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley provisions in the Exchange’s 
rules subsequent on any change in its 
ownership.16 These provisions will be 
implemented by the end of 2007.17 
As a division of the London Stock 
Exchange, AIM is subject to the 
recognition requirements that apply 
to the Exchange. However, the rules 
relating to trading venues have 
been altered by the introduction of 
the Market in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), and these will impact 
on AIM in a number of ways.18 
Implications of MiFID for AIM
The aim of the new European provisions 
is, among other things, to facilitate the 
establishment of trading platforms by 
removing the ability of member states 
to require trading to be concentrated 
on a single market. The concentration 
provisions had never applied in the 
UK, and investment firms had begun 
setting up their own trading platforms, 
using their FSA authorization to do 
so. The FSA regulated such platforms 
through variations of the individual 
permissions given to investment firms 
as part of the authorisation process, 
and guidance in the Market Conduct 
Sourcebook of the FSA Handbook.19 
Removal of the concentration provisions 
facilitates a fragmentation of trading 
venues, with a number of regulatory 
implications. In an attempt to stimulate 
market competition, whilst reducing the 
scope for regulatory arbitrage, MiFID 
seeks to harmonise the regulatory 
requirements that apply to different 
types of trading venues. Trading venues 
are now classified into three types: 
regulated markets; multi-lateral trading 
facilities (MTFs); and over-the-counter 
(OTC), which includes systematic 
internalisers. The London Stock Exchange 
is a recognised investment exchange, 
the Main Market is a regulated market, 
and AIM is a multi-lateral trading facility 
operated by the London Stock Exchange. 
PLUS was an Alternative Trading System 
(ATS) operated by a service company, 
though it became a recognised 
investment exchange in July 2007. 
The provisions which have been 
introduced do not establish complete 
parity between the operation of 
MTFs and regulated markets either in 
terms of primary market obligations 
or functions as trading venues. In 
general, the requirements imposed 
on the operators of regulated markets 
are more detailed, and these are 
regarded as premium markets. 
MiFID introduces broad requirements on 
those operating MTFs (eg the Exchange) 
to establish transparent and non-
discretionary rules and procedures for 
fair and orderly trading and to establish 
objective criteria for the efficient 
execution of orders. As an operator of 
an MTF, the Exchange is also required 
to establish transparent rules regarding 
the criteria for determining the financial 
instruments that can be traded on its 
systems and governing access to its 
facilities. It has to ensure that there is 
access to sufficient publicly available 
information to enable its users to form 
an investment judgement, taking 
into account the nature of the users 
and types of instruments traded.20
In addition, the Exchange is placed 
under an obligation to establish and 
maintain effective arrangements and 
procedures for the regular monitoring 
of compliance by its users, and to 
monitor transactions in order to identify 
breaches of those rules, disorderly 
trading conditions or conduct that may 
involve market abuse. It is to report 
significant breaches to the FSA21 and 
comply immediately with any instruction 
from the FSA to suspend or remove a 
financial instrument from trading.22
The main regulatory concern arising 
from fragmentation of trading is the 
potential for a parallel fragmentation 
15 FSMA ss 296-298.
16 The context and purpose of the Act are set out in House of Commons Research Paper 06/58, Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses Bill (House of Commons, 2 
November 2006), available at www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-058.pdf.
17 Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses Act 2006; the FSA is consulting on the rules: FSA, CP07/10 Notification Obligations under the Investment Exchanges and 
Clearing Houses Act (June 2007).
18 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/9/EC (MiFID). MiFID is subject to further detailed elaboration in Directives and Regulations (known as Level 2 measures).
19 FSA Handbook, Market Conduct Sourcebook, Chapter 5.
20 MiFID art 14.
21 MiFID art 26.
22 MiFID art 14(7).
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of transparency, with implications 
for competition, efficiency in price 
formation, monitoring of compliance 
with disclosure obligations and market 
abuse. MTF operators are required to 
monitor trading on their markets to 
ensure compliance with their rules, 
identify disorderly trading conditions and 
detect market abuse.2 A key resource 
which they need in order to perform this 
monitoring is trade reports. However, 
there are no detailed provisions on the 
nature of the post-trade transparency 
and reporting regime for MTF shares.
There is a significant exception to the 
lighter regime for trade transparency 
on MTFs, and that is where the shares 
traded on the MTF are also traded on a 
regulated market. Here MTF operators 
are subject to detailed provisions on 
pre- and post-trade transparency, 
which are in line with those that 
apply to regulated markets.24 
The exact form of the transparency 
regime for MTF shares is at present 
under consideration by HM Treasury 
and the FSA. It is not yet clear exactly 
what the impact will be for AIM. The 
MiFID regime creates the potential for 
there to be two types of post-trade 
transparency regimes on a single 
market, depending on the shares being 
traded. The FSA is currently consulting 
on whether or not to extend the MiFID 
post-trade transparency regime for 
regulated market shares to MTF shares. 
The MiFID requirements largely echo 
the current recognition requirements 
imposed on the Exchange by the FSA, 
and so in most areas meeting the new 
requirements involves few changes 
either in substance or in operational 
practices. However, the new provisions 
emphasise the need for operators of 
MTFs to have ‘transparent and non-
discretionary rules and procedures’ 
to maintain fair and orderly markets. 
Furthermore, MTF operators are clearly 
under obligations to prevent market 
abuse on their markets.25 The Exchange 
in effect has the sole responsibility for 
this with respect to AIM shares traded 
by non-UK investment firms in other 
EEA states as these fall outside the 
current scope of FSA’s requirements 
for transaction reports.26 Finally, and 
most significantly, the Exchange will be 
under a new requirement to manage 
any conflicts of interest it may have 
between the interests of its owners and 
operators and the interests of those 
who use its facilities or the interests 
of the markets which it operates.27 
Taken together, these responsibilities 
together with the increased size 
and significance of AIM, may have 
implications for the position of AIM’s 
regulatory functions within the 
Exchange’s internal governance structure. 
These are discussed further below. 
2. AIM / The  Exchange 
as regulators
In 2000 the Exchange’s role as a primary-
market regulator of the Main Market 
was transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority, which as the UK Listing 
Authority issues the Listing Rules, vets 
applications for listing and monitors 
compliance. However the Exchange is 
responsible for establishing the primary 
market responsibilities for those admitted 
to AIM. The regulatory regime which 
the Exchange has established for AIM 
companies differs from that which 
applies to those listed on the Main 
Market. In particular, the role played 
by Nomads is quite different from that 
played by sponsors to companies seeking 
listing on the Main Market. Nomads 
have a dual set of responsibilities: to the 
company being admitted, and to the 
Exchange. Nomads are essentially the 
front line of AIM’s regulatory regime. 
They are meant to shepherd the company 
not only through the admissions process 
but thereafter, ensuring that it complies 
with its regulatory obligations. This is 
a distinct role from that of sponsors 
to the Main Market, and Nomads play 
a critical part in AIM’s regulation.
This section considers first the 
main differences in the regulatory 
requirements between AIM and the Main 
Market; the next section considers the 
role of Nomads in the regulatory regime.
2.1 Admissions to AIM
One of the key questions of regulatory 
policy for trading venues is whether and 
how admission to a market should be 
2 MiFID art 26 para 1.
24 MiFID art 29, subject to implementing measures in Level 2 relating to different trading systems (Regulation 1287/2006 art 17); MiFID art 0; Implementing Regulation 
1287/2006 arts 27-4).
25 MTFs fall outside the Market Abuse directive, which predates MiFID; however MiFID introduces the obligation on MTF operators to prevent and detect market abuse. 
The UK market abuse regime includes MTFs, but the FSA only receives transaction reports from UK investment firms; only the Exchange receives reports from non-UK 
investment firms in other EEA states.
26 FSA Handbook, SUP 17.
27 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses) (Amendment) Regulations 2006, SI86/2006,  
reg  para 7().
21
restricted. Should admission to a market 
be open to all types of companies, 
subject to disclosure obligations, or 
should the market restrict access to 
companies that meet certain criteria? 
If so, what should the criteria be? 
This is an important question, as the 
admissions criteria have a direct impact 
on the type of market created. 
AIM started out as a niche market for 
small cap companies, but, as discussed 
in Section 2, whilst UK small-caps 
continue to be an important part of the 
market, the nature of the companies 
quoted on AIM has changed significantly 
in the last few years. There are now 
three types of companies admitted 
to trading on AIM: British companies, 
foreign companies, some of which are 
domiciled overseas, others of which 
come to AIM via UK registered holding 
companies (particularly in the oil, gas 
and mining sectors) and closed end 
property and investment funds.
The entry of overseas and in particular 
closed end property and investment 
companies has changed AIM’s character 
to some extent. The introduction in 
November 2007 of the Specialist Fund 
Market specifically for complex and 
sophisticated investment entities (hedge 
funds and private equity), a further 
example of niche market creation, 
may have the effect of drawing those 
companies off AIM, leaving it to the 
more traditional type of trading company 
and to straightforward investment funds. 
The question remains, however, to what 
extent any trading platform should 
be criticized for poor performance of 
the companies it admits to trading. 
Admission to a market provides access to 
capital, but it can also have a signalling 
effect. The question is what signals 
does admission to a market give, and 
what should it give. What can a market 
and its regulator be expected to do? 
They cannot be expected to remove the 
performance risks that attach to any 
investment. Indeed, those operating 
and regulating the market have to be 
wary of implicitly bestowing commercial 
approval on companies that it admits, 
creating a potential for moral hazard 
on the part of investors, and the risk 
of significant reputational damage for 
the operator and regulator should an 
admitted company fail to perform as 
investors expected. But market operators 
can be expected to remove or at least 
mitigate risks of abuse of their markets, 
and to ensure a transparent investment 
and trading regime. Exchanges have also 
traditionally played a role in affording 
certain rights to investors from the 
management of the companies that 
are admitted to trading, supplementing 
those provided in company law 
– through requirements in their rules for 
shareholder approval of certain types of 
transaction, for example, or compliance 
with codes of corporate governance. 
AIM’s regulatory regime is clearly less 
prescriptive than for the Main Market. 
AIM’s new Rules for Companies, issued 
in February 200728 have introduced 
enhanced disclosure provisions,29 
and the contents of the admission 
document are to a significant extent 
derived from EU provisions.0 There are 
key differences in the eligibility criteria, 
however, reflecting and reinforcing the 
different roles of the two markets. 
The criteria for being admitted to AIM 
are less restrictive: there are no minimum 
capital requirements and there is no 
requirement for the company to have 
been trading for three years prior to 
admission, although the requirement 
for three years’ of audited accounts for 
companies that have been trading is 
the same as for the Main Market. There 
is no minimum free float requirement, 
although in practice investors will expect 
at least ten per cent of the shares to 
be made available to the public1 and 
under the new rules the percentage 
being offered must be disclosed.
Although AIM companies are not 
required to have a past trading history, 
AIM does have ‘lock in’ provisions for 
new businesses: where an applicant’s 
main activity is a business which has 
not been independent and earning 
revenue for at least two years, it must 
ensure that all related parties and 
senior management agree to retain 
their interests in their securities for 
one year from the admission to AIM.2 
Moreover the rules on reverse takeovers 
seek to ensure that an AIM company 
cannot fundamentally transform its 
business, board or voting control or (if an 
investing company) depart substantially 
from the investment strategy set out 
in its admission document without 
28  The changes were proposed in AIM Notice 24 (October 2006) and introduced in Notice 27 (February 2007) available at www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/
products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/For+AIM+Advisers/aimnotices.htm.
29  Companies applying for admission to AIM now have to disclose information on any restrictions on the transfer of shares, the percentage of the free float, and the 
applicant’s expected capitalization on admission to AIM. It now also has to provide information on any legal or regulatory breaches. An AIM traded company is 
also required to maintain a specific section on its website where it is to publish certain information about the company, which must be kept up to date. Additional 
provisions apply to investment companies whom must give details of its investment strategy.
0  The Prospectus Directive 200 applies to public offers, though securities included in an offer with a total consideration of Euros 2.5million calculated over 12 months 
fall outside the Directive (art 1.2(h)).
1  AIM Investor Survey, Arbuthnot Securities.
2  AIM RC r.7.
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shareholder approval and without 
seeking a new admission to AIM. 
Admission to AIM, in other words, 
is not a licence to companies to do 
what they will. A company cannot be 
admitted to AIM purporting to do or 
be one thing and then fundamentally 
change its nature. AIM seeks to ensure 
that what investors bought into is 
in fact what the business does. Any 
substantial departure from that has to 
be subject to agreement from investors. 
2.2 Continuing obligations: 
corporate governance 
and investor protection
On the whole, companies admitted to 
AIM are subject to the same ongoing 
obligations for disclosure and transaction 
reporting that apply to the Main Market, 
though there are some differences, 
noted below. Moreover, anyone 
seeking to invest in an AIM company 
via an intermediary will be protected 
by the FSA’s Conduct of Business 
requirements, discussed below.4 
There are again some key differences, 
however, notably with respect to 
the extent to which shareholder 
approval is required for certain 
transactions and with respect to their 
corporate governance obligations.
The managers of AIM companies are 
required to obtain shareholder approval 
on fewer occasions than companies 
listed on the Main Market. In particular, 
shareholder approval is only required 
for disposals of over 75 per cent of 
assets, in contrast to the 25 per cent 
threshold under the Listing Rules.5 
Further, there is no requirement for 
shareholder approval of related party 
transactions, only a requirement that 
after consultation with its Nomad, 
directors consider that the terms of 
the transaction are fair and reasonable 
insofar as its shareholders are concerned, 
and that requirement becomes operative 
only with respect to transactions which 
exceed five per cent of any of the class 
tests, in contrast with the 0.25 per cent 
threshold under the Listing Rules.6 
The regulation of corporate governance 
structure is also less prescriptive than for 
companies listed on the Main Market. 
Companies on the Main Market are 
under a ‘comply or explain’ obligation 
with respect to the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance: they either have 
to comply or explain and justify their 
departure from the Code. AIM companies 
simply have to have ‘appropriate’ 
corporate governance structures. Indeed 
the provisions on corporate governance 
are set out in the rules for Nomads 
rather than rules for AIM companies: 
Nomads are required to consider, with 
the directors, the adoption of appropriate 
corporate governance measures.7 
The regulatory regime thus relies 
heavily here, as elsewhere, on there 
being an implicit shared understanding 
of ‘appropriateness’ within the 
Nomad community. In assessing 
‘appropriateness’, AIM in practice 
expects Nomads to provide a corporate 
governance regime which accords 
with the principles of existing codes, 
such as that of the Quoted Companies 
Alliance,8 if not with their detailed 
provisions. The justification given by 
AIM for these differences in corporate 
governance requirements9 has a dual 
basis: the degree of regulation that is 
appropriate for the type of companies 
that are admitted to AIM, and the role of 
Nomads in ensuring the appropriateness 
of the company’s actions. Given the 
wide variety of companies that trade 
on AIM, it is not necessarily appropriate 
to have the full Combined Code 
requirements imposed upon them. 
Those companies, it is argued, are 
young, growth companies with dynamic 
business operations which should not 
be impeded by unnecessarily rigid or 
inappropriate restrictions on their internal 
operations. Rather than relying on formal 
requirements to provide protection 
for investors, the AIM regime relies on 
Nomads to ensure that the company 
acts appropriately, coupled, following 
the recent rule changes, with disclosure 
to investors. The enhanced disclosure 
provisions introduced in February 2007 
make it easier for existing and potential 
investors to see these structures. 
Whilst these arguments are valid, there 
is a question as to whether they hold 
for the larger AIM companies. There 
are nearly 00 companies on AIM with 
a market capitalisation of over £100m. 
Given that they are of comparable size to 
companies on the Main Market, it could 
be argued that they should be subject to 
comparable regulatory regimes for their 
corporate governance and be required 
to put in place similar protections for 
 AIM RC r.14 and r.16.
4 FSA Handbook, COB and NEWCOB.
5 AIM RC 15; LR 10.
6 AIM RC 1; LR 11.
7 AIM RN r.18, Sched  AR2. The absence of similar provisions from the Rules for Companies underlines the regime’s focus on Nomads, rather than companies, as the 
main target of their regulation.
8 Financial Reporting Council’s Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the Quoted Companies Alliance’s Corporate Governance Guidance for AIM Companies 
(available from www.qca.org.uk). Note that proposals are being developed separately on behalf of the private equity for a corporate governance code for private 
equity funds to enhance the transparency and independence of the corporate governance of companies which they buy, but it is anticipated at present that these will 
apply only to companies which are equivalent in size to those in the FTSE 250 index: Financial Times 17 July 2007.
9 Including rules on shareholder notification and approvals.
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investors. Whilst on their face the 
rules appear to create the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage, with companies 
which might be more suited to the Main 
Market trading on AIM to take advantage 
of AIM’s less prescriptive regime, it can 
be countered that both Nomads and 
institutional investors will ensure that 
companies ratchet up their corporate 
governance structures appropriately. 
Although there is anecdotal evidence 
that this occurs, there is little systematic 
empirical evidence as to how and 
whether this occurs in practice. 
2.3 Investment companies 
and AIM
The question of whether investment 
companies, a term which includes closed 
end investment companies, private 
equity and hedge funds, are the ‘right 
sort’ of company to be admitted to AIM 
has been raised. As discussed in Section 
4 below, in 2006 over half of the new 
money raised on AIM, just over £6bn, 
was raised by investment companies. 
The debate on where and how 
investment companies should be 
admitted to trading is striking, for it 
illustrates the strong sense inside and 
outside the Exchange of what types 
of companies are appropriate for 
AIM. Whilst the rules do not appear 
particularly restrictive, in practice AIM has 
quite specific expectations of companies. 
The informal market requirement of 
a minimum ten per cent free float 
was noted above. Although there is 
no maximum limit on capitalization, 
companies with a capitalization of over 
£500m at admission are seen by AIM as 
more appropriate for the Main Market. 
In particular, complex share structures 
are not permitted in practice, and there 
is a requirement that there should be 
no restrictions on the transfer of shares. 
Although the investment companies 
may be investing in specialist areas 
(eg property in Vietnam), alternative 
investment companies such as hedge 
funds or certain private equity companies 
have been turned away from AIM 
in favour of companies which have 
a ‘plain vanilla’ share structure and 
investment strategy. Thus whilst the 
formal position under the admission 
rules is quite flexible, in practice there 
is a strong sense within the Exchange, 
and indeed the broader AIM community, 
of which types of companies AIM is 
appropriate for, and which it is not.
The demand for admission from 
investment companies has caused the 
Exchange to review its regulatory regime. 
Part of the reason why some investment 
companies have sought admission to 
AIM has been that they did not wish, or 
were not able, to comply with the rules 
for listing on the Main Market. Just what 
those rules have provided has been an 
issue of some confusion both within 
the City and within the FSA. Until 2005, 
investment companies listing on the Main 
Market had to comply with additional 
rules which limited the types of 
investment strategies they could pursue. 
The super-equivalent requirements 
included restrictions on the investment 
strategies of investment companies. 
For example it required that they hold 
no more than 20 per cent of their 
investments in one company, and were 
prohibited from exercising control over 
any company in which they invested.40 
These rules clearly were not suitable 
for many private equity companies, or 
active or single strategy hedge funds.
In 2005, as part of a larger review of the 
UK Listing Rules and the implementation 
of the Consolidated Admissions and 
Reporting Directive, the UKLA allowed 
overseas companies to list under 
Directive-minimum rules, even if they 
had not been listed on another market 
before.41 Confusingly, these listings 
were still referred to in the UK Listing 
Rules as secondary listings, even though 
there was no primary listing elsewhere. 
Under the rules, UK companies, 
however, still had to list under the 
‘super-equivalent’ requirements.42 
Although overseas investment companies 
could have avoided these restrictions 
by using the gateway provided by the 
amended Chapter 14 rules, this route 
was not widely used.4 After consultation 
with the market, and in particular 
pressure from the investment trust 
community, the FSA decided in 2007 
that it would remove this gateway and 
instead provide a unitary regime for 
all investment companies, irrespective 
of domicile. The regime will be ‘super-
equivalent’, but the restrictions on 
investment strategies will go, and 
will be replaced with requirements to 
disclose the strategy so that investors 
can make up their own minds whether 
it is something they want to invest in. 
These changes will mean that the Main 
Market is more open to investment 
companies than it was before, or at least 
than it was recognized as being before. 
40 FSA Handbook, Listing Rules chapter 15.
41 Under FSA Listing Rules, Chapter 14.
42 Chapter 15 of the Listing Rules.
4 FSA CP06/4.
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The creation of the 
Specialist Fund Market: 
delineating the markets
In July 2007 the Exchange announced 
the introduction of the Specialist Fund 
Market for investment funds, to be 
launched on 1 November 2007. The 
introduction of the Market in effect 
recreates, in regulatory terms, the 
position under Chapter 14 of the Listing 
Rules. Its presence should expand the 
portfolio of London’s equity markets.44 
In creating the SFM the Exchange has 
expanded its menu of options, and 
is making the differences between 
them clear: the Main Market is its 
flagship international market; the SFM 
is for highly specialized entities and 
professional investors only; and AIM 
is for smaller growing companies and 
straightforward investment funds seeking 
to target retail investors.45 Although the 
Association of Investment Companies 
has expressed reservations,46 the creation 
of the SFM should help to more clearly 
position AIM in the minds of investors 
and issuers alike. The SFM is intended to 
be a professionals-only market, and the 
Exchange has stated that only investment 
entities which target institutional, 
professional and highly knowledgeable 
investors will be admitted to trading.47 
Retail investors are able at present, 
and will continue to be able, to invest 
in AIM companies, however, and it is 
to the protections afforded to retail 
investors that the next section turns.
2.4 Investing in AIM: 
retail investors
With the changing nature of AIM 
companies, the question arises as 
to whether some AIM companies, 
particularly investment trusts, are 
appropriate for retail investors. Retail 
investors currently invest directly in AIM 
companies and indirectly via the funds 
they purchase from institutions. Large 
fund providers such as Gartmore and 
Fidelity offer funds for retail investors 
which specialize in small and medium 
capitalized stocks, including AIM 
companies, and pension funds also invest 
in AIM companies. Indeed, investment in 
AIM companies by institutional investors 
has grown considerably since the dot.com 
boom, and the market has become an 
integral part of their investment strategy 
(see further Section 5). About half of the 
shares in AIM companies are thought 
to be held by institutional investors. The 
rest in the hands of owner-managers, 
family shareholders, employees and 
other retail investors. Investing in AIM 
shares can confer considerable tax 
advantages for individual investors, and 
for some it is an attractive market.
The main responsibility for investor 
protection lies with the FSA. AIM ensures 
that admission documents contain 
a prescribed statement which draws 
attention to the risks of investing in AIM 
companies,48 but dealing in and advising 
on investments is regulated by the FSA.49 
There is no distinction in FSA’s conduct of 
business regime between those seeking 
to invest in AIM companies and in any 
other type of equity. Retail investors 
who purchase AIM shares directly or 
indirectly from financial advisers are 
covered by the FSA’s conduct of business 
rules, in particular by the suitability 
requirement: advisers must ensure 
that the product which they advise the 
customer to invest in is suitable for that 
customer. Those who invest in AIM via 
investment trusts or collective investment 
schemes receive an additional layer of 
regulatory protection, as advisers are 
under additional obligations, including 
know your customer requirements and 
enhanced suitability and disclosure 
provisions. Retail investors who invest 
directly in the market via brokers 
are not covered by the suitability 
requirement but brokers are under the 
normal obligations of fair dealing and 
market conduct imposed by the FSA.
The FSA also has a statutory duty to 
improve public understanding of financial 
markets, and has an extensive financial 
capability programme. It issues generic 
consumer advice on investing on its 
website, but does not have specific 
information on investing in equities. 
Instead it directs consumers to the 
London Stock Exchange’s Investor 
Centre. This contains generic information 
on shares and other equity related 
instruments, and advice on devising 
investment strategies. There is also a 
brief outline of the two markets, and 
investors are warned that due to its less 
prescriptive regulation investing in AIM 
companies is more risky than investing 
in equities listed on the Main Market. 
44 Announced in July 2007, the Specialist Fund Market is intended to provide a venue for highly specialist investment entities with potentially highly complex share 
structures who wish to target institutional, professional and highly knowledgeable investors. The SFM will be a regulated market, so subject to the full panoplay of EU 
law, but it will not be a listed market, so the Listing Rules, and their ‘super-equivalent’ regime, will not apply. The Market will launch on 1 November 2007.
45 Spelt out clearly, for example, in the ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ on the SFM: www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/
specialistfundmarket/sfmfaqs.htm.
46 Financial Times, 1th July 2007.
47 LSE, The London Stock Exchange’s Specialist Fund Market: Guidance for Admission to Trading for New Applicants (London, July 2007).
48 RC Schedule Two.
49 FSA Handbook, Conduct of Business sourcebook, to be replaced on 1 November 2007 with NEWCOB sourcebook, implementing MiFID.
25
The extent to which retail investors 
should be protected from themselves 
is the central issue in retail regulation. 
Whilst there are key areas of concern 
in retail regulation, these relate more 
to the structure of the retail product 
market, notably but not exclusively the 
remuneration structure of investment 
advisers, and there is little evidence 
at present that retail investors have 
either ‘mis-bought’ products which 
expose them to AIM companies or 
that these have been missold. 
However, given the increasing 
involvement of retail investors in AIM 
traded companies through products 
offered by institutional investors, there 
may be scope for more to be done by the 
FSA to improve consumer understanding, 
of the role and status of AIM, and of the 
relative risks of investing in the market. 
3. Role of Nomads
The central plank of the AIM regulatory 
regime is the Nomad system. All those 
seeking admission to AIM must appoint 
a Nomad (Nominated Advisor), and 
must retain one throughout their 
admission to the market. Nomads are 
responsible to the Exchange for assessing 
the appropriateness of an applicant to 
AIM, or an existing AIM company when 
appointed as its nominated advisor, 
and for advising and guiding an AIM 
company on its responsibilities under 
these rules. If an AIM company ceases to 
have a Nomad then trading in its shares 
will be suspended; if none is appointed 
within a month then admission of 
its securities will be cancelled.50
The role of the Nomad is unique to 
AIM. Nomads guarantee the suitability 
of the company for admission to AIM 
and have ongoing responsibilities to the 
Exchange for the company’s continued 
compliance with its rules. They can 
also act as the issuing broker for an 
AIM company and as such have three, 
potentially conflicting, roles: to the 
company; to the Exchange; and their 
own commercial interest in ensuring a 
good flow of companies onto AIM.
The Nomad community has expanded 
since the launch of AIM in 1995. There 
are currently 76 Nomads, although 
activity is heavily concentrated in the 
0 or so Nomads who are appointed to 
around 80 per cent of AIM companies. 
One of the key questions is whether 
the Nomad system has remained 
sufficiently robust. Following a review 
of its regulatory regime for Nomads in 
2006, AIM introduced new Rules for 
Nomads in February 2007 in order to 
emphasise and clarify their obligations.51 
The changes largely turned the previously 
tacit and implicit expectations and 
understandings of AIM and Nomads 
into explicit and formalized rules and 
guidance. Whilst the fundamental 
obligations have not changed, there 
is now far more detailed guidance 
as to Nomads’ obligations both on 
admission and with respect to the 
continuing relationship Nomads are 
expected to have with firms. This helps 
communicate to new Nomads the 
nature of their obligations, and the 
detailed provisions help Nomads explain 
to companies, particularly overseas 
companies, the nature of both parties’ 
responsibilities under the AIM rules. 
Given the extent to which AIM relies 
on market actors to assist with the 
regulatory regime, it is critical that 
Nomads have a full understanding and 
acceptance of their role. In order to try 
to create and preserve a community 
of Nomads who are familiar with the 
market and its obligations, the regulatory 
regime places considerable emphasis 
on the need for Nomads to have prior 
experience before they can become a 
Nomad, and for them to continue to be 
involved in the market to retain their 
Nomad status. To become a Nomad 
both firms and individuals within the 
firm must meet specific requirements as 
to experience and qualifications,52 and 
must be independent from the issuer.5 In 
particular, the applicant firm has to have 
practised corporate finance for at least 
the last two years and / or have acted on 
at least three relevant transactions during 
that period (ie transactions requiring 
a prospectus or offer document on a 
takeover) and has to employ at least four 
qualified executives. Qualified executives 
are full time employees who have acted 
in a corporate finance advisory role for at 
least three years54 and who have acted 
in the lead on at least three appropriate 
capital market transactions in the last 
three years. In order to qualify, the 
applicant firm or qualified executive 
must have acted as lead advisor and 
be prominently and unequivocally 
named in the public documentation 
relating to the transaction. 
50  AIM RC r.1.
51  AIM Rules for Nominated Advisors (RN).
52  Although technically separate, the term Nomads here will be used to refer both to the firm and to qualified executives within the firm.
5  Independence is defined in RN r.21 and Schedule 1; the burden of proof for demonstrating independence lies on the nomad. Independence includes a bar on being 
the reporting accountant and/or auditor for the issuer (unless ‘appropriate safeguards’ are in place); a bar on Nomads, or partners, directors or employees or their 
associates being directors of the issuer; holding over ten per cent of the shares of the issuer; dealing in the securities of the issuer during certain periods; or holding 
over three per cent of the shares unless ‘appropriate safeguards’ are in place; a safe harbour for Chinese walls or equivalent is provided.
54  Acting as legal or accounting advisor does not count for these purposes under the rules.
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In addition, proposed qualified executives 
are required to demonstrate a sound 
understanding of the UK corporate 
finance market and AIM in particular.55
The overriding principle is whether the 
firm or its qualified executives ‘might 
endanger the reputation and integrity 
of AIM’.56 Applications can be refused 
on that ground alone. Nomads are 
also under continuing obligations to 
perform their functions with due skill, 
care and diligence and to avoid all 
conflicts of interest and any semblance 
of conflicts.57 In particular, there is a 
continuing obligation on Nomads to 
comply with the rules relating to the 
number of transactions with respect to 
which they have to act to maintain their 
Nomad status. The Exchange retains the 
right to conduct interviews and tests of 
Nomads to assess their understanding 
of the rules and of corporate finance. 
If it finds that the Nomad has fallen 
below the criteria for recognition at 
any time in any way it may remove its 
Nomad status or impose conditions 
on its ability to act as a Nomad. 
These provisions are more onerous 
than those which apply to sponsors 
for admissions to the Main Market. 
The rules are not new: they were 
contained in almost identical terms 
in the previous rules. However their 
re-publication in the new Nomad rule 
book has heightened their profile, and 
new provisions have been introduced 
requiring Nomads to issue annual returns 
stating who the qualified executives 
are, and what transactions they have 
done to ensure that Nomads take their 
post-IPO responsibilities seriously. 
These provisions are strictly applied by 
AIM, indeed too strictly for some. There 
is evidence that they are beginning 
to have the effect of winnowing out 
Nomads: the number of Nomads 
this year has dropped from 85 to 76 
and is likely to drop further. Despite 
criticisms from some sectors of the 
Nomad community, AIM is right to 
insist on continuing compliance with 
its eligibility requirements in order to 
ensure that the Nomad community 
is fully apprised of its role, and to 
maintain the depth of understanding 
as to the regulatory requirements 
that is necessary for its principles-
based regulatory regime to work.
The duties of Nomads have also been 
more explicitly set out in the new rules. 
On admission Nomads are required to:
• gain a sound understanding of 
the applicant and its business
• investigate and consider the suitability 
of each director and proposed 
director, and the efficacy of the board 
as a whole, and where necessary 
senior managers and substantial 
shareholders, bearing in mind it will 
be admitted to a UK public market
• consider with the company the 
adoption of ‘appropriate corporate 
governance’ measures58
• oversee the due diligence process 
and be satisfied that it has been 
appropriately carried out
• be actively involved in the 
preparation of the admission 
document and satisfy itself that it 
complies with the AIM Rules for 
Companies and that appropriate 
verification has been made59
• satisfy itself that the company 
has sufficient systems, procedures 
and controls to comply with 
AIM rules and understands its 
obligations under them.
Significant emphasis is thus placed on 
the Nomad’s ability to judge whether a 
company is and remains ‘appropriate’ 
for AIM. On admission, the Exchange’s 
role is quite distinct from that played 
by the UKLA with respect to listing 
on the Main Market. AIM does not 
approve the admission document; 
it places the onus on the Nomad to 
ensure that all is in order, that the 
rules have been complied with and 
that the company is ‘appropriate’ to be 
admitted to AIM.60 AIM has only ten 
days notice of the admission document, 
and, in practice, the reliance is almost 
entirely on Nomads to ensure not only 
that the documents are in order but 
that the business of the company, 
its share structure and governance 
structures are all appropriate for AIM.
The key difference between Nomads 
and sponsors is in the continuing 
obligations which Nomads have after 
admission. Again these have been 
reemphasized in the publication of the 
new rules.61 They are required to: 
• maintain regular contact with the 
AIM company in order to ensure 
it remains up to date with what is 
happening in the company and that 
the company continues to understand 
its obligations under the AIM rules
55 AIM RN r.4.
56 AIM RN rr.2-.
57 AIM RN rr.21 and 22.
58 Companies admitted to trading on AIM are not under the ‘comply or explain’ obligation with respect to the Combined Code, in contrast with those listing on the Main Market.
59 Exceptions are made for quoted applicants, as they do not need to produce an admission document (on the basis they will already have been making disclosures in 
their home market).
60 AIM RN r.20 Schedule Two.
61 With some effect, perhaps: see ‘Aim Market: Nomads quit after Exchange tightens rules on advisers’, Daily Telegraph, 22 May 2007.
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• advise the company on any changes 
to its board of directors, assessing 
the suitability of new directors and 
the continued efficacy of the board
• undertake prior review of 
relevant notifications made by 
the AIM company to ensure 
compliance with AIM rules
• monitor (or have in place procedures 
with third parties, usually brokers) 
for monitoring the trading in 
securities of an AIM company 
for which it acts, particularly 
where there is unpublished 
price sensitive information in 
relation to the company.
Nomads are under an obligation 
to seek the advice of the Exchange 
where they are uncertain as to the 
interpretation or application of the 
rules.62 Advice will not be given on a 
hypothetical, no-names basis, however.6 
AIM expects Nomads to be open 
and honest with it, and in return to 
provide clear advice. Under a principles-
based regulatory regime, consistency 
of advice is important, and AIM has 
systems in place to help ensure this. 
In practice, the AIM regulation team 
communicates almost exclusively with 
Nomads, and very rarely with companies. 
The position of Nomads as the regulatory 
front line raises the question of how 
AIM ensures that they are acting 
appropriately, and it is to this and the 
broader question of the operation 
and independence of AIM’s regulatory 
functions that the next section turns.
4. Operation of the AIM 
regulatory regime
4.1 The position of AIM 
within the Exchange’s 
governance structure
AIM is growing in size and significance 
both for the economy and for the 
Exchange. The regulatory regime is 
responding, and the resources being 
put into regulation are expanding. The 
regulatory team is deeply embedded 
within the Exchange’s management 
structure. There is no direct reporting 
line from the head of AIM Regulation 
to a Board member. There is an internal 
AIM management board whose role 
is to coordinate both the commercial 
development of AIM, and its regulatory 
regime. The resilience and integrity of 
that regulatory regime is seen by the 
management board as integral to AIM’s 
success. There is also a group of external 
advisers, the AIM Advisory Group, 
whose role is to ensure the reputation 
and integrity of the AIM market. 
The increased size and significance 
of AIM means that the quality of its 
regulatory regime is relevant not only for 
the Exchange’s own reputation, but is a 
significant matter of public policy. Thus 
far the public interest has been addressed 
through the Exchange meeting its 
recognition requirements for the FSA. 
These have not to date included a 
requirement that its regulatory regime be 
separated from its commercial functions, 
nor is one proposed. However, the recent 
changes in the size and nature of AIM, 
combined with changes introduced by 
EU law in the Exchange’s regulatory 
responsibilities and in particular the 
conflicts of interest requirement, raise 
the question of whether AIM’s regulation 
can continue to be treated as a relatively 
small part of the Exchange’s operations.
Exchanges have in the past had 
significant difficulties with actual or 
perceived conflicts of interest between 
their commercial and regulatory roles. 
In response, many have hived off their 
regulatory functions into separate 
bodies which are clearly independent, 
or abandoned them altogether.64 The 
New York Stock Exchange, for example, 
established NYSE Regulation Inc, a non-
profit company established in 2006 to 
regulate its markets, including Euronext. 
NYSE Regulation Inc is part of the NYSE 
Group but has a separate board of 
directors, the majority of whom are not 
affiliated with any other NYSE Board. 
NYSE Regulation and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
have recently announced that they will 
merge to form the world’s largest self 
regulatory body, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) with over 
000 staff, to regulate their markets 
under the oversight of the SEC.65 
There are differences in the scale of the 
markets and in the regulatory model 
between AIM and these markets,66 
but the question has to be addressed 
as to whether there needs to be a 
greater organizational separation of 
AIM’s regulatory and other roles. 
62 RN r.19.
6 RN r.19.
64 Again the body will operate independently from the markets. In Canada, on its demutualization the Ontario Securities Commission required the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) to establish a separate and independent Regulatory Services division: 2 OSCB 2945 (www.osc.gov.on.ca/MarketRegulation/Marketplaces/Exchanges/
ro/TSE/xro-tse_2-OSCB-2495.pdf). In practice a separate company was formed in 2004, Market Regulation Services Inc, to formulate rules ensuring the integrity of 
trading on those markets who wish to adopt its rules, notably TSX and TSX-V, overseen by the Ontario Securities Commission.
65 It was going to be called the Securities Industry Regulatory Authority, but NASD announced in July 2007 that the name would be changed following representations 
that the acronym SIRA could cause confusion or offence due to its similarity with the Arabic term used to refer to biographies of Muhammed.
66 Though these differences of scale are not so considerable in comparison to TSX, for example.
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There is considerable academic and 
regulatory debate as to whether or 
not any exchange can also perform 
a regulatory role, particularly once 
demutualized.67 Whilst some exchanges 
have divested themselves, or been 
divested, of their regulatory functions, 
others have not. Arguments can be 
made either way: competition between 
exchanges could lead to a ‘race to 
the bottom’ or conversely a ‘race to 
the top’ depending on whether a 
strong regulatory regime plays a role 
in attracting business. As an IOSCO 
report concluded, there is no universal 
solution; rather each situation should be 
considered on the basis of the quality of 
the regulatory regime as it operates in 
practice. It is clearly an issue which has to 
be kept under view.68 The Exchange has 
taken the view that the regulation of AIM 
is sufficiently operationally autonomous 
from the rest of the organisation and 
that there is no need for change. 
4.2 Enforcement 
The Exchange has three main sets of 
enforcement powers: to suspend trading 
or cancel admission; to take disciplinary 
action against issuing companies; 
and to take disciplinary action against 
Nomads. In February 2007 it introduced 
the power to issue warning notices 
and doubled the maximum fine that 
can be levied by the executive panel to 
£50,000. The external AIM Disciplinary 
Committee can impose unlimited 
fines on companies and Nomads.
The Exchange can exercise supervisory 
and enforcement powers against both 
issuers and Nomads. The Exchange 
may suspend trading in securities: 
• Where trading in those securities 
is not being conducted in 
an orderly manner
• Where it considers that an 
AIM company has failed to 
comply with the rules
• For the protection of investors
• Where the integrity and 
reputation of the markets has 
been or may be impaired.69
It may cancel admission where a 
suspension has been in place for six 
months or where it considers that 
the AIM company has breached the 
rules.70 It may also take disciplinary 
action with respect to rule breaches 
by issuing a warning notice, a fine or 
censure the company, and publish 
the fact of the fine or censure 
(though not the warning notice). 
Companies have the right to appeal.
The Exchange has equivalent 
enforcement powers with respect to 
Nomads. It can remove the qualified 
executive status of an employee of a 
Nomad for breach of the AIM rules on 
both companies and nomads, and for 
failing to act with due skill care and 
diligence.71 It can also take disciplinary 
action against Nomad firms for breach 
of the rules or if it considers that ‘the 
integrity or reputation has been or may 
be impaired as a result of its conduct or 
judgement’. In such circumstances the 
Exchange can levy a fine, ‘name and 
shame’, remove the nomad from the 
register, and publish the action it has 
taken and reasons for that action.72 The 
Exchange can also prevent the firm from 
acting as a Nomad whilst disciplinary 
proceedings are taking place, or if it fails 
to meet its recognition requirements, 
is not meeting its obligations or 
has insufficient staff to do so.7 
AIM focuses its supervisory attention 
primarily on Nomads. In practice, 
AIM has not had a policy of regular, 
proactive inspections of all Nomads. 
It has conducted reviews of certain 
themes or issues. For example, following 
the increase in mining, oil and gas 
companies, mainly from overseas, 
coming to the market in 2004-5, the 
AIM regulatory team conducted a 
review of the requirements with respect 
to these companies leading to the 
formulation of additional requirements, 
in particular the need for a competent 
person’s report on the company and 
its resources. These were published 
in a guidance note for oil, mining and 
gas companies in March 2006.74 
Outside the thematic reviews, 
investigation of individual Nomads has 
been largely reactive: to information 
given by others, to press reports, to 
67 See for example IOSCO Technical Committee, Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualization (IOSCO, 2001); P.G. Mahoney, ‘The Exchange as Regulator’ (1997) 8 Virginia 
Law Review 145; R.S. Karmel, ‘Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges’ (2002) 5 Hastings Law 
Journal 67; J.C. Coffee, ‘Racing Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance’ (2002) 102 
Columbia Law Review 1757; E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 7.
68 IOSCO Technical Committee, Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualisation (IOSCO 2001).
69 RC r.42.
70 RC r.40.
71 Qualified executives can also be removed if they are declared bankrupt, are the subject of disciplinary action by another regulator or becomes mentally incapacitated: 
RN 27.
72 RN r.29.
7 RN r.0.
74 AIM Guidance Note for Mining, Oil and Gas Companies, March 2006. These set out requirements for a competent person’s report to be given on all the material assets 
and liaibilities of the applicant, a formal legal opinion letter to be given on, inter alia, the title or validity and enforceability of any assets, and for the Nomad to conduct 
a site visit and physical inspection and to have access to specialist sector experts. It also requires resource and drilling updates to be provided to the market, signed off 
by an appropriately qualified person.
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indications arising from communications 
with Nomads that something might be 
amiss, or other indicators such as high 
turnover with a Nomad or low levels of 
resourcing of the Nomad function within 
the firm. As a result of the internal review 
of AIM’s regulatory operations, annual 
returns have been introduced in 2007 
for Nomads to facilitate a more proactive 
supervisory strategy. Annual returns 
will be monitored for the purposes of 
assessing the continued eligibility of 
the Nomad, for example the number 
of relevant transactions completed. 
In addition, compliance visits will be 
conducted to ensure compliance with 
Nomads’ obligations under the rules. 
A broad risk assessment is undertaken 
and Nomads prioritized on the basis of 
their impact (measured by the number of 
companies they work for), their systems 
and controls and the quality of their 
work and behaviour as Nomads. Firms 
with good systems and controls are not 
necessarily assumed to be good Nomads: 
they may act as a Nomad only rarely or 
not resource the function effectively, 
and conversely being a good Nomad 
does not mean there are necessarily 
appropriate systems and controls in 
place. Compliance visits are to become 
far more structured processes lasting 
about two weeks in which the AIM 
team will review at least one admission 
and one continuing relationship with 
a company, and interview senior 
executives and compliance managers. 
Inspection and compliance activities 
are being facilitated by the greater 
specification of Nomad duties in 
Schedule , and by the increased size of 
the AIM regulatory team. It could still 
potentially take up to three years to get 
through the first round of visits to all 
Nomads, but given the concentration 
of companies with certain Nomads, 40 
per cent of Nomads (calculated on the 
basis of the number of companies they 
act for) should be visited within the 
first twelve months. Many Nomads are 
also sponsors for companies going to 
the Main Market. The AIM team works 
closely with the UKLA in relation to the 
supervision of advisers, although the 
two regulators conduct their supervisory 
functions independently of one another, 
on separate visits, with relevant 
information being communicated 
between them. Specialists are also 
appointed on a more individual basis, to 
investigate issues where more specialist 
knowledge might be necessary, for 
example with respect to particular types 
of companies or those who are active 
in particular sectors (eg mining).75 
Investigations have so far rarely led to 
formal enforcement actions being taken 
against issuers or Nomads. In 2005 there 
were five private censures of issuers 
and Nomads and one public censure 
(of Durlacher Corporation, a Nomad); 
there was one private censure in 2006. 
In October 2007 Nabarro Wells became 
the first Nomad to be fined as well as 
publicly censured for breaching the rules 
of the market. The breaches included 
the failure to undertake the necessary 
level of due diligence on companies that 
it was bringing to AIM; the fine for this 
and other failings was £250,000. As in 
this case, there are strong arguments 
for making enforcement decisions public 
where the conduct of a Nomad or 
issuer is sufficiently serious or relevant 
to investors. Publication improves the 
transparency of the AIM regulatory 
and enforcement process. It can also 
have a significant deterrent effect, and 
provide leverage for Nomads when 
explaining the obligations of Nomads 
and issuers to issuing companies. 
5. Role of the FSA
5.1 Role of the FSA as regulator 
of the Exchange and AIM
As a market operated by the Exchange, 
AIM falls within the scope of regulation 
by the FSA. There is a separate 
team within the FSA responsible for 
monitoring the Exchange, including 
AIM, and supervision occurs on a 
‘close and continuous’ basis. The 
FSA uses its risk based supervisory 
framework, Arrow II, to assess AIM. 
Arrow II identifies the risks that those 
being regulated by the FSA pose to 
the FSA’s objectives, and assesses the 
level of those risks within the business 
and control functions of the firm. 
As a regulator of a regulator, the FSA 
has to decide to what extent it is going 
to rely on AIM’s reports as to how it is 
performing its regulatory functions, and 
to what extent it is going to assess this 
directly itself. The Exchange is responsible 
for monitoring and enforcing the AIM 
rules including the performance of 
Nomads, but the FSA has a clear interest 
in understanding the arrangements the 
Exchange has in place for doing this 
and in monitoring the effectiveness 
of the Exchange’s oversight of the 
market, especially with regard to the 
maintenance of orderly, clear, and proper 
markets. As part of this the FSA talks to 
market participants about the way that 
AIM is performing its regulatory role.
The FSA is aware of the Exchange’s 
concerns as to whether the regulation 
of AIM was keeping pace with the 
rapid growth of the market. Whilst 
75 The FSA has been moving away from requiring routine audits of returns for some time, and is proposing to cease it altogether for most types of firms (see FSA, 
External Assurance of Regulatory Returns, CP 07/15 (July 2007); but it does use external assurers on a bespoke basis quite regularly.
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welcoming the recent changes in the 
rules and regulatory operations, it is 
keen to see the effectiveness of these 
changes and has worked with the 
Exchange to better understand this.
5.2 FSA regulation of 
AIM companies and 
dealings on AIM
Companies admitted to AIM are 
required to comply with the rules of 
the Exchange. Those undertaking 
investment business in the UK are also 
required to be authorised by the FSA 
and as such are subject to the relevant 
FSA rules, including those relating 
to conduct of business. In addition, 
activities on AIM are covered by the 
FSA’s Code of Market Conduct which 
sets out the types of market activity 
that amount to market abuse. 
The Exchange monitors trading on AIM 
in real time with the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with its own rules and also 
of identifying potential market abuse. 
Any potential cases of market abuse are 
notified to the FSA. In addition, the FSA 
also receives transaction reports which 
come in at the end of each business 
day. The FSA is currently developing a 
new system, SABRE II, a database of 
all transactions with a system of alerts 
to identify suspicious trades. This will 
further enhance the FSA’s ability to 
identify suspicious transactions which 
could amount to market abuse. 
The fragmentation of trading venues 
gives rise to a host of regulatory 
difficulties relating to monitoring of the 
markets. Both the Exchange and the FSA 
are currently consulting on a number 
of proposals relating to post-trade 
transparency reporting, for example, to 
improve transparency and the flow of 
information going to each of them to 
enable them to perform their market 
monitoring responsibilities.76 These 
fall outside the scope of this report.
Summary
The AIM regulatory regime has 
undergone considerable change in 
the last year. The AIM rules have 
been clarified and obligations of both 
Nomads and companies have been more 
explicitly set out. The resourcing of AIM’s 
regulatory functions has increased and a 
more systematic approach for monitoring 
all Nomads is being introduced. 
It is as yet too early to assess how the 
new regime for supervising Nomads will 
operate and whether the AIM regulatory 
team is sufficiently well resourced to 
implement the new regime effectively. 
The robustness of a regulatory regime 
lies as much in its implementation as in 
its rules, and the Nomad system remains 
critical to the effectiveness of the AIM 
regulatory system. The recent changes 
demonstrate that AIM, the Exchange and 
the FSA recognize the need to ensure 
that its regulatory regime is adapted in a 
way that meets the challenges brought 
about by the expansion of the market. 
76 FSA, Trading of MTF Shares: impact of proposed stamp duty changes DP07/ (July 2007); AIM Notice 18/07 Registered Organisations for AIM Securities (April, 2007).
1
What sort of companies come to 
AIM and what do they get out 
of it? The broad answer is that 
they are predominantly small and 
medium-sized companies that 
want to grow, and they come to 
AIM in order to raise capital from 
knowledgeable investors who 
are likely, if the business fulfils its 
promise, to support further fund-
raising at a later date. New entrants 
range from early stage businesses 
which might have an initial market 
value of £10m or less to more 
established companies which might 
be capitalised at £50m or more. 
The average market capitalisation 
of AIM companies has risen from 
£24m in 2003 to £65m in 2007, 
but there is a continuing inflow of 
smaller and less mature businesses, 
mainly from within the UK. 
Overview
AIM companies can be classified by 
sector, by market capitalisation, and by 
country of operation. As Table 4.1 shows, 
the resources sector makes up the largest 
part of AIM on the basis of market 
capitalisation, and these companies 
tend to be appreciably larger than, for 
example, companies in the technology 
sector, which make up 15 per cent of 
all AIM companies but only seven per 
cent of the market capitalisation; the 
resources sector is also the one with the 
largest number of foreign companies. 
The foreign companies that come to AIM 
are on average larger than the British 
constituents. As Table 4.2 shows, there 
are 141 foreign companies valued at 
£100m or more, and they account for 
more than three-quarters of the total 
market capitalisation of AIM’s non-
British contingent. (These figures exclude 
those foreign companies which are 
traded on AIM through UK-domiciled 
‘top companies’.) The striking feature 
of this table is the large number of 
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The companies on AIM
By number of companies By market value
Financials 21 29
Resources 17 1
Technology 15 7
Business services 8 6
Media and content 7 4
Lifestyle 4 
Health 7 5
Industrials 9 7
Consumer products 7 5
Construction  2
Other 2 1
Table 4.1 Breakdown of AIM companies by sector (per cent) – first quarter 2007
Source: AIM Investor Survey 2007, Arbuthnot Securities
Current Size
May 2007 May 2007
Numbers Market Cap. (£ million)
Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total
>= 100 million 1 141 274 29,406 4,914 73,320
50 to 100 million 141 92 233 10,122 6,689 16,811
40 to 50 million 50 27 77 2,264 1,24 3,498
30 to 40 million 74 7 111 2,582 1,259 3,841
20 to 30 million 114 47 161 2,88 1,171 4,010
10 to 20 million 210 60 270 2,994 899 3,893
 5 to 10 million 179 49 219 1,261 56 1,616
<= 5 million 252 42 294 580 97 677
Total 1,144 495 1,639 52,046 55,620 107,656
Table 4.2 Breakdown of AIM companies by market capitalisation (May 2007) 
Source: London Stock Exchange: AIM statistics 
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Table 4.3 Breakdown of AIM companies by country or region of operation (June 2007)
Source: London Stock Exchange
Table 4.4 Winners of the Aim Company of the Year Award 1996-2006
Moorepay – processor of payrolls for smaller companies (subsequently taken over)
International Greetings – greeting card supplier
Ask Central – pizza chain (subsequently taken over)
Independent Energy – gas and electricity supplier (failed after move to Main Market)
Access Plus – print management company (subsequently taken over) 
Inter Link Foods, supplier of cakes to supermarkets (cancelled)
Majestic Wine – chain of wine stores 
Mears – support services group
Connaught – facilities management group (moved to Main Market)
Ideal Shopping Direct – distance retailer via TV and internet
Synergy Healthcare – health care equipment and services
Country/region No of 
companies
% Market 
value (£m)
%
UK 1,144 70.0 52,046 48. 
Rest of Europe 151 9.2 18,896 17.7
Americas 141 8.6 17,165 15.9
Asia 119 7.2 10,941 10.2
Australasia 48 2.9 ,978 .6
Africa 6 2.1 4,640  4.
Totals 1,639 100.0 107,666 100.0
British companies valued at £20m or less 
– representing just over half of all AIM’s 
British companies, but under ten per 
cent of their total market capitalisation. 
A third way of classifying AIM companies 
is by country of operation – that is, the 
country where their principal assets 
are located even if they were admitted 
to AIM through a UK-registered ‘top 
company’. As Table 4. shows, the 
largest non-British component is from 
other parts of Europe (including Ireland), 
followed by the Americas. This includes 
69 from the US, 46 from Canada and 
five from Brazil. From Asia, China is 
well represented with 49 companies, 
India with 21, and Israel with 20. 
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British companies
At the heart of the British contingent 
on AIM are companies valued in the 
range of £50m-£500m, operating with 
a clear business plan in industries which 
are easily understood by investors. A 
snapshot of the kind of company that 
can do well on AIM is provided in Table 
4.4, which lists the companies that have 
won the ‘AIM Company of the Year’ 
award in the period from 1995 to 2007.77 
Among these eleven companies, 
Connaught, the facilities management 
group which is profiled on this page, 
is a good example of a company 
which used AIM to make the transition 
from a family-controlled to a more 
widely held enterprise, and one that 
was better equipped to expand by 
acquisition. AIM served the company 
well, and as it became bigger and 
of more interest to a wider range of 
investors, it reached the point where 
a transfer to the Main Market made 
sense. While the decision on whether 
to move from AIM to the Main Market 
can be finely balanced (as discussed 
later in this section), Connaught’s 
advisers believed that the transfer would 
expose the company to a different set 
of investors, including institutions which 
are restricted in the amount they can 
invest in AIM companies. The move 
to the Main Market did not involve 
any significant changes in corporate 
governance, since the company’s 
arrangements were already broadly 
in line with the Combined Code. 
Connaught plc
Connaught was started in 1982 by Bill 
Tincknell and his son Mark, focusing 
on the concrete repair business and 
mainly dealing with older tower 
blocks that had been built in the 
1950s and 1960s. Local authorities 
and housing associations were the 
company’s principal customers.
In 1996 Mr Tincknell senior retired 
from the business and his shares 
were bought by his son and three 
other senior managers. The buy-
out was supported by the venture 
capital arm of HSBC, which acquired 
20 per cent of the equity. Two years 
later the company was floated 
on AIM, enabling HSBC to exit 
(though it retained a small holding 
in the company through a Venture 
Capital Trust). Most of the investors 
which acquired shares at the time 
of the flotation were institutions 
specialising in small cap stocks, VCTs 
and some IHT funds. The proportion 
of shares held by management after 
the flotation was around 50 per cent. 
In 2002 the company acquired 
Gasforce, which had originally 
been British Gas’s commercial 
and industrial servicing arm; it 
had been sold to employees in 
1996. There were 240 employee 
shareholders, all of whom became 
shareholders in Connaught through 
the acquisition. The cost of the 
purchase was £21.7m (Connaught’s 
market capitalisation at the time was 
£28m) and it was partly financed by 
a secondary share issue on AIM.
The subsequent growth of the 
business brought Connaught to a 
size where it could consider moving 
to the Main Market, and it did so 
in 2006. It did not have to make 
the switch, but its brokers advised 
that, if it wanted to continue to 
grow, it needed to broaden the 
investor base and attract institutions 
which were restricted in the 
amount of money that they could 
invest in AIM, including tracker 
funds which invest in the FTSE 
Small Cap Index but not in AIM. 
The move did not require significant 
changes in corporate governance. 
The board and management had 
been strengthened at the time of 
the AIM flotation, including the 
appointment of a new finance 
director. Mark Davies, who had 
previously held senior executive 
posts in Courtaulds and Chubb, 
was brought in as chief operating 
officer in 2004, and he became 
chief executive in 2006. When the 
company floated on AIM there 
were four executive directors and 
two non-executives on the board; 
there are now three executives 
and three non-executives.
Mark Davies has no doubt that 
AIM served the company well. ‘For 
eight years, from 1998 to 2006, it 
provided us with a very supportive 
environment’. Flotation allowed 
the VC backers to exit, and gave 
the company an opportunity to 
make a large acquisition which 
would have been difficult to 
handle if it had stayed private. The 
acquisition brought in a new group 
of shareholders, who saw Connaught 
77 The award scheme is sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers in association with the London Stock Exchange. According to the prospectus for the scheme, the Company 
of the Year ‘will have demonstrated to its new shareholders that it is a responsible, fully accountable, dynamic business with strong growth prospects and a commitment 
to AIM. The Company of the Year’s growth prospects will be excellent but these prospects will not necessarily have manifested themselves in results announced to date. 
Above all, the winner will be a serious, well-managed business, having attracted public funding to enhance and develop its growth potential to the full’.
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as a company that was ambitious to 
grow. Today institutional investors, 
including well-known names such 
as Scottish Widows, Standard Life 
and Fidelity, own 80 per cent of the 
company, with managers, employees 
and ex employees accounting 
for 17 per cent, and private 
investors around three per cent.
Another company which has followed 
a similar path to Connaught is Mecom 
Group. Floated on AIM in 2005 and 
run by former newspaper editor David 
Montgomery, it has built up a group 
of newspapers in Continental Europe, 
including Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Poland and Germany; these 
acquisitions have been partly financed 
by the issue of Mecom shares. With 
a market capitalisation of over £1bn, 
it has been one of the highest-valued 
stocks on AIM, and is expected to move 
to the Main Market later in the year. 
Connaught and Mecom have been 
star performers, but many of the other 
British companies which constitute 
the heartland of AIM are likely to 
satisfy their growth ambitions without 
moving to the Main Market, and have 
no ambitions to make the switch. An 
example is Murgitroyd, the patent 
and trade mark attorney practice 
which is profiled on this page. 
Murgitroyd Group
Murgitroyd Group, a European 
Patent and Trade Mark Attorney 
practice headquartered in Glasgow, 
was floated on AIM in 2001. 
The business was founded as a 
sole practitioner and became a 
partnership in the late-1970s. It 
was incorporated in 1993, with Ian 
Murgitroyd and two other founding 
partners as sole shareholders. 
The decision to float on AIM, as Keith 
Young, chief executive, explains, was 
to achieve four things. The first was 
to allow two of the three partners 
to make a partial exit. The second 
was to restructure the financial 
base of the business, replacing bank 
debt with equity. The third was 
to obtain access to a larger pool 
of capital in order to facilitate the 
growth of the company. There were 
no plans at the time of flotation 
for major new investment, and the 
acquisitions which the company 
has made have been paid for in 
cash rather than shares. But the 
stronger financial base has enabled 
the company to grow faster than it 
would otherwise have done; it has 
been able to finance organic growth 
and acquisitions in parallel, whereas 
pre-AIM each move would have been 
made sequentially. Fourth, having 
the shares publicly quoted has been 
helpful for recruiting and retaining 
key people. As a professional 
services business Murgitroyd is 
dependent on a small number of 
highly qualified employees. The 
higher profile that comes from being 
publicly quoted is useful, as is the 
ability to put in place remuneration 
arrangements that are linked to the 
share price. Employees looking to 
acquire equity in the business can 
do so in a straightforward way.
The AIM flotation enabled the 
company to make progress on all 
four fronts. No major changes had 
to be made in corporate governance 
when the company floated – three 
non executive directors were 
appointed, with Ian Murgitroyd 
remaining as Executive Chairman. 
Some 45 per cent of the shares are 
now held by people in the business, 
or by members of the families 
of the founding partners. The 
balance is largely in the hands of 
institutions, most of whom have held 
the shares since the flotation. The 
shares are seen by the institutions 
as consistent performers, with the 
business growing organically at 
around ten per cent a year, paying 
regular dividends and offering the 
prospect of predictable growth. 
Companies like Connaught and 
Murgitroyd are profit-making when they 
come to AIM; the nature of their business 
can be easily explained to investors. This 
is not the case with many of AIM’s high-
technology companies, which come to 
the market at an earlier stage in their 
development. The value of AIM for 
companies of this sort is that it provides 
an alternative, or least a supplement, 
to venture capital funding. As British 
venture capital firms have increasingly 
focused on larger transactions, including 
management buy-outs, a gap has 
opened up in the financing of early-
stage businesses. Flotation on AIM is 
a way of filling the gap, and young 
companies in high-technology industries 
have been able to attract investors who 
are knowledgeable about these sectors 
and willing to take the risk of investing 
in what is inevitably a speculative area. 
The case of Plant Impact, profiled on 
this page, illustrates this process. 
Plant Impact 
Plant Impact has its origins in 1993, 
when PiBioscience was formed to 
bring to market a range of nutrient 
products designed by the group’s 
technical director, David Marks. 
Marks had previously worked with 
Peter Blezard at the European 
subsidiary of a US agrochemicals 
group; Blezard became the chief 
executive of the new company. 
Its focus was on developing crop 
nutrients and natural pesticides that 
improve the health and productivity 
of crops, while also being non-
toxic and environmentally sound. 
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At the start the business consisted 
of two separate companies – one 
focusing on nutrients and the 
other on pesticides – with common 
ownership and management. Early 
funding came from a group of 
business angels in the North West, 
and from the Rising Stars Growth 
Fund, a specialist venture capital 
fund set up with the support of the 
North West Development Agency 
to invest in early stage technology 
companies in the region. 
The initial investment from Rising 
Stars was £30,000, and the fund 
continued to invest in the business 
as work continued on a promising 
new pesticide for which patent 
protection was secured. The business 
was reorganised in 2005 and the 
two separate companies were 
brought together to form Plant 
Impact. Although still loss-making, 
it was making good progress and 
needed more capital An additional 
£500,000 was raised in June 2005, 
partly from Rising Stars, partly 
from private investors; the latter 
included Martin Robinson, who 
became non-executive chairman, 
and Gordon Harman, who became 
finance director. Robinson was 
formerly chief executive of Lloyd 
Street Private Equity and of Henry 
Cooke Group; he has been involved 
in AIM from the start of the market 
and is currently chairman of another 
AIM company, Braemar Group.
This was followed a few months 
later by the raising of a further 
£1m, coming partly from several 
venture capital firms including YFM 
and Rising Stars, and a new group 
of business angels. This was seen 
as a precursor to an AIM flotation, 
and the investors subscribed for 
convertible loan stock which would 
be converted into shares (at a 
discount) at the time of flotation.
The AIM flotation took place in 
October 2006, with Grant Thornton 
acting as the Nominated Adviser and 
Fiske as broker. Out of the £4.25m 
raised, some £3.75m came from new 
investors, including a number of 
institutions specialising in small cap 
stocks as well as private investors. 
The free float at the start amounted 
to 48 per cent of the equity though 
this will increase after the lock-
in period expires. Rising Stars has 
continued as a major investor, with 
a representative on the board. 
Martin Robinson regards what has 
been achieved so far as a good 
example of what AIM can do for 
early-stage companies. Plant Impact 
has a pipeline of promising products, 
but needs more capital to exploit 
them. There is a fair prospect that 
further funds could be raised on 
AIM over the next couple of years, 
and the company could then reach 
a size where it will attract the 
attention of the big players in the 
agrochemical industry. The options 
could then include licensing the 
technology to one such company, 
or the outright sale of the group. 
If all goes well, AIM will prove to 
have been an appropriate vehicle 
for financing a technology-based 
business during a particular phase of 
its development, and for generating 
a good return for investors. 
The suitability of such early-stage 
companies for the public markets is a 
matter of some debate. That they are 
loss-making is not in itself an argument 
against flotation, but some observers 
believe that an early-stage company 
in a high technology sector should 
plan to raise enough money through 
the Initial Public Offering to take the 
business through to the point where it 
is profit-making, or least cash-positive. 
Going to investors for more money just 
to keep the business alive is difficult, 
unless the company can demonstrate 
a clear pathway to viability. Yet there 
are many AIM companies which are in 
this situation, and only a few will make 
it through to commercial success. 
This is part of the larger question of 
whether there are too many small, 
under-performing companies on AIM. 
Although there is no minimum size 
requirement for new AIM companies, the 
costs associated with flotation make it 
uneconomic for companies to raise much 
less than £10m in their IPO. However, 
there are nearly 500 companies on AIM 
with a market capitalisation of less than 
£10m, and they represent nearly 0 per 
cent of the British contingent in terms 
of numbers, although only two per cent 
of the market’s total capitalisation.78 Of 
course not every new entrant to AIM can 
expect to become big, but the presence 
of so many small, illiquid stocks does 
not enhance the quality of the market.
Some market participants describe the 
lower end of AIM as ‘public venture 
capital’, and it attracts a different sort 
of investor from the larger end. But for 
companies in this category AIM does 
play an important role. In particular, 
it has contributed to the growth of 
high-technology sectors which would 
otherwise have been constrained by a 
lack of capital at crucial stage in their 
growth; the case of the biotechnology 
industry is discussed in Section 7. 
Whether some of these companies 
come to the market too early is an open 
question, but the main determinant is 
78  It is worth noting that on the Main Market there are 88 companies valued at less than £10m, 81 valued at £10m-£25m and 111 valued at £25m-£50m. These three 
groups account for 25 per cent of the 119 companies listed, but less than one per cent of the total Main Market equity value.
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whether they can attract support from 
investors who understand both the 
industry and the company’s business; 
the presence of such knowledgeable 
investors is one of AIM’s strengths. 
Foreign companies 
When the push for foreign companies 
began in 2002, the first targets were 
mining and other natural resources 
companies, with the two largest sources 
being Australia and Canada. Most of 
them came to AIM through a dual 
listing with their home exchange, and 
this was facilitated by the Designated 
Markets Initiative, introduced by the 
Stock Exchange in 200. Of the 1 
Canadian companies quoted on AIM 
in mid-2005, 22 were oil and gas or 
mining companies. Only three were 
traded solely on AIM; the others were 
listed on either the main Toronto Stock 
Exchange or Toronto’s ‘junior’ exchange, 
TSX Ventures. One of the attractions 
of AIM for these companies was that it 
allowed them to raise modest amounts 
of money – say £20m to £0m – by 
means of placements with institutions, 
and to do so within a flexible regulatory 
regime. Another attraction was the 
long-established reputation of London 
as a repository of expertise in mining 
and other resource-based stocks; 
there is a clustering effect here which 
has worked to AIM’s advantage. 
Outside the resources sector most of 
the foreign companies which have 
come to AIM are those which conduct 
a large part of their business outside 
their home country; they are looking to 
the London market, not just as a means 
of raising new capital, but as a way 
of making themselves better known 
internationally. One example is Protonex, 
a Massachusetts-based company which 
makes fuel cell systems for military 
and commercial applications; it raised 
$16m on AIM in July 2006. Its chief 
executive, Scott Pearson, commented 
later that AIM admission had given the 
company an awareness and credibility 
outside the US. ‘We are not viewed as 
just an American company any more’.79
One of the reasons why American 
companies come to AIM is that capital-
raising by small companies on the public 
markets has become more difficult and 
more expensive in the US. Estimates 
made by Canaccord Adams (shown in the 
Appendix to this section) indicate that 
for a $50m company the costs of an IPO 
in the US are around $5.2m, compared 
to $.9m on AIM, and that the annual 
running costs for a public company are 
about $2.m in the US, compared with 
slightly more than $900,000 on AIM. 
Bigger companies, whether based in 
the US or outside, will continue to list 
on NASDAQ or the New York Stock 
Exchange because of the depth of 
the US capital market – and, in many 
cases, the need to raise their profile 
in what may be the largest market for 
their products. But there is a gap for 
smaller companies which AIM has been 
able to fill. The Citel story, described 
on this page, illustrates this point. 
Citel
Seattle-based Citel is a 
telecommunications specialist that 
has its origins in work carried out 
in Nottingham, England, in the 
early 1990s on linking the personal 
computer to the telephone system. 
The company was founded in 1995, 
and it went through several rounds 
of financing from leading British 
venture capitalists such as MTI and 
Advent Venture Partners. However, 
the PC/telephone concept proved 
difficult to commercialise – not just 
for Citel but for others who tried 
to develop that market – and by 
early 2000 it was clear that a change 
of direction was needed. At that 
point Mike Robinson was brought 
in as chief technology officer; he is 
now chief executive. He had spent 
twelve years with Active Voice, 
which had developed innovative 
software for voice mail and Internet 
Protocol (IP) telephony. (Active 
Voice floated on NASDAQ in 1992 
at a valuation of $63m, and was 
acquired by Cisco in 2001 for $267m.) 
In 2001, under Robinson’s guidance, 
Citel switched its attention to the 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) 
arena, and developed a device 
that enabled companies to link 
their existing business telephones 
to a VoIP-based communications 
network. The device was originally 
known as the Handset Gateway, 
and has now been renamed a 
Telephone VOIP Adaptor (TVA). A 
major effort was launched to find 
partners and customers for the 
device, focusing primarily on the 
US. A big step forward for Citel 
was a co-development and co-
marketing deal with 3Com, which 
was then the leading player in VOIP 
telephone systems; a few months 
later another partnership deal 
was negotiated with Mitel. These 
developments formed the basis for 
another round of venture capital 
finance in the autumn of 2001.
Although the company still did its 
development work in Nottingham, 
Citel’s centre of gravity was 
shifting to the US, which was 
the primary market for the new 
device. The company headquarters 
was moved to Seattle in 2003. 
79  Susan Arterian Chang, ‘Tech start-ups spurn NASDAQ for London’, IEEE Spectrum, December 2006.
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Development work continued 
over the next few years, but the 
company was still loss-making; it 
needed a broader product base 
and it needed one of the big US 
telecommunications carriers to 
commit to VOIP using the Citel 
device. The first problem was dealt 
with in January, 2005, when Citel 
acquired MCK Communications, 
which made a product with similar 
technology to Citel’s TVA. Citel 
now had about 45 employees split 
between the Seattle headquarters, 
the development centre in 
Nottingham, and MCK’s development 
office in Calgary, Canada. 
By the start of 2006 the business 
was gaining momentum, and in 
the spring of that year Sprint, one 
of the big telecommunications 
carriers, decided to invest on a 
substantial scale in a VOIP system 
using the Citel device. This would 
involve a large increase in the 
scale of Citel’s output, and the 
company would need more capital. 
After considering the possibility of 
a further private round of finance, 
the board decided on a public 
flotation, and Robinson and his 
team considered a range of options, 
including the over-the-counter 
market in the US. NASDAQ was ruled 
out, mainly because Citel was too 
small – it needed to raise some $15m 
– $20m, whereas the minimum size 
of a NASDAQ issue, given the costs 
involved, would be at least $50m. 
AIM was chosen because it was well 
equipped to serve small, growing 
companies; it had investors who 
were comfortable with the high-risk/
high-return nature of this type of 
business; and it had an appropriate 
level of regulation. The fact that 
Citel was partly British was also a 
factor, though not a decisive one.
Citel raised $17m through the IPO 
at a price of 95p; the NOMAD and 
broker was Panmure Gordon, and the 
shares were taken up by a range of 
UK institutions, including some that 
specialised in IT companies as well as 
some generalist investors. After the 
IPO, Citel suffered a setback as Sprint 
ran into technical problems with its 
VOIP launch (not linked to Citel’s 
equipment) and the promised orders 
did not materialise. However, other 
carrier partnerships and customer 
wins have recently been announced. 
Robinson has no doubt that coming 
to AIM was the right decision. He sees 
AIM playing the same role for small 
technology-based companies that 
NASDAQ played some 15-20 years 
ago. ‘NASDAQ has become too big 
and too crowded’, he says, ‘and it is 
very hard for a small company to get 
any attention, quite apart from the 
costs involved. One of the attractions 
of AIM is that you can start small and 
grow organically into a substantial 
size – perhaps a $500m business 
or even more – without having to 
move to a different exchange.’ 
The clustering effect which applies in the 
mining industry may also be influencing 
some American companies. One of 
the fastest-growing parts of AIM in 
the last two years has been the ‘clean 
technology’ sector, comprising companies 
which specialise in renewable energy. 
One example is Los Angeles based Solar 
Integrated Technologies, which makes 
turnkey photovoltaic roofing systems for 
commercial and industrial applications. 
It came to AIM in 2004 ‘because of the 
desire of our customers to grow our 
presence in Europe’ and to gain access to 
‘the sophisticated investor base focused 
in the emerging renewable energy 
sector’.80 AIM is increasingly becoming 
the home for cleantech companies 
across the globe.81 Of the 25 companies 
which make up this sector on AIM, 
more than half are based in the US. 
Several leading US investment banks have 
acquired Nomad status. For example, 
Jefferies, a New York-based investment 
bank and securities firm, became a 
Nomad last year; it acts as broker for 14 
AIM companies and Nomad for ten of 
them, including four American and two 
Canadian companies. Jefferies focuses 
on larger companies, principally those 
which either have a market capitalisation 
of £75m or more at the time of flotation 
or have a clear prospect of reaching 
that level within a short period. It avoids 
smaller issues because of concern 
about the market’s ability to support 
research and liquidity in these stocks. 
Another sign of the growing importance 
of the US to AIM has been the recent 
move by two of the most active British 
AIM brokers, Collins Stewart and 
Panmure Gordon, to increase their 
presence in the US. The former bought 
a US investment bank, C E Unterberg 
Towbin, partly to take advantage of the 
growing interest among US companies 
in coming to AIM.82 The latter acquired 
Think Equity Partners, a US investment 
bank specialising in telecommunications, 
media and technology; again one of the 
motives was to boost Panmure’s ability to 
bring US technology companies to AIM.8 
80 London Stock Exchange press release, 12 May 2004.
81 Warming to Cleantech, a report by Library House, June 2006.
82 Financial Times, 22 May 2007.
8 Financial Times, 19 February 2007.
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Continental Europe, though nearer than 
the US, is in some ways more difficult 
territory for AIM, not least because of 
the presence of powerful local stock 
exchanges which have no wish to 
see their future ‘national champions’ 
migrate to the London market. Following 
the demise of EASDAQ, the London 
Stock Exchange saw an opportunity to 
promote AIM as a European growth 
market, and it received some support 
in this objective from the European 
Venture Capital Association. There are 
now 151 European companies traded 
on AIM, and they include several 
technology-based businesses. The first 
German company to obtain a primary 
quotation on AIM was SQS Software 
Quality Systems, which tests software 
for large industrial companies. It raised 
£11m on AIM in September, 2005, and 
a few months later issued further shares 
on AIM to finance an acquisition.
Outside Western Europe, AIM has 
attracted companies which might 
in the past have raised capital in the 
US. In Israel, for example, there is a 
dynamic group of high-technology 
enterprises which have traditionally 
had close links with the US. There are 
more than 100 Israeli companies listed 
on NASDAQ, but London has gained 
ground in the last few years for the 
same reasons of cost and regulatory 
complexity that have influenced US 
companies; there are now 20 Israeli 
companies on AIM. One example is 
Metal-Tech, which makes molybdenum 
and tungsten-based products. Mr Modi 
Ashkenazy, chief financial officer, said 
the company came to AIM because 
London was seen as the metals capital 
of the world, and because the company 
would have had to wait another two 
years to reach a sufficient size to make 
it worthwhile floating on NASDAQ.84 
Another case is Leadcom Integrated 
Solutions, which is profiled on this page. 
Leadcom Integrated 
Solutions Ltd
Leadcom has its origins in three 
companies, all focused on the Israeli 
telecommunications market, which 
were set up in the early 1980s by 
local entrepreneurs. The most 
successful of the three was Leadcom, 
whose main activity was in providing 
deployment services and solutions 
to telecommunications network 
operators and vendors, and, when 
the three companies were merged 
in 2003, it was this business which 
became the heart of the enlarged 
group; the company was re-named 
Leadcom Integrated Solutions. The 
management team, led by Arik 
Alcalay as chief executive and Eytan 
Mucznik as chief financial officer, set 
about re-positioning the business 
as a supplier of telecommunications 
services to overseas equipment 
vendors and network operators, 
principally in emerging markets.
By the end of 2004, after a good 
deal of rationalisation had been 
carried out, the company was gaining 
momentum and winning valuable 
overseas contracts. But rapid growth 
brought financial strains, and the 
company needed new sources of 
capital. After evaluating different 
options, Alcalay and Mucznik 
reached the conclusion that the best 
option was to float on the public 
markets. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
was virtually closed to IPOs at the 
time; NASDAQ in the US was open 
only to service companies with a 
market capitalisation of at least 
$100m; and Singapore was not much 
interested in non-Chinese companies. 
Thus AIM looked to be the most 
likely solution, at least as a first step.
The company was successfully floated 
on AIM in April 2005 at a price 
of 32p per share, with Corporate 
Synergy (now Blue Oar) as its 
NOMAD. (Leadcom subsequently 
changed its NOMAD to Altium, and 
more recently to Panmure Gordon, 
keeping Blue Oar as joint broker). 
The market was strong at that time 
and the shares were mostly taken up 
by UK institutions. However all of the 
$14m that was raised was needed to 
repay bank debt. The company was 
growing fast – new contracts were 
won in Africa and elsewhere – and 
it would soon need more capital. In 
2006 two important transactions 
took place. First, the shares held 
by the founders were placed by 
Corporate Synergy and Altium at 
73p; this raised the free float from 
50 per cent to 98 per cent. Second, 
there was a secondary offering on 
AIM to raise a further $21m These 
shares were marketed strongly to 
UK and American investors, with 
the result that the proportion of 
the equity held by UK institutions 
came down to about 85 per cent. 
At the end of 2006 a further 
capital raising exercise took 
place – a $30m bond issue sold 
to Israeli investors. Today Israeli 
investors hold approximately 40-
45 per cent, UK institutions 45 
per cent and the rest is held by 
Americans. The Israeli investors 
were for the most part private 
funds which were free to invest 
in AIM stocks, with conventional 
Israeli institutions lagging behind. 
For companies which like Leadcom 
are operating predominantly in 
global markets, London has obvious 
attractions with its large pool of 
globally-minded investors. From the 
company’s point of view AIM has 
84  Financial Times, 16 September 2005.
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some limitations, not least those 
arising from the restrictions on 
Israeli and some other institutions to 
invest in AIM stocks. If the company 
continues to perform well, then a 
move to the London Stock Exchange 
Main Market might make sense; 
this would also permit – as an AIM 
quotation does not – dual listing 
with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. 
Real estate and equity 
investment funds
In 2006 just over half the new money 
raised on AIM – a total of just over 
£6bn – was raised by property funds 
and equity investment vehicles. These 
IPOs tend to be larger, and they invite 
investors to back, not a particular 
company, but a team of managers whose 
skill lies in identifying and exploiting 
investment opportunities in a particular 
sector or region. One example is Dolphin 
Capital Investors, which concentrates 
on real estate developments in Greece, 
Cyprus and Croatia; it raised £20m 
when it floated on AIM in April 2007 
and a further £250m two months later.
The attraction of AIM for the 
promoters of these businesses is 
that they are not subject to the rules 
– for example, on the proportion 
of the fund that can be invested in 
one company or one sector – which 
govern investment trusts and similar 
investment entities on the Main Market. 
These entities have served to extend 
AIM’s reach into emerging markets, 
especially India, China and Russia. In 
2006 Indian-related companies were 
the second largest source of new listings 
on AIM after UK-based companies. 
They included several large property 
listings, including the $700m IPO of 
Unitech Corporate Parks. Because of 
the restrictions on the ability of Indian 
companies to raise funds in their local 
exchanges, many of them have chosen 
to incorporate in favourable tax regimes 
such as the Isle of Man, and to seek 
IPOs on AIM. According to a leading 
Indian banker, Indian companies have 
been tapping AIM to get access to 
an international professional investor 
base that is less volatile than the retail-
dominated markets at home.85 
Movements between AIM 
and the Main Market
When AIM was launched in 1995, part of 
its intended role was to act as a feeder to 
the Main Market. When an AIM company 
reached an appropriate size and was 
able to meet the requirements of the 
Main Market – for example, on the size 
of the free float – it was expected to 
make the switch. However, the cut-off 
point has not been precisely defined, 
and companies have some discretion 
in deciding when, and whether, to 
move from one market to the other. 
Currently the Stock Exchange has an 
informal guideline that companies 
with a market capitalisation of £500m 
or more should consider making the 
switch, but this is not mandatory. 
When companies move to the Main 
Market they are subject to more onerous 
rules, covering not only the free float but 
also the requirement to seek shareholder 
approval for mergers and acquisitions 
above a certain size; they are also subject 
to the Combined Code on corporate 
governance. Their shares become 
officially ‘listed’, and no longer qualify 
for the tax advantages enjoyed by AIM 
investors. On the other hand, they gain 
access to a wider pool of institutional 
investors, including tracker funds which 
invest in the FTSE Small Cap Index but 
not in AIM. They may also gain a greater 
degree of visibility with analysts and 
the financial community as a whole, 
especially if the peer group to which they 
belong consists mainly of companies 
that are listed on the Main Market. 
In practice the decision depends, not 
only on the size of the company, but also 
on the sector that it is in, on its strategy 
and on the amounts of money that it is 
likely to have to raise from shareholders. 
Over the whole period since AIM was 
created 111 companies have moved 
from AIM to the Main Market; their 
average market capitalisation on 
transfer was £22m. Over the same 
period 271 companies have moved from 
the Main Market to AIM; these were 
predominantly small companies with an 
average market capitalisation of £21m. 
Some of these companies felt they were 
too small to be noticed on the Main 
Market; others, especially those which 
were keen to expand by acquisition, were 
attracted by AIM’s more liberal rules 
on the size of acquisition that has to be 
formally approved by shareholders. 
What has emerged is not simply a junior/
senior relationship, but rather the co-
existence of two complementary markets 
which have different characteristics 
and suit different types of company. 
One of the merits of AIM for small 
companies that want to become big is 
that it can accommodate substantial 
expansion – say, from a £10m market 
capitalisation to £500m or more 
– without the need to switch to a 
separate market. Institutions are in any 
case more interested in the quality of 
the companies they are considering as 
possible investments than in which of 
the two markets they are traded on.
It is true that AIM does include 
companies that are by definition risky 
– oil and gas exploration companies, 
and early stage biotechnology firms 
– and some companies may feel that, 
in moving to the Main Market, they are 
85  Financial Times 1 July 2007.
40
demonstrating that they have reached a 
more mature stage in their development. 
But this does not imply any pressing 
desire to get away from AIM. Mark 
Davies of Connaught remarks that, when 
the company decided to move to the 
Main Market, there was no sense that it 
was trying to escape a tainted market. 
Appendix to Section 4
NASDAQ (in US dollars) AIM (in US dollars)
Shares issued (numbers) 5m 20m
Amount raised 50m 50m
Registration fee c.9,000 c.20,000
Filing fee c.9,000 na
Listing fee c.100,000 c.7,500
Printing c.220,000 c.40,000
Legal fees c.750,000 c.600,000
Accounting fees c.490,000 c.50,000
Blue sky fees c.10,000 na
Transfer agent, registrar fees c.10,000 c.14,000
Retainer na c.275,000
Underwriting discount/step-up c.,500,000 c.2,500,000
Miscellaneous c.75,000 c.50,000
Total approximate cost c.5,173,000 c.3,856,500
Table 1 IPO costs on NASDAQ and AIM 
NASDAQ (in US dollars) AIM (in US dollars)
Directors and officers insurance c.500,000 c.100,000
Directors fees and expenses c.150,000 c.150,000
Annual audit fees c.00,000 c.150,000
404 Compliance c.500,000 na
Legal fees c.00,000 c.00,000
Internal costs for SEC and 
Exchange compliance
c.00,000 na
SEC filing expenses and listing fees c.5,000 c.7,000
Nomad expenses na c.90,000
Other (investor relations, mailing etc) c.250,000 c.125,000 
Total approximate cost c.2,335,000 c.922,000
Table 2 Annual costs of being a $200m public company 
Source: Canaccord Adams, ‘AIM: a global financing alternative for 
small-cap companies’, Executive Briefing Series 2006.
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Who are the investors in AIM 
companies, and what determines 
the attractiveness of the market? 
This section looks first at the tax 
incentives which have helped 
to stimulate the interest of 
private investors in AIM, then 
at the growing importance 
of institutional investors. 
Tax incentives
When AIM was launched in 1995 
it benefited from the tax incentives 
which had been put in place by the 
Conservative government to encourage 
private investors to buy shares in small, 
growing companies. An important 
ruling by the Inland Revenue was to 
treat AIM companies as unlisted for tax 
purposes. This meant that investments 
in AIM companies that met certain 
criteria (principally that they should 
be trading companies, not financial or 
property-based) attracted 100 per cent 
relief from Inheritance Tax as long as 
the investment was held for at least two 
years. This tax ruling remains, allowing 
private client stockbrokers to offer an IHT 
portfolio service which may be geared 
wholly or mainly to AIM companies. 
These IHT portfolios generally invest in 
the larger and more established AIM 
companies which pay regular dividends.
In addition, as noted in section 2, the 
Conservative government introduced 
two new schemes – the Enterprise 
Investment Scheme (EIS) and Venture 
Capital Trusts (VCTs) – which, though not 
specifically targeted at AIM, helped to 
stimulate investment in AIM companies. 
The EIS was aimed mainly at business 
angels and other wealthy individuals 
who were interested in taking a stake 
in entrepreneurial firms at an early 
stage of their development. Currently, 
the main features of the scheme are 
that individuals who subscribe for new 
ordinary shares in qualifying companies, 
up to a maximum of £400,000 in 
any one year, are entitled to a 20 per 
cent initial income tax relief on their 
investment; they are also exempt from 
capital gains tax on disposal as long as 
the investment is held for three years. 
The definition of qualifying companies 
is framed so as to exclude lower risk 
activities such as the management 
of hotels and nursing homes.
The EIS was designed for all unquoted 
companies, not for AIM in particular, 
but AIM companies had the attraction 
of already being on a public market; 
thus there was greater liquidity in their 
shares and information about them 
was more readily available than in 
the typical unquoted business. Some 
EIS investors preferred to invest in 
a spread of companies, and private 
client stockbrokers developed EIS 
portfolios, some of them geared 
wholly or mainly to AIM companies. 
Venture Capital Trusts are publicly 
quoted companies (listed on the London 
Stock Exchange’s Main Market), which, 
like investment trusts, raise funds from 
investors to acquire stakes in a range 
of companies that meet the scheme 
requirements. The requirements are the 
same as for the EIS, and exclude low-
risk businesses. The most that a VCT 
can invest in one company is £1m in any 
twelve month period, and they have 
to invest 70 per cent of their funds in 
qualifying companies within three years. 
Some VCTs invest in companies which 
are not quoted on AIM or any other 
public market, while others concentrate 
mainly on AIM companies. In the early 
years of the scheme investors in VCTs 
were entitled to 20 per cent income tax 
relief on their initial investment and to 
capital gains tax deferral, as long as the 
investment was held for five years. 
Both the EIS and the VCT arrangements 
have been modified several times since 
their introduction, In the case of VCTs for 
example, the initial income tax relief was 
raised from 20 per cent to 40 per cent 
for the tax years 2004-05 and 2005-
06, and this produced a spectacular 
increase in the amounts of money raised 
– £520m in the first year and £750m in 
the second. However, the 2006 Budget 
reduced the initial tax relief to 0 per 
cent, and the amount raised by VCTs fell 
sharply in 2006-07, to £270m. Another 
important change was the ruling that 
any new money a VCT raised after 6 
April 2006, had to be invested in firms 
with gross assets of no more than £7m; 
the previous limit had been £15m. 
The rules for VCTs were tightened further 
in the 2007 Budget. For funds raised 
after 5 April 2007 the annual investment 
limit per qualifying company was reduced 
to £2m (that is, the investee company 
cannot receive more than £2m from 
funds that were raised through the EIS 
or from VCTs after 5 April 2007) and 
qualifying companies had to have no 
more than 50 full-time employees at the 
time of investment; previously there had 
been no restriction on the number of 
employees. The government was obliged 
to make these changes in order to 
comply with the European Commission’s 
guidelines on state aid for risk capital. 
As a result of these changes, according to 
Martin Churchill of Tax Efficient Review, 
the amounts of new money raised by 
VCTs in 2007-08 and subsequent years is 
expected to run at no more than £200m 
a year. However, thanks to the large 
amounts of money that had been raised 
in earlier years when the rules were more 
liberal, the VCTs still have considerable 
resources at their disposal, and the 2007 
budget changes are not expected to lead 
to an early reduction in the flow of funds 
going into AIM companies from VCTs. 
For AIM, the tax reliefs available through 
VCTs have probably been the most 
important of the various tax incentives 
introduced by successive governments 
to stimulate investment in unquoted 
companies. However, the number of AIM 
companies that qualify under the VCT 
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rules is small in relation to the market as 
a whole, and is getting smaller as a result 
of the new rules. A survey of VCT AIM 
managers carried out by Tax Efficient 
Review showed that, out of a total of 
just under £5bn raised on AIM in the 
period January-September 2005, only 
£615m, or about 12 per cent, was VCT 
qualifying. The bulk of this money has 
gone into small capitalisation stocks, and 
these companies have been the principal 
beneficiaries of the VCT scheme. 
Institutional investors
Tax incentives have been helpful for 
AIM, especially in the early years, and 
they have been put to good use by 
investing institutions that specialise in 
small capitalisation stocks. But, as the 
market has developed in size and in the 
range of companies quoted, mainstream 
investing institutions have become more 
actively involved. Their interest in the 
market quickened during the dot.com 
boom of the late 1990s; some of the 
‘hottest’ stocks available were quoted on 
AIM, and the institutions needed to buy 
into them in order to ensure that their 
overall investment performance kept 
pace with their peers. Although many 
of AIM’s internet-related companies 
fell to earth in 2001 and 2002, as did 
their counterparts on the Main Market, 
this did not have the effect of turning 
institutional investors away from AIM. 
From 2002 onwards, as stock markets 
recovered, institutional interest in the 
market increased. Between 200 and 
2007 the proportion of AIM shares 
held by institutional investors rose from 
about a third to about 60 per cent.86 
These institutions include some of the 
world’s largest investment groups; 
Table 5.I lists the fifteen most active 
institutional investors in AIM, ranked 
by the number of investments. 
Institution No of investments Value of investments (£m)
Fidelity 160 1,07
Artemis Investment 
Management
10 677
F & C Asset Management 120 64
AXA 118 56
Gartmore 90 544
AMVESCAP 84 652
RAB Capital 78 50
Goldman Sachs 72 448
Bank of New York 70 257
Pershing Keen Nominees 70 8
Merrill Lynch 67 596
HSBC 65 162
Chase Nominees 62 24
UBS 59 79
JPMorgan 59 278
Table 5.1 Most active institution by number of investments in 2006
Source: Growth Company Investor, Institutional Investors in AIM 2006
Sector No of Investments Value (£m) % of total 
Investments 
Mining 802 6,852 16.0
Oil and gas 441 5,477 12.8
Real estate 01 4,742 11.1
General financial 880 4,852 10.5
Support services 494 2,690 6.
Equity investment 
Instruments
222 2,415 5.6
Industrial metals 49 2,284 5.
Travel & leisure 00 2,222 5.2
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology
01 1,826 4.
Media 415 1,618 .8
Others 2,144 7,86 19.1
Total 6,349 42,814 100.0
Table 5.2 Value of institutional holdings in principal sectors
Source: Growth Company Investor, Institutional Investors in AIM 2006 
86 Growth Company Investor magazine estimated that in August 2006 institutions controlled 56.7 per cent of AIM shares, compared with 5.2 per cent in 200.
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Not surprisingly, much of the investment 
by mainstream institutions goes 
into companies with relatively high 
market capitalisations. The sectors 
which contain a large number of such 
companies include mining, oil and gas, 
and real estate, and these three sectors 
accounted for nearly 40 per cent or 
all institutional investment in AIM in 
2006 (Table 5.2). However, there is 
also considerable institutional interest 
at the lower end of the market. 
To a much greater extent than, 
say, NASDAQ in the US, AIM is an 
institution-dominated market. Virtually 
all IPOs and secondary offerings on 
AIM take the form of private placings 
with institutions. Moreover, of the 
shares in AIM companies that are not 
owned by institutions, only about half 
is thought to be owned by genuine 
retail investors who are actively buying 
and selling in the market. The rest is in 
the hands of directors, employees and 
members of the founding families. 
Is this ownership structure a weakness 
or a strength? One advantage from 
the AIM company’s point of view is 
that investors who take up the shares 
at the time of flotation are potentially 
stable, long term holders and are likely 
– if the company fulfils its promise – to 
support further share issues. So far in 
2007 60 per cent of all the new money 
raised on AIM has been in the form of 
secondary equity offerings, and most of 
that has been taken up by institutions. 
On the other hand, AIM needs retail 
investors to enhance the liquidity of the 
market. It is estimated that in 2005-06 
70 per cent of trading activity on AIM 
was accounted for by retail investors, 
although they accounted for only 20 
per cent of the value of trades. 
More retail investors on AIM would 
be welcomed by the London Stock 
Exchange, although any ambitions in 
that direction are tempered by the fact 
that AIM is very different in character 
from the Main Market and best suited 
for experienced and knowledgeable 
investors. The literature put out by 
AIM companies and their advisers 
has to contain full explanations, not 
only about the nature of the business, 
but about all the features of an AIM 
company – concerning regulatory 
scrutiny, for example, and corporate 
governance arrangements – that 
make it different from a company 
listed on the Main Market. 
On the institutional side, an important 
priority for the London Stock Exchange 
over the last few years has been to 
encourage more non-British institutional 
investors to take an interest in AIM, 
especially those based in the countries 
from which non-British AIM-quoted 
companies originate. British investors, 
when considering investing in a non-
British company, whether at the time of 
flotation or later, feel greater confidence 
if they know that local investors in the 
country where the company has its main 
base are also substantial shareholders 
in the business. The Exchange has been 
active in promoting the attractions of 
AIM around the world; the new SETSmm 
trading system, mainly designed to 
improve liquidity and reduce spreads, 
had the additional advantage of being 
more intelligible to overseas investors 
who were not familiar with the market-
maker system. However, finding new 
shareholders is largely the responsibility 
of the investment banks and brokers 
which handle AIM companies. Part of 
the reason for the US acquisitions made 
recently by Collins Stewart and Panmure 
Gordon, referred to in Section 4, was to 
strengthen their distribution capacity in 
the US. Other London firms have made 
partnerships with overseas brokers in 
order to bring in more local investors. 
Further progress in this area is needed, 
since UK-based investors cannot be 
expected to satisfy the capital needs of 
all the world’s growing companies. 
How do investors 
view AIM?
Although the number of IPOs on 
AIM has declined in 2007 after the 
exceptionally large number of flotations 
in 2005 and 2006, new money 
continues to flow into the market from 
institutions and private investors, and 
there is no evidence that the criticism 
of AIM from across the Atlantic has 
significantly affected investor sentiment. 
There has been unease among some 
investors about IPO over-pricing, and 
about the amount of money that has 
gone into investment fund structures 
targeting a variety of industries such 
as real estate, film, or distressed debt. 
As one leading investor put it, ‘these 
vehicles are lucrative for the brokers 
that introduce them and the teams 
that manage them, but can be slow to 
provide returns to investors’.87 However, 
the general view is that the broadening 
of the AIM population has been good 
for AIM and for the participants in 
the market. Although AIM does now 
consist to some extent of several distinct 
sub-markets, it has been able to serve 
these different constituencies without 
having to alter in any fundamental 
way the regulatory system that has 
been in place since the start. 
Some investors have suggested that the 
AIM management and Nomads may have 
put too much stress on securing IPOs, to 
the detriment of existing companies on 
the market. The managers of Bluehone’s 
87  Andrew Crossley, Fund manager, Invesco Perpetual, Foreword to AIM Investor Survey 2007, Arbuthnot Securities 2007.
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AIM VCT, one of the largest venture 
capital trusts, commented in their 
2006 report that part of the reason 
for the disappointing performance of 
the FTSE AIM All-Share Index over the 
preceding year ‘appears to be that much 
of the appetite for AIM companies as 
investments has been satisfied by the 
provision of new shares as, over the last 
two years, companies have raised nearly 
£2bn of new money from investors 
– more than 1.6 times the money raised 
in the previous nine years since AIM was 
launched’. The managers noted that, 
with more international companies now 
coming to AIM and growing interest 
in the market from overseas investors, 
the high level of fund raising had been 
relatively easily absorbed. But they 
went to on to express the hope that ‘as 
existing companies make progress with 
their business plans this is recognised 
by investors and results in increasing 
valuations. However, with so many 
companies on the market, particularly 
below £50m market capitalisation, 
it will take a concerted effort by 
management teams and their advisers 
for this progress to be noticed’.88 
There is also a view that the AIM 
management could do more to 
promote the attractions of existing 
AIM companies, especially to private 
investors. The main responsibility for 
stimulating wider interest among private 
investors in AIM companies lies with 
brokers, but the AIM management 
team has also sought to increase the 
accessibility of the market – for example, 
by introducing a range of new sector-
based AIM indices; the Exchange also 
runs events known as Capital Market 
Days to promote less well known AIM 
companies to potential investors. 
Others have criticised Nomads for 
inadequate attention to their companies 
after the IPO. According to this view, 
there are too many under-performing 
companies on AIM; some of them 
may need a different strategy or an 
injection of new management, but are 
under insufficient pressure to make 
these changes. Two new funds have 
recently been established – the Bluehone 
Value Fund and Collins Stewart’s AIM 
Realisation Fund – which will offer 
to buy shares from investors in these 
under-performing companies; the 
managers of these funds will use their 
influence as shareholders to bring 
about the necessary changes. The 
Bluehone Value Fund will ‘agitate for 
change by shaking up management, 
forcing through restructuring or 
mergers and acquisitions’.89
These moves are unlikely to affect 
the very smallest and most illiquid 
stocks, valued at less than £5m, and 
the presence of this long tail is seen by 
some market players as a weakness. 
The Exchange may have to do more to 
encourage analysts to look more closely 
at these under-researched companies. 
But AIM is a broad church and intends to 
remain so. While some institutions focus 
on AIM companies valued at more than 
£50m – they have little interest in what 
is sometimes described as the ‘public 
venture capital’ segment down below 
– others like these more speculative 
stocks, believing that they can make 
money for their clients by picking out 
those companies which have a plausible 
story and a realistic business plan. 
AIM is commonly described as a stock-
picker’s market, and, because so much of 
it consists of small, growing companies, 
there is a degree of risk which is greater 
than on the Main Market. But most 
investors believe that for AIM to try to 
eliminate risk through stricter rules over 
admissions would be a serious error. 
88  The AIM VCT, summary annual report for the year ended 20 November 2006, January 2007
89  Sunday Times 17 June 2007
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The failure rate on AIM 
AIM started in 1995 with ten companies. 
Since then, a total of 2,698 companies 
have been admitted to AIM and 1076 
have been delisted, which leaves 1,62 
companies on AIM as of February 
2007 (Table 6.1) Delistings occur for 
a variety of reasons, only some of 
which can be classified as company 
failures. The biggest single source 
of delistings, accounting for nearly 
half the total, is the reverse takeover, 
through which a company changes its 
identity but remains on AIM. Other 
delistings occur as a result of transfers 
to the Main Market, acquisitions, 
or redemptions (investment funds 
redeeming or closing their funds) – none 
of which can be described as failures. 
Genuine failures can arise from the 
liquidation of the company; restructuring 
because of financial strains; and breach 
of the AIM rules. In addition, a company 
may choose to delist without giving a 
reason. Table 6.2 shows the number of 
failures of AIM companies since 2000, 
including as failures those companies 
that delisted without explanation. In 
terms of numbers the failure rate was 
highest in 2006 at 112. This was mainly 
because of a tightening of the rules 
governing the length of time cash shells 
could be traded on the exchange; 64 
companies not fulfilling the listing criteria 
for cash shells were delisted in that year. 
If those companies are excluded, the 
average failure rate over the last four 
years has been less than three per cent. 
Liquidity and volatility
To assess the liquidity of the market 
two different variables are used: 
• Volume: This is constructed from 
the monthly trading file as the 
average monthly trading volume 
of a stock in a year. We then find 
out the median across all stocks in 
a year. We calculate this measure 
using both the number of shares, as 
well as the value of those shares. 
• Turnover: This is defined as the 
total monthly volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding. 
Both these variables are calculated for 
each stock for each month and then the 
median for all stocks across the years 
for which data is available is presented.
Table 6. shows that liquidity as 
measured by the average monthly 
volume of individual stocks traded has 
increased between 2001 and 2007 and 
the average for the period is 1.08 million 
shares. Liquidity as measured by turnover 
increased between 2001 and 2006 and 
has a monthly average of 2.5 per cent; 
which translates to approximately 0 per 
cent for the whole year. AIM’s turnover 
of 5 per cent in 2006 compares 
Year Companies 
– Beginning 
of the year
Admissions Delistings Companies – 
End of the year
1995 10 12 12 121
1996 121 145 14 252
1997 252 107 51 08
1998 08 75 71 12
1999 12 102 67 47
2000 47 277 100 524
2001 524 177 72 629
2002 629 160 85 704
2003 704 162 112 754
2004 754 55 88 1,021
2005 1,021 519 141 1,99
2006 1,99 462 227 1,64
2007 to Feb 1,64 4 6 1,62
Total 2,698 1,076 1,632
Table 6.1: Admissions and delistings on AIM by year
Year
Average number of 
companies during the year
Failures % Failures
2000 46 2 7.%
2001 577 2 5.6%
2002 667 41 6.2%
2003 729 82 11.2%
2004 754 18 2.0%
2005 892 1 2.5%
2006 1,517 112 7.4%
2007 to Feb 1,6 27 1.7%
Table 6.2: Failure rate on AIM (by year)
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favourably with that of ‘junior’ exchanges 
in other parts of the world, where 
turnover ranges between 15 per cent and 
50 per cent. AIM performance is all the 
more remarkable since it has more than 
1,600 companies listed, whereas other 
‘junior’ exchanges, with the exception 
of Toronto, are very much smaller. 
Averages can mask wide variations in 
the underlying patterns. As Figure 6.1 
shows, the highest decile stocks had 
volumes of 50 million shares a month, 
whereas the lowest deciles had volumes 
of less than a million in a month.
Liquidity for all deciles shows a slightly 
declining trend between 2004 and 
2006. However, the decline is small 
and some variation is to be expected 
given the fact that the number of 
companies quoted on AIM more than 
doubled from 754 at the beginning of 
2004 to 164 by the end of 2006.
As figure 6.2 shows, there is a large 
difference in monthly turnover between 
the lowest and highest deciles. Monthly 
turnover for Decile 5 ranges between one 
and two per cent (the figures for Decile 
1 are less than one per cent and hence 
were not plotted). On the other hand, 
the highest group has a turnover ranging 
between 15 per cent and 29 per cent. 
This confirms that there is wide variation 
in liquidity amongst stocks on AIM, and 
stocks in the highest decile group show 
monthly liquidity levels of around 25 
per cent that are close to levels on other 
exchanges. Stocks in the highest groups 
show high liquidity, whereas the lowest 
groups have low levels of liquidity. 
An important influence on liquidity is 
the size of the free float. Stocks with a 
high proportion of free float are more 
likely to be actively traded and to show 
higher liquidity as compared to those 
with a lower free float. Since the actual 
free float numbers of stocks traded 
are not available, a proxy – investibility 
weightings – is used for the analysis. 
Year Number of Companies Volume (Shares) Turnover
2001 702 709,920 2.0%
2002 790 50,067 1.5%
2003 87 97,528 2.5%
2004 1,106 1,179,576 .2%
2005 1,519 1,77,674 .0%
2006 1,862 1,410,708 2.9%
2007 to Feb 1,681 1,9,486 2.5%
Average 1,219 1,076,994 2.5%
Table 6.3: Monthly average liquidity measures for AIM (medians across stocks for the year) 
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Figure 6.1: Average monthly trading volume by deciles
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Figure 6.2: Average monthly turnover by deciles
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The investibility weightings for stocks 
are assigned by FTSE and used in 
calculating their indices. The investibility 
weightings in turn are based on the 
free-float of the stocks. FTSE calculates 
investibility weightings only for stocks 
which are part of the FTSE All Share 
Index. There are around 400 stocks 
quoted on AIM which do not form part 
of the FTSE All Share Index and hence 
do not have an investibility weighting. 
Figures 6. and 6.4 plot the average 
monthly liquidity of stocks with various 
investibility weightings. 0 corresponds 
to a low investibility weighting, 0.5 to a 
medium, 50 per cent weighting and 1 to 
a high, 100 per cent weighting. Higher 
investibility weightings are mainly a result 
of a higher free float for those stocks.
As these figures show, there is a clear 
pattern both in the average monthly 
trading volume and monthly trading 
turnovers. Stocks having higher 
investibility weightings (corresponding to 
a higher free float) show higher liquidity 
on both measures as compared to stocks 
with lower or no investibility weightings. 
Because AIM caters to such a diverse 
group of companies, three different 
platforms have been introduced 
for different types of stocks. 
• SETSmm is the system used for 
the most liquid stocks on AIM. 
SETSmm combines an order book 
with an integrated market-maker 
liquidity provision. At the end of 
February, 2007, 11 stocks with a 
total market capitalisation of £6 
billion were trading on SETSmm.
• SEAQ is the trading service for AIM 
securities that are not liquid enough 
to trade on SETSmm. The service 
is based on two-way continuous 
quotes, offered by at least two 
competing market makers. SEAQ 
has by far the largest number of 
AIM stocks trading on it. As of 
February 2007 there were 1470 
AIM stocks on SEAQ with a total 
market capitalisation of £58 billion.
• SEATS is the trading platform 
for less liquid securities, which 
will be replaced by the SETSqx in 
2007. SEATS had only 18 stocks 
having a total market capitalisation 
of £1 billion trading on it at 
the end of February, 2007. 
The monthly liquidity patterns on the 
various systems are shown in Figure 6.5. 
Since the SETSmm was introduced in 
December 2005 the figures below are 
also presented from that date onwards. 
In all the months analysed the trading 
volumes as well as turnover of stocks 
traded on SETSmm is way ahead of SEAQ 
and SEATS. This is to be expected since 
this category includes the most liquid 
and largest stocks on AIM. The average 
monthly trading volume on SETSmm 
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Figure 6.4: Average monthly turnover by Investibility Weightings
48
over the period analysed (December 
2005 to February 2007) is just over 20 
million shares, compared to 6.4 million 
on SEAQ and 0.22 million on SEATS. 
AIM has the infrastructure necessary to 
cater to the liquidity needs for a wide 
variety of stocks, and it is clear that the 
introduction of SETSmm succeeded in 
its purpose of increasing liquidity and 
lowering spreads on the largest stocks. 
Figure 6.7 presents the average quoted 
daily spreads on different system. 
SETSmm by far is the best performer 
with a spread of 0.62 per cent, followed 
by SEATS and SEAQ with 11 per 
cent and 14 per cent respectively.
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Figure 6.5: Monthly trading volume by trading systems
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Volatility
Volatility is typically used to quantify 
the risk of the market over a particular 
time period. The most common method 
of estimating volatility is to calculate 
the standard deviation of the returns 
from the market. We use the daily 
FTSEAIM Index as well as the FTSEAIM50 
and FTSEAIM100 to estimate the 
historic volatility of AIM each year.
Table 6.4 presents the estimates 
of annual historical volatility based 
on various indices. FTSEAIM Index, 
which is the longest series, had an 
average volatility of 14 per cent per 
annum, whereas the FTSEAIM50 and 
FTSEAIM100 Indices show a higher 
volatility of 16 per cent and 18 per cent 
per annum respectively. The volatility of 
the FTSEALL Share and FTSE100 Indices 
for the same period were 17 per cent 
and 18 per cent respectively. Given that 
a large number of diverse stocks are 
traded on AIM, one would expect higher 
volatility; however, the table indicates 
that the volatility on AIM is stable and 
comparable to that of the main market.
Capital raised 
Another important aspect in evaluating 
the quality of a market is whether 
companies are able to raise capital 
successfully on the exchange. Table 6.5 
shows the capital raised by companies 
through initial public offerings (IPO) 
and follow-on offerings since 1995.
A total of 2,65 UK and 47 
international companies have been 
admitted to AIM since its inception. 
Amongst them they have raised a 
total of £49bn. The total capital raised 
through IPOs, £28bn, exceeds the total 
raised through further issues, which 
stands at £21bn. The total number 
of companies admitted to AIM was 
highest in 2005, while the total capital 
Year FTSEAIM FTSEAIM100 FTSEAIM50
FTSE ALL 
SHARE
FTSE100
1997 6%   12% 14%
1998 11%   18% 21%
1999 15%   16% 18%
2000 28%   17% 19%
2001 1%   20% 22%
2002 8%   25% 26%
2003 7%   18% 19%
2004 8%   10% 10%
2005 11% 11% 12% 9% 9%
2006 1% 18% 21% 1% 1%
2007 to Feb 9% 12% 11% 12% 12%
Average 14% 16% 18% 17% 18%
Table 6.4: Annual volatility of AIM
Year
Number of Admissions Money Raised £ million
UK International Total New Further Total
1995 120  123 70 25 95
1996 11 14 145 514 02 816
1997 100 7 107 44 50 694
1998 68 7 75 268 290 558
1999 96 6 102 4 600 934
2000 265 12 277 1,754 1,20 3,074
2001 162 15 177 59 55 1,128
2002 147 1 160 490 486 976
2003 146 16 162 1,095 1,000 2,095
2004 294 61 355 2,776 1,880 4,656
2005 99 120 519 6,461 2,481 8,942
2006 8 124 462 9,944 5,74 15,678
2007 to 
June
99 9 138 ,515 6,280 9,575
Total 2,365 437 2,802 28,158 21,284 49,438
Table 6.5: Capital raised by year
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raised was highest for 2006. In fact, 
75 per cent of the total capital raised 
so far was in the years 2004 to 2007.
AIM’s has been successful in enabling 
companies to raise capital. Even though 
companies have successfully raised 
capital on AIM in every year since its 
inception, the amount of capital raised 
has increased significantly since 2004.
Aftermarket performance 
of new entrants
To analyse the after market performance 
of new entrants on AIM, we use the 
monthly trading files (available since 
end 2000) to calculate the monthly 
returns (based only on capital gains and 
excluding dividends) from a portfolio 
consisting of all new entrants on AIM 
from December 2000 onwards over a 
period of 6 months. We present in 
Table 6.6 and Figure 6.8 the cumulative 
monthly value-weighted returns 
(over six-monthly intervals) as well as 
abnormal returns from such a strategy. 
The returns generated are 1.8 per 
cent returns or one per cent abnormal 
returns in the first month and from 
thereon the portfolio generates a 
consistent positive return (both raw 
as well as abnormal) over the entire 
6 month period. In other words, an 
investment strategy based on investing 
in all new entrants as and when they 
are quoted on AIM on a value-weighted 
basis since December 2000, generates 
a raw return of 84 per cent over 6 
months and an abnormal return of 60 
per cent. The abnormal return is arrived 
at by subtracting from the raw return 
of each security for a particular month 
the overall market return for that month 
measured using the FTSEAIM index. 
Months after 
entry
Number of 
Firms
Cumulative 
Returns
Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns
1 1,470 1.8% 1.00%
6 1,410 1.54% 10.5%
12 1,168 29.9% 22.92%
18 902 4.52% 2.55%
24 66 56.77% 41.4%
0 477 76.6% 54.48%
6  84.09% 58.67%
Table 6.6: Aftermarket performance of new entrants
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Figure 6.8: Cumulative returns from new entrants
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As noted in Section 5, AIM is often 
described as a stock-picker’s market, 
and indices encompassing all AIM 
companies have only limited value. We 
provide in Table 6.7 a comparison of 
the various AIM Indices with the FTSE 
All Share Index and the FTSE100 Index. 
The longest running index, the FTSEAIM 
Index, gave an annualised return of 
one per cent per annum over the entire 
period (up to February 2007) which was 
much lower than the seven per cent 
and six per cent generated by the FTSE 
All Share and FTSE100 Indices over the 
same period. However, the performance 
of the FTSEAIM Index is distorted by the 
effect of the dot-com boom and bust, 
producing a very large gain in 1999 
and a sharp correction in 2001 and 
2002. Since 200 the FTSEAIM Index 
has produced positive returns in each 
year. The newer Indices, the FTSEAIM50 
and FTSEAIM100, introduced in 2005, 
produced annualised returns of three 
per cent and six per cent respectively.
Year FTSEAIM FTSEAIM100 FTSEAIM50 FTSE ALL   
SHARE
FTSE100
1997 -9%   0% 0%
1998 -20%   1% 16%
1999 87%   22% 19%
2000 -%   -6% -9%
2001 -46%   -14% -15%
2002 -9%   -26% -25%
2003 4%   19% 16%
2004 19%   12% 11%
2005 5% 7% 14% 20% 19%
2006 15% -8% -6% 16% 1%
2007 to Feb 5% 6% % 0% 0%
Average 1% 3% 6% 7% 6%
Table 6.7: Annual index returns 
Source: Daily Return Index from Thomson Datastream for respective indices
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The need to ensure that small and 
medium-sized firms have adequate 
access to external sources of finance 
has long been a matter of concern to 
British governments. While much of 
the government activity in this area has 
been concerned with bank lending, 
there has also been considerable stress 
on the need for SMEs to draw on more 
diverse sources of finance, including 
stock markets. That was why in the 
early 1990s the then Conservative 
government, and the Bank of England, 
were keen to ensure that the London 
Stock Exchange set up a successor 
to the Unlisted Securities Market. 
In a series of reports, starting in 1994, 
the Bank of England monitored the 
improvements that were made in small 
business financing. In the final report, 
published in 2004, the Bank noted the 
increase in the total value of private 
equity invested in the UK, but pointed 
out that the industry had increasingly 
concentrated on larger, later-stage 
deals. ‘Research has suggested that 
the low levels of venture capital are 
largely the result of the high, fixed 
transaction costs associated with the 
provision of small amounts of capital, a 
shortage of available exit options and 
the historically lower returns gained from 
early stage investments. Thus, while 
the private equity market has grown 
overall this has still left an equity gap’.90 
The Labour government that has been 
in office since 1997 has sought to fill the 
gap in a variety of ways, including the 
establishment of public sector Regional 
Venture Capital Funds, which provide 
risk capital in amounts up to £500,000 
to small and medium-sized enterprises; 
in identifying suitable recipients these 
funds work closely with private sector 
venture capital firms. The RVCF normally 
expects to exit within about five years, 
at which point the company should be 
wholly transferred to the private sector, 
with additional equity coming from the 
venture capital community. However, this 
next stage in the company’s development 
has become problematic, because of 
the lack of interest on the part of many 
venture capital firms in early-stage 
businesses. This is the gap which AIM 
has partially filled – hence the lower 
end of the AIM market is sometimes 
described as ‘public venture capital’. 
Is this an appropriate role for AIM? 
The few venture capital firms which 
specialise in nurturing early stage 
businesses have no doubt about the 
value of AIM as a financing option 
for certain types of company. Equally, 
the regionally-based venture funds, 
some of which originate from, or have 
links to, government-funded regional 
development agencies, regard AIM as 
essential, not necessarily as a means of 
making a full exit from their investment, 
but as a way of bringing in additional 
investors – mainly institutions – who will 
support the business in the next phase 
of its development. As a recent study 
of funding technology has noted, AIM 
has become an effective alternative 
to venture capital for fund raising by 
companies initially backed by business 
angels and looking for follow-on 
capital in the £2m-£10m range. 91 
Of course some of these companies 
will under-perform, and they may slip 
back to become ‘micro-caps’ – valued 
at less than £5m. As one fund manager 
who has investments in several of 
these firms points out, ‘they are in 
a real bind because they can’t raise 
interest from investors and the AIM 
overheads impact profits, but leaving 
the market is such an expensive process 
that that is not an option either’. The 
best hope for these firms may be to 
attract the attention of private equity 
firms – some AIM companies have been 
taken private in this way – but they 
may be too small to be of interest. 
AIM and the regions
Of the 1,55 UK-domiciled companies 
traded on AIM in 2007, there is a strong 
concentration in London and the south 
east (Figure 7.1). But there is also a 
substantial regional dimension, as there 
is among the Nomads. Bell Lawrie, for 
example, which is based in Edinburgh 
and is now part of the Brewin Dolphin 
group, has deep roots in Scotland – it 
was a founder member of the Scottish 
Stock Exchange in the mid-19th century 
– and it has close links both with private 
clients in the region and with companies 
that may be candidates for AIM. Among 
the companies that Bell Lawrie has 
brought to AIM is Dobbies, the garden 
centre company; it floated on AIM in 
1997 and made a number of subsequent 
share issues. Dobbies has recently been 
taken over by Tesco at a price which 
valued the company at just over £150m. 
Scotland is also the home of a large 
number of technology-based businesses, 
with a strong biotechnology cluster 
centred on Dundee. Although one of 
Dundee’s stars, Cyclacel, chose to list its 
shares on NASDAQ (via a reverse take 
over in 2005), others have floated on 
AIM. The Scottish Venture Fund, which 
makes investments in the £2m-£10m 
range, is one of three venture funds run 
by Scottish Enterprise (Scotland’s main 
development agency, funded by the 
Scottish Executive). The others are the 
Scottish Co-Investment Fund, investing 
in the £500,000 to £1m range, and 
the Scottish Seed Fund (£100,000-
£500,000). These Scottish funds have 
stakes in seven AIM companies, including 
Stem Cell Sciences, a specialist in stem 
7
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90 Finance for small firms, an eleventh report, Bank of England, April 2004.
91 David Gill, Tim Minshall, Craig Pickering and Martin Rigby, Funding technology: Britain forty years on, University of Cambridge Institute for Manufacturing, January 2007.
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cell technologies, Omega Diagnostics 
Group, a medical diagnostics company, 
and Portrait Software, a supplier of 
customer interaction software. 
Another regional venture capital firm 
with links to the public sector is Leeds-
based YFM Group; it was formed 20 
years ago as an economic regeneration 
initiative in Yorkshire but is now owned 
by its management. YFM has around 
£00m under management, including 
private sector funds as well as regional 
and sub-regional venture capital funds in 
Yorkshire, London, the South West and 
the North West. Like the Scottish Venture 
Fund, YFM often takes small initial stakes 
in the companies it backs through its 
regional funds, investing up to £1m, and 
it has the ability to see them through 
multiple funding rounds to a flotation. 
YFM would be unlikely to support an 
AIM flotation unless the company can 
achieve a market capitalisation of at least 
£10m, and on average the companies 
invested in by its regional funds on AIM 
are valued at just over £20m; it will 
often hold on to its stake until an ‘exit’ 
event, which may be an acquisition. 
As an example of a regionally-based 
company which has made excellent use 
of AIM, the Tanfield Group, profiled 
on this page, could hardly be bettered. 
But the businesses which make up 
the Tanfield Group were relatively 
mature when they came to AIM. To the 
extent that equity financing problems 
for small business persist they affect 
smaller and less mature businesses. A 
novel attempt to attack this market is 
the creation of what is described as 
virtual exchange, called Investbx, by 
Advantage West Midlands, the regional 
development agency for the Midlands. 
Investbx, which was given the go-
ahead in 2007,aims to help expanding 
SMEs raise equity finance up to £2m. 
Tanfield Group
Tanfield Group is a regionally based 
business which started small, used 
AIM to fund its growth, and now 
has a market capitalisation of over 
£500m. The architect of the group 
is Roy Stanley, an entrepreneur 
who has specialised in buying 
companies, turning them round 
and selling some of them on. 
At the end of the 1990s Stanley 
was running a group of businesses, 
most of which were privately owed. 
The one public company was a 3D 
imaging company called Comeleon, 
which Stanley had listed on AIM in 
2000, mainly in order to get access 
to the larger amounts of capital that 
were needed to develop what was 
becoming an international business 
– many of its customers were in the 
US. Although Comeleon prospered 
at the start, the market for its 
products changed substantially over 
the next two years – many of its US 
customers moved their operations 
offshore – and the business model 
was no longer working effectively. 
In 2003 Stanley decided to reverse his 
two private businesses into Comeleon 
– the enlarged AIM-listed group was 
re-named Tanfield Group – and to 
refocus the business on engineering; 
Comeleon remains part of the group, 
but it is now a small part of the whole. 
The attraction of AIM, as Stanley 
saw it, was that it would give him 
access to capital as he developed 
the engineering side of the group 
over the next few years. The first 
step came in October 2004, when 
he bought Smiths Electric Vehicles 
– a company which Stanley had long 
regarded as a suitable acquisition; as 
a manufacturer of ‘clean’ vehicles in 
an environmentally-conscious world, 
it had excellent growth prospects. At 
the time Smiths was making profits of 
some £400,000 on sales of £9m, and 
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Tanfield bought it for £2.4m92; it was 
financed by a share issue that raised 
some £4m. In June 2006 Stanley made 
another acquisition of UpRight, a 
manufactured of powered platforms 
which fitted well with one of Smith’s 
ancillary operations. A further sum 
of £10m was raised through AIM.
The company has become a 
significant contributor to the 
economy of the north east, with 
capital investment running in 
excess of £15 million and a high 
level of spending on training and 
development. In June 2007 Tanfield 
announced the purchase of a US 
manufacturer of aerial equipment 
and a placing to raise £115m, of 
which £50m will be used to fund the 
acquisition and to pay down debt. 
The group now employs over 1,100 
people, with operations in the US, 
New Zealand, Japan and the UK. 
Stanley believes that AIM provides 
an excellent platform for a growing 
business with a sound business plan. 
‘I’ve had experience of all sorts of 
different funding methods – bank 
loans, venture capital firms, private 
equity and so on, but AIM has 
served us extremely well’. Tanfield’s 
investor base now includes leading 
institutional investors such Fidelity 
and M & G. The free float is about 85 
per cent; Stanley, who had majority 
control at the time of the merger 
with Comeleon, now holds just 
under ten per cent of the shares.
AIM and the 
biotechnology industry 
The development of a strong British 
biotechnology industry has been a 
concern for government since the 
late 1970s. It was at that time that 
policy-makers became aware of the 
huge lead which US companies had 
established in an important new 
technology. Although part of the 
reason for US superiority was the scale 
of Federal support for biomedical 
research, through the National Institutes 
of Health, it was also noted that 
American firms such as Genentech 
had been able to float their shares on 
the stock market at an early stage in 
their development, and this source of 
funding was largely absent in the UK. 
Under pressure from the venture 
capital community the London Stock 
Exchange changed its rules in 1991 
to allow biotechnology companies 
to be listed even though they had no 
record of making profits. The first to 
take advantage of the change was 
British Biotechnology, and by the end 
of 1995 about 25 biotechnology firms 
were quoted on the Exchange. In the 
late 1990s the biotechnology sector 
benefited from the general enthusiasm 
for high-technology stocks, and several 
British companies floated in London, 
both on the Main Market and on AIM, 
although the most dynamic market for 
biotechnology firms (for a brief period) 
was the Neuer Markt in Germany. 
The subsequent stock market collapse 
led to a fallow period for biotechnology 
flotations in Europe, but by 200 
interest in the sector was reviving, and 
the London market saw an increasing 
number of biotechnology flotations. 
There are now some 56 publicly quoted 
British biotechnology companies, 
compared with 19 in Germany and 
ten in France.9 Of the 2 biotech 
IPOs that took place in Europe in 
2006, nine were in London, and all 
but one of them were on AIM. 
Many of the 50 or so biotechnology 
companies now quoted on AIM are 
still in their early stage of growth, 
with no profits and no products yet 
on the market. Reneuron, profiled on 
the next page, is one such case. 
Did these firms come to the 
public market too early? In the US 
biotechnology companies generally 
come to the market at a later stage; 
they may still be loss-making but they 
have products well advanced in clinical 
trials. But this reflects the greater size 
and maturity of the US biotechnology 
industry, and of the US venture capital 
community. Given the way venture 
capital has evolved in the UK, an AIM 
flotation is often the only option for 
British biotechnology companies. 
Inevitably some have performed poorly 
after their flotation, but there have been 
enough successes to suggest that AIM 
can play a valuable role for an industry 
which, despite disappointments, still 
holds great promise. Companies which 
come to the market with a credible 
story and deliver on their promises 
have been able to raise further capital 
and achieve impressive growth. One 
success story is Silence Therapeutics 
(formerly SR Pharma), a specialist in 
RNAi technology which was spun out 
of University College London in 1994. 
Originally floated on AIM, it moved to 
the Main Market in 1999, but came 
back to AIM in 2004. Since then it 
has raised further funds, some of 
which were used to acquire a German 
company, Atugen, working in the 
same field. Another example is NeuTec, 
which specialises in the development of 
genetically recombinant antibodies; it 
came to AIM in 2002 and was bought 
by Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company, four years later for £05m.
9  Financial Times, 29 June 2007.
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Moreover, there are venture capital 
firms, of which Abingworth is a notable 
example, which have specialised in 
the biotechnology sector for many 
years and are actively involved in AIM. 
While it is mainly concerned with 
UK-based companies, Abingworth 
recently brought to the market an 
American company, Entelos, which 
was too small to list on NASDAQ, and 
a Swedish specialist in diagnostics, 
Xcounter, which has done well and 
currently has a market capitalisation 
of some £70m. Another Abingworth-
backed company, a British drug delivery 
business called Phoqus, floated in 2005 
and recently raised a further £5m. 
There are few sure-fire successes in 
biotechnology, but venture capital firms 
and investors which specialise in the 
sector continue to find the biotechnology 
sector on AIM attractive. Abingworth 
has raised a new £00m fund, and 
it will use these resources to support 
biotechnology ventures from the early 
stage, when an investment of around 
£250,000 might be needed to get the 
business moving, through to an IPO 
or a trade sale. An IPO on AIM rarely 
involves a complete exit; Abingworth is 
ready to participate in further financing 
rounds before the final exit takes place. 
As for moving to the Main Market, 
Abingworth takes the view that there is 
not much difference, from the investor’s 
point of view, between a £100m 
company on AIM and a £100m company 
on the Main Market; the liquidity of 
the two shares is about the same.
Whether any of the AIM companies will 
reach the size of the American giants 
such as Genentech or Amgen is doubtful 
– they are more likely to sell out to larger 
groups as NeuTec did – but this has more 
to do with the nature of the industry 
than with any deficiencies in AIM, or in 
the London capital market as a whole. 
Small though many of the companies 
are, there is a thriving biotechnology 
sector in the UK, drawing on the high 
quality of UK academic science in this 
field, and AIM helps to support it. 
ReNeuron
ReNeuron is an early stage 
biotechnology company, focusing 
on stem cell therapy, which was 
founded in 1997 on the basis of 
research carried out at the Institute 
of Psychiatry, Kings College London. 
It was backed from the start by 
Merlin, a UK venture capital firm 
that specialises in biotechnology; 
Merlin put in £250,000 seed capital 
at the start, followed by £5m a 
year later. It was Europe’s fist 
publicly listed stem cell company.
At the time of the company’s 
formation the technology boom 
was in full swing, and the company 
had no difficulty securing a 
flotation on AIM in 2000, raising 
just over £20m. The company’s main 
focus was on stem cell therapy, 
but it also had interests in small 
molecules and proteins as part of 
an effort to broaden its Central 
Nervous System franchise.
The flotation came just as the 
stock market was about to crash 
and the ReNeuron share price fell 
sharply, along with other high-
technology stocks. Quite apart 
from the stock market collapse, the 
company had problems of its own. 
The stem cell expansion technology 
on which it had been working was 
not producing stable cells, and 
the outlook for the company was 
uncertain. In these circumstances 
there was no alternative but to 
go private again – Merlin took the 
company out of AIM in 2003. 
Over the next two years, under a 
new chief executive, Michael Hunt 
(who had previously held senior posts 
at Biocompatibles International), 
ReNeuron refocused its business, 
withdrew from some peripheral 
operations, and licensed in a new 
technology which proved to be 
more successful in the laboratory. 
Although it was still some way 
from getting its ReN001 therapy 
for stroke victims into clinical trials, 
pre-clinical testing was producing 
promising results, and the company 
was able to refloat on AIM in August 
2005, raising just under £10m.
As a loss making early stage company 
with uncertain prospects it may not 
have been an ideal candidate for 
public markets, but the company 
was unable to find further venture 
capital backers – not because it was 
too small, but because of the early 
stage nature of the technology 
and the regulatory hurdles that 
would have to be overcome. A 
flotation on AIM was a way of 
raising the capital needed to keep 
the company going, and it was able 
to attract institutional investors as 
well as a range of private investors, 
hedge funds and high net worth 
individuals who were willing to 
take a risk on the new technology. 
An important milestone was reached 
in December 2006, when ReNeuron 
filed its first Investigational New 
Drug application with the Food 
and Drug Administration in the US 
to start clinical trials with ReN001. 
The share price rose sharply on 
the announcement although it fell 
back a month later when the FDA 
announced that it was putting 
the application on hold; this was 
not a rejection of the application, 
but rather an indication from 
the FDA that it needed more 
information about the treatment.
Despite the delay ReNeuron was 
able to raise a further £5.5m in 
February of this year through a 
placing on AIM. The money was 
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needed to progress the ReN001 stem 
cell therapy into the clinic as well 
as accelerating the development of 
other therapeutic programmes.
Since the company’s return to 
AIM in 2005 the shareholder base 
has changed substantially. While 
Merlin has retained approximately 
30 per cent of the equity (and has 
a representative on the board), a 
new investor has appeared in the 
form of the Saad Group, a large 
conglomerate based in Saudi Arabia, 
controlled by Mr Maan Abdulwahed 
al-Sanea. Saad has several other 
UK investments (including a 3.1 per 
cent stake in HSBC) and is known 
to take a long-term strategic view 
of its holdings; it now holds just 
under 30 per cent of ReNeuron. 
Michael Hunt, the company’s chief 
executive, believes that AIM has 
served the company well . ‘We are 
a loss-making cash-burn company’, 
he says, ‘and it is not easy to 
interest venture capital or indeed 
other investors in businesses of this 
kind – they are more likely to back 
companies which have already got 
products in clinical trials’. The entry 
of new investors, notably Saad, has 
made a big difference, and much will 
depend on whether the company can 
keep the confidence of these new 
shareholders. Another cash-raising 
exercise will probably be necessary in 
the next year, and in the longer term 
– assuming that clinical trials go well 
– the company might look to license 
its technology to a larger biotech or 
pharmaceutical company; a trade 
sale would be another possibility. 
AIM and its UK constituency
As AIM has become a more international 
market over the last five years, there has 
been some anxiety that its traditional 
constituency – small and medium-sized 
British companies – might be neglected, 
or that Nomads and brokers might be 
diverting their activities to larger and 
more lucrative non-British IPOs. In 2005 
and 2006, when the number of IPOs was 
exceptionally high, foreign companies 
raised a total of just over £10bn through 
IPOs, representing 68 per cent of all the 
money raised on AIM through IPOs. But 
the amounts of money raised by British 
companies also increased during those 
two years. There is no evidence that 
the increase in the number of foreign 
issuers has made it more difficult for 
British companies to access AIM. 
What is also clear, as Table 7.1 shows, 
is that the average amount of money 
raised by AIM companies has risen in 
recent years. Up to 2002 nearly 0 per 
cent of new issues were for less than 
£5m, whereas from 2004 onwards small 
issues accounted for less than five per 
cent of the new capital raised. The share 
accounted for by larger issues, which 
was around 20 per cent up to 2002, 
has risen to more than 70 per cent in 
recent years. While this may suggest that 
some small British companies are being 
squeezed out, the general view among 
brokers and investors is that companies 
should not come to AIM unless they 
are raising at least £10m, and in that 
sense recent trends cannot be regarded 
as adverse for UK-based companies 
 Money Raised (£ m) % of Total 
Year <5M 5-50m >50m Total <5M 5-50m >50m Total
1998 75.56 141.90 50.01 267 28% 5% 19% 100%
1999 112.85 165.79 55.04 4 4% 50% 16% 100%
2000 258.58 1,25.60 169.90 1,754 15% 76% 10% 100%
2001 172.12 420.95 0.00 59 29% 71% 0% 100%
2002 12.55 185.76 180.75 490 25% 8% 7% 100%
2003 82.41 79.05 6.97 1,095 8% 5% 58% 100%
2004 281.41 1,666.55 827.94 2,776 10% 60% 0% 100%
2005 50.88 2,660.57 ,449.79 6,461 5% 41% 5% 100%
2006 28.25 2,709.44 6,951.1 9,944 % 27% 70% 100%
2007 to June 87.64 879.72 2,550.49 ,518 2% 25% 7% 100%
All 1,828.25 10,535.33 14,869.02 27,233 7% 39% 55% 100%
Table 7.1 Breakdown of money raised through IPOs by size 1998-2007.
Source: London Stock Exchange
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The growth of AIM over the past 
five years has occurred during a 
period in which the City of London 
as a whole, and the London Stock 
Exchange in particular, has improved 
their competitive position in 
what has become an increasingly 
integrated world financial system. 
In 2006 London attracted 75 per 
cent of all the international IPOs 
that came to Europe – a total of 86 
flotations, 66 on AIM and 20 on 
the Main Market, raising a total of 
15bn euros. In the same year the US 
attracted only 18 international IPOs, 
raising a total of 6.2bn euros.94
This impressive performance followed 
a period in which the Exchange had 
gone through a series of upheavals 
which drastically altered its role and its 
internal organisation. These included 
‘Big Bang’ in 1986, the shift from 
floor-based to screen-based trading, 
the conversion of the Exchange from 
a mutual ownership structure to an 
investor-owned enterprise, and the 
transfer of its responsibility as listing 
authority to the Financial Services 
Authority. There were some missteps 
along the way which upset market 
participants, notably the initial reluctance 
to set up a successor to the Unlisted 
Securities Market and the attempted 
merger with the Deutsche Börse. But by 
2002 the Exchange had emerged from 
these problems and could concentrate 
on what was clearly recognised as its 
primary task: ‘to provide its members 
with a trading forum that combined 
the minimum regulation required for 
an orderly and disciplined market and 
the maximum freedom necessary for 
innovation and development’.95 With 
most of the world’s leading investment 
banks and fund managers now well 
established in London, it also had 
an opportunity to increase its share 
of international company flotations, 
and of trading in foreign securities.
The Exchange’s ability to exploit this 
opportunity has been enhanced by the 
changes that have taken place in the UK 
and US regulatory systems. As a result of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 
of 2000, the UK has a single regulator 
which is committed to transparency, 
accountability and a risk-based approach 
to regulation. Meanwhile the US capital 
markets have been in the throes of their 
post-Enron reappraisal. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 not only increased 
the costs and complexity of public 
flotations, but also served to accentuate 
the differences between London and 
New York in the philosophy of regulation. 
‘The FSA favours an environment where 
principles of regulation are published 
and there is a degree of discretion as 
to how these principles are applied… 
In the USA the regulatory philosophy is 
based around more clearly defined rules 
and is described as more prescriptive’. 
The Oxera study from which this 
assessment is taken quoted a senior US 
investment banker as saying: ‘The FSA 
listens to and understands our concern. 
In the USA regulators develop rules 
and expect you to stick to them.’96
Within this framework AIM has been 
able to establish a distinctive role in the 
a la carte menu of options which London 
offers to companies which wish to issue 
securities, to the investment banks which 
advise them, and to investors. There are 
three tiers of regulation: the top level 
which applies to listings on the London 
Stock Exchange’s Main Market and 
where the requirements are tougher than 
those laid down in the EU Prospectus 
and Transparency Directives; a middle 
tier which applies to secondary listings 
including Global Depositary Receipts, 
sold only to professional investors; and a 
lower tier of which the main constituents 
are the Professional Securities Market, 
designed for debt securities, and AIM. 
A new addition to the menu will be 
the Specialist Fund Market, which 
was described above in Section . 
What is the value of AIM to the City of 
London? It provides an exit route for 
private equity firms, especially those 
focusing on early-stage companies. It 
allows private investors to take a stake in 
small, high-growth companies, principally 
through collective vehicles or through 
portfolios put together by broking firms. 
It has contributed to the impressive 
growth of the ‘small-cap’ sector of the 
financial community – the investment 
banks, brokers and fund managers 
which specialise in smaller companies.
AIM’s success in attracting foreign 
companies has broadened the appeal 
of London as a financial centre and 
reinforced the cluster of experience, 
resources and management skills which 
underpins the dynamism of the City. The 
income which AIM generates – based 
on fees generated by IPOs and further 
equity issues, together with payments 
to lawyers, accountants and other 
advisers – is estimated to be running 
currently at about £1bn a year, of which 
around half comes from companies 
based outside the UK; thus AIM makes 
a significant contribution to the City 
of London’s ‘invisible exports’.97 
8
AIM and the city of London
94 IPO Watch Europe: Review of 2006, PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
95 Michie, The London Stock Exchange, p 616.
96 The competitive position of London as a financial centre, Oxera/Corporation of London, November 2005.
97 This figure is an estimate which draws on information contained in ‘The cost of capital: an international comparison’, a report by Oxera and the London Stock 
Exchange, June 2006 (this report estimated IPO underwriting fees AIM as .5 per cent for domestic companies and 4.9 per cent for foreign companies) , and on the 
estimates for other costs shown in the Appendix to Section 4 of this report. 
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Moreover, while the initial batch of 
foreign companies that came to AIM 
were based in developed countries, the 
AIM population now includes a range 
of companies from emerging markets, 
including Russia, India, China and Brazil. 
There are also investment entities in 
AIM which focus on countries that 
are just joining the emerging market 
category, such as Vietnam. Thus AIM 
has provided a means whereby capital 
can be channelled to these countries and 
investors can benefit from their growth. 
For a brief period after the collapse 
of the dot.com boom AIM was the 
only ‘junior’ market left standing 
in Europe, and it was well placed 
to take advantage of the demise of 
its rivals. Since then, competition 
has been getting stronger, both 
within the UK – from what used to 
be known as Ofex, and is now PLUS 
Markets Group – and in Europe, 
as leading Continental exchanges 
seek to re-establish their position at 
the small- and mid-cap end of the 
market. There is also the possibility 
of greater competition from the US, 
as the established stock exchanges 
and other market operators look 
for ways of encouraging smaller 
companies to float their shares in the 
US, rather than coming to London.
Competition in the UK
When AIM was created in 1995 a 
separate over-the-counter market, 
known as Ofex, was set up by a London 
stockbroking firm, J P Jenkins, which 
specialised in small-cap securities. 
Although there was some overlap 
between the two markets, Ofex catered 
mainly for companies that were too small 
to float on AIM, and some of them later 
graduated to AIM. In 2004, however, 
Ofex became part of PLUS Markets 
Group, which has ambitions, not just to 
act as a ‘feeder’ to AIM, but to become 
a fully fledged stock exchange in its own 
right. PLUS, which is led by a former 
head of AIM, Simon Brickles, is backed 
by several leading City firms, including 
Winterflood (part of Close Brothers) and 
KBC Peel Hunt, which act as market-
makers on PLUS, while continuing to 
play a major role on AIM. PLUS itself is 
a public company which is traded on 
AIM. In mid-2007 there were about 
200 companies quoted on the PLUS 
primary market; most of the new issues 
have been in the range of £100,000 to 
£5m; the larger flotations have attracted 
the interest of Venture Capital Trusts 
and other institutional investors. 
PLUS also provides an alternative 
trading platform for small and mid-
cap companies that are traded on the 
Main Market or on AIM. The platform 
is based on a quote-driven trading 
system, which for some market-makers 
is more profitable than the order-driven 
system, known as SETSmm, introduced 
by the London Stock Exchange in 2006 
for larger AIM shares. (The merits of 
the two systems have been the subject 
of dispute between the Exchange and 
PLUS, with the former strongly denying 
that the PLUS system offers superior 
liquidity and lower spreads.98) By mid-
2007 PLUS was trading over 1000 
shares, mostly drawn from companies 
covered by the FTSE Fledgling and 
Small Cap indices. About 50 AIM 
companies are also traded on PLUS. 
Looking further ahead, PLUS has 
aspirations to compete against the 
Exchange, not just in small capitalisation 
stocks but across the board. In pursuit 
of this objective it successfully applied 
in 2007 to become a Recognised Stock 
Exchange; this will allow it to trade a 
wider range of instruments including 
real estate investment trusts. 
In the short term it is not clear whether 
PLUS will be mainly complementary 
to AIM or a direct competitor. Some 
market participants believe that, if the 
focus of AIM were to shift towards 
larger companies, it could lose its special 
character as a market for small, growing 
companies, and that role could be taken 
over by PLUS. There is no evidence as yet 
that this is happening, but the existence 
of PLUS as a potential alternative is 
9
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not unwelcome to the investment 
banks and brokers which specialise in 
small-capitalisation stocks. They see it 
as a useful competitive spur for AIM; 
their support for PLUS could also be 
an insurance policy against possible 
changes in the character of AIM, perhaps 
arising from a change in the ownership 
of the London Stock Exchange. 
Junior stock exchanges 
outside the UK
There are several stock exchanges around 
the world which, like AIM, are geared 
primarily to the needs of small and 
medium-sized companies, although they 
vary considerably in size and importance. 
The only two that are comparable with 
AIM in the number of companies listed 
are TSX Ventures in Toronto and KOSDAQ 
in Korea, and AIM is the only one with a 
significant number of foreign companies 
(Table 9.1). AIM also has by far the highest 
market capitalisation among these 
exchanges. In December 2006 the market 
capitalisation of AIM at $177.5bn was only 
slightly lower than the market capitalisation 
of all the other eleven exchanges put 
together. Another difference is that, 
while AIM caters for a large number 
of small and medium-sized companies 
– the average market capitalisation at 
the end of 2006 was $109m – most 
of the other exchanges either have a 
smaller number of larger companies, 
like Spain and Italy, or more very small 
companies, like Toronto (Table 9.2). 
Competition in Europe
After the collapse of the high-flying 
European growth markets in 2002 and 
200, the leading Continental bourses 
re-thought their approach to ‘junior’ 
markets. First to start afresh was Paris. 
In May 2005, the Paris bourse, through 
the Euronext grouping of which it was 
a part (and which later merged with the 
New York Stock Exchange), launched 
Alternext, aimed not at high technology 
in particular but at small- and mid-cap 
companies in general. According to 
Martine Charbonnier, executive director 
at Euronext, the aim was for Alternext 
to become ‘the eurozone benchmark for 
the mid-cap segment’.99 By June 2007, 
Country Exchange
December 2006 Average (2002 to 2006)
Market 
Cap. ($ m)
Average 
Market 
Cap. ($ m)
Market 
Cap. ($ m)
Average 
Market 
Cap. ($ m
London AIM 177,464 109 76,984 70
Germany Entry Standard - - - -
Euronext Alternext 4,51 60 2,749 56
Spain Nuevo Mercado 11,176 1,016 1,88 1,068
Italy Mercato Expandi 1,621 524 7,990 499
Ireland Irish Enterprise ,250 141 1,424 129
OMX Investor & NM List 1,00 0 1,075 26
Toronto TSX Ventures 47,161 21 24,128 11
Hong Kong Growth Enterprise 11,429 58 8,868 46
Korea KOSDAQ 77,56 81 5,589 9
Singapore SESDAQ 6,415 8 ,678 24
Tokyo Mothers 2,54 174 28,92 247
Total  386,183 69 204,760 41 
Table 9.1: Number of companies on ‘junior’ exchanges as of December 2006 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges
Country Exchange  Domestic  Foreign  Total
London AIM 1,28 06 1,634 
Germany Entry Standard 70 6 76
Euronext Alternext 7 2 75
Spain Nuevo Mercado 10 1 11
Italy Mercato Expandi 26 0 26
Ireland Irish Enterprise 19 4 23
OMX Investor & NM List 4 0 34
Toronto TSX Ventures 2,244 0 2,244
Hong Kong Growth Enterprise 198 0 198
Korea KOSDAQ 962 0 962
Singapore SESDAQ 129 40 169
Tokyo Mothers 185 2 187
Table 9.2: Market capitalisation of ‘junior’ exchanges 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges
99 Euronext press release 11 May 2007.
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after two years of operation, Alternext 
had attracted 100 companies, with a 
total market capitalisation of over five 
billion euros. The sector composition 
of these companies was broadly 
based, with the technology element 
amounting to 16 per cent of the total.
All but four of the companies quoted 
on Alternext in mid-2007 came from 
the six Euronext countries, but Mrs 
Charbonnier made clear her intention to 
compete against AIM for non-European 
companies, with Eastern Europe, Russia 
and China being particular targets.100 The 
admission rules are similar to those of 
AIM in that the new entrant has to have 
a sponsor, comparable to the Nominated 
Adviser, but more restrictive in two 
respects; companies floating on Alternext 
must have an operating history of at least 
two years, and the free float of shares for 
a public offering must amount to at least 
2.5m euros. Like AIM, Alternext is not 
subject to the EU Prospectus Directive, 
and is regulated by Euronext itself. 
The Deutsche Börse also re-entered 
the fray in 2005, introducing a new 
market segment called Entry Standard 
 
for small and mid-cap companies. 
The rules were more in line with AIM 
than with Alternext, in that there 
was no minimum operating record 
required and no minimum free float of 
the shares. By July 2007 the number 
of companies admitted to the Entry 
Standard segment had reached 100. 
In the short term Alternext and Entry 
Standard, like AIM in its early days, 
are likely to get most of their business 
from small, domestically-orientated 
companies whose shares will be of 
interest to local investors. They do 
not have the advantage which has 
been helpful to AIM, especially at the 
start – a tax regime which encourages 
private investors to acquire shares in 
small, growing companies. The UK 
also has a more highly developed 
‘equity culture’ than either France or 
Germany, and a stronger tier of banks, 
brokers and institutional investors that 
specialise in smaller companies. 
In the longer term the combined strength 
of the New York Stock Exchange and 
the exchanges grouped in Euronext 
could represent a credible challenge, 
not just to AIM, but to the London 
Stock Exchange as a whole. Some of 
the recent IPOs on Euronext have been 
relatively small – a Dutch biotechnology 
company, for example, raised 50m 
Euros in June 2007, joining seven other 
biotechnology firms listed on Euronext 
– and this market may be attractive to 
some British companies that wish to raise 
their profile on the Continent. Sinclair 
Pharma, which moved from AIM to the 
Main Market in 2007, also arranged 
a secondary listing on Euronext. 
Although AIM is currently in a strong 
position, it will not have the field to itself.
Competition from the US
The rise of AIM, and its success in 
attracting flotations from the US, 
has aroused some concern in the US. 
Although one reaction has been to 
cast doubt on the quality of the AIM 
market, there has also been increasing 
discussion about the apparent inability 
of US public markets to serve the needs 
of smaller companies. The Schumer-
Bloomberg report, published in 2007, 
noted that since 2001 870 companies 
had been admitted to AIM, compared 
with 526 on NASDAQ, and the trend 
appeared to be accelerating. The report 
pointed out that less than half the AIM 
companies would meet the initial market 
capitalisation requirements on NASDAQ, 
and the authors did not recommend that 
US exchanges should relax their listing 
rules to attract small issues. Nevertheless, 
they warned that the dearth of small 
company listings in the US posed ‘a risk 
that the next Microsoft or eBay could 
be listed abroad during its infancy, 
with the United States thus forgoing 
the associated future benefits’.101
There are some facilities in the US which 
enable small companies to access outside 
investors. They include the NASDAQ 
Small Cap market; the Bulletin Board, 
an electronic quotation system that 
displays prices and volume information 
for over-the-counter securities not traded 
on a national exchange; and the Pink 
Sheets, through which brokers trading 
in OTC shares publish bid and ask prices. 
In 2006 the owners of the Pink Sheets 
launched a new ‘premier tier’ market, 
called OTCQX, aimed at filling the gap 
between the regulated exchanges and 
the over-the-counter market; the rules 
were based partly on those of AIM, 
including the use of ‘designated advisers 
Industrials 26.0%
Technology 15.7%
Consumer services 1.7%
Health care 12.0%
Consumer goods 11.8%
Utilities 8.9%
Financials 7.0% Oil and gas 2.4%
Basic materials 1.2% 
Telecoms 1.2%
Table 9.3 Sectoral breakdown of Alternext 
companies in March 2007 (by market cap)
Source: Euronext press release 11 May 2007
100 Financial Times 8 March 2007.
101 Charles E Schumer and Michael R Bloomberg, Sustaining New York’s and the US’s global financial services leadership, New York January 2002.
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for disclosure’. Another proposal has 
been put forward by the American Stock 
Exchange, for a second-tier listing venue 
called the American Trading Platform 
for micro-cap companies.102 But none 
of these proposals have the attraction 
– which AIM offers – of allowing small 
companies to start small and then grow 
to a substantial size without having to 
move to another market. As one recent 
recruit to AIM put it, ‘you get the stigma 
of being looked at as a second-class 
company yet you must still bear the huge 
cost in terms of legal and accounting fees 
to ensure Sarbanes-Oxley compliance’. 
Most of the attention of the financial 
services community in the US is focused 
on securing some relaxation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley rules as they affect all 
quoted companies, not small companies 
in particular. Such a relaxation, if it 
occurred, might have the effect of 
increasing the attractiveness of a 
US listing for those non-American 
companies which wish to tap into the 
US capital markets and to increase their 
visibility in the US. But it would not 
necessarily affect small-capitalisation 
companies. There is any case a view in 
the US that companies should not go 
public too early and that the US system 
benefits from the exclusion from the 
main exchanges of untried companies 
of the sort that come to AIM. 
AIM and NASDAQ in their present 
form are not direct competitors. As the 
Schumer-Bloomberg report pointed out, 
to a large extent the two exchanges 
operate at different places along the 
IPO spectrum. The companies that 
come to NASDAQ are generally larger 
and better established than those that 
come to AIM. In any case, as a senior 
 
US Treasury official recently noted, the 
vitality of a country’s capital markets 
cannot be measured simply by the 
number of IPOs.10 The US is still far 
ahead of other countries in its ability 
to fund growing companies before 
flotation. Moreover, for European high-
technology companies for which the US 
is the most important market for their 
products, a listing on a US exchange 
has obvious attractions. To the extent 
that such listings have become more 
expensive and difficult, such firms may be 
more inclined to look for a trade buyer 
in the US instead of a public quotation. 
102 Letter to the Financial Times from Neal Wolkoff, chairman of the American Stock Exchange, 16 March 2007.
10 Speech by Robert K Steel, Under-Secretary for domestic finance, May 17, 2007. He said: ‘IPOs have become an often-referenced benchmark of capital markets 
competitiveness, but focusing solely on that measurement is too simple and not forward-looking enough’. 
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At the time this report was written 
(September 2007), the London Stock 
Exchange was in the process of 
extending its European reach through 
the acquisition of Borsa Italiana. At the 
same time NASDAQ, having failed in its 
earlier bid to take over the Exchange, 
was pursuing its bid to merge with 
the Nordic exchange, OMX. Further 
mergers or alliances among the 
world’s leading stock exchanges seem 
likely, and these moves could have a 
direct or indirect impact on AIM. As 
things now stand, however, AIM is a 
valuable asset within the London Stock 
Exchange, and the Exchange authorities 
have to consider how best that asset 
can be preserved and enhanced. 
The two central issues are, first, what sort 
of market AIM wants to be, and, second, 
what further change, if any, should be 
made in its regulatory arrangements. 
On the first, the core mission of AIM is 
likely to remain what it has been from 
the start, to provide a market for small 
and medium-sized companies which are 
ambitious to grow and need capital for 
expansion. How ‘small’ should be defined 
in this context is a matter for debate, but 
companies coming to AIM need to be big 
enough to be of interest to institutional 
and private investors, to be able to 
handle the costs and responsibilities 
that go with being a public company, 
and to meet the standards of suitability 
that are implicit – if not precisely spelt 
out – in the rules for Nomads. Some 
market participants believe that there 
are too many ‘microcap’ companies 
on AIM which should probably not be 
on a public market. While there is no 
easy way of winnowing out unsuitable 
companies that are already there, 
fewer such companies are likely to be 
admitted in future; there are already 
indications, partly as a consequence 
of the new Nomad rules, that Nomads 
and brokers are discouraging very small 
companies from coming to AIM.
Against that, the Exchange has to be 
careful to ensure that the pendulum 
does not swing too far in the opposite 
direction and that AIM does not become 
dominated by larger companies – say, 
with capitalisations ranging from £100m 
to £500m. Some of the companies in 
that size range are potential candidates 
for the Main Market, and, while they 
may have good reasons for wanting 
to stay on AIM, they may be quite 
similar to their Main Market peers 
in terms of management, corporate 
governance and ownership structure. 
If AIM was to become too skewed in 
the direction of bigger companies, 
the distinction between it and the 
Main Market could become blurred, 
as happened with the Unlisted 
Securities Market in the early 1990s. 
On internationalisation, a challenge for 
AIM is how to strengthen its position 
in Continental Europe in the face of 
competition from NYSE Euronext and 
perhaps from the Deutsche Börse. The 
merger with Borsa Italiana will give the 
London Stock Exchange a direct stake 
in the eurozone and an opportunity to 
tap into the Italian business community, 
which has an ample supply of small and 
medium-sized companies potentially 
suitable for an AIM-type market. 
Could AIM become too big? While the 
current number of AIM companies – just 
under 1,700 – is well below the ,200 
companies listed on NASDAQ, there are 
obvious dangers that, as the size of the 
market grows, the smaller companies 
may receive little attention from analysts 
and have little visibility among investors. 
Investors are interested in quality, not 
quantity. While the market is to a large 
extent self-correcting – hence the 
fall in IPOs in 2007 after a very large 
number of new entrants in 2005 and 
2006 – the role of Nomads is crucial. 
As discussed in Section  of this report, 
Nomads are the lynch pin of the AIM 
regulatory system. There is a heavy 
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responsibility on them for assessing the 
suitability of AIM companies, and they 
take on a considerable reputational 
risk. The 80-odd Nomads currently 
approved by the Exchange vary in size 
from ‘bulge bracket’ investment banks 
like Merrill Lynch and big accounting 
firms like KPMG to financial boutiques 
which focus on the smaller AIM 
companies. If the companies they act 
perform poorly or fail, should that be 
regarded as a failure of the regulatory 
system, prompting further changes in 
the AIM rules, or can the market be 
relied upon to sort things out? Nomads 
and brokers who bring weak companies 
to AIM, or whose due diligence 
turns out to have been deficient, will 
be shunned by investors on future 
occasions – this is the market at work. 
How far should these market pressures 
be reinforced by specific rules? New rules 
have been introduced in response to 
particular events or market developments 
– for example, the 2005 rules on cash 
shells, and the 2006 guidelines on 
mining, oil and gas companies, which 
required improvements in the quality 
of the ‘competent person’s report’ 
on reserves and resources. There is 
always the risk that any new rules will 
be taken by outsiders as a sign that 
the system as a whole is flawed, and 
this was why a few market participants 
were not enthusiastic about the new 
Nomad rules that were introduced in 
February 2007. In general, however, 
the reaction to the new rules was 
positive, on the grounds that, with the 
increase in the size and complexity of 
the market, there was a need to clarify 
and formalise what was expected of 
the Nomads. There are indications 
that, following the publication of the 
rules, some Nomads are withdrawing 
from the role, or cutting back on the 
number of companies they act for. 
AIM is an exchange-regulated market, 
and the London Stock Exchange 
has so far been able to maintain an 
appropriate balance between top-
down supervision and allowing market 
forces to work. The evolution of AIM 
has been a market-driven process, and 
the market will continue to develop in 
response to the changing demands of 
issuers and investors. The regulatory 
arrangements will also need to evolve, 
as has happened over the last three 
years, but this is likely to take the form 
of incremental adaptation, rather than 
radical reform of a distinctive system 
which has proved to be effective, and 
which has contributed to a notable 
success for the City of London 
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